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PREFACE 
The creation of India and Pakistan as independent states 63 years back 
raised the issues rooted in colonial legacy as well as historical acrimony. The 
region is often recognized as a high risk conflict zone because of history of 
tense relations. Both, India and Pakistan are the most difficult and most 
important neighbours for each other. Their drift towards war begins when they 
cease to talk. Their relationship is a mixture of national prejudice, injured ego 
and plain rivalry. This was rooted in the history of partition, in which major 
roles were played by the imperialist policy of divide and rule. There is perhaps 
no other bilateral relationship which has attracted such intense global scrutiny 
for over six decades as the India-Pakistan relationship. The long-disputed 
Kashmir issue continues to be both a cause and consequence of India and 
Pakistan hostility. The Indo-Pakistan relations over the years had marked by so 
many ups and downs. 
The cavernous seated antagonism between India and Pakistan on several 
times resulted in the form of conflicts- 1947-48, 1965, and 1971. When 
fighting erupted again in 1999, the stakes were more menace than ever, since 
both countries had tested nuclear weapons the year before. The nuclear tests of 
India-Pakistan in May 1998 set the stage for an invigorated nuclear debate in 
the region. Tension mounted over the question of when and how India-Pakistan 
might escalate the minor-war, which put the world on vigilant since both had 
tested nuclear devices in May 1998 and subsequently declared themselves to be 
nuclear weapon states. This open nuclearisation of South Asia sharpened the 
wedge in the relations between India and Pakistan. This crucial juncture is the 
principal background of this study. Although the fundamental problems of both 
countries have domestic roots, the projection of the super powers into South 
Asia severally complicated these problems by exacerbating tensions between 
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India and Pakistan. A more recent concern has been the growth and expansion 
of terrorist and extremist groups, and tendencies, in the region which pose a 
threat not only to India-Pakistan, but also to the whole world. The key to a 
stable Asia lies in how India and Pakistan, with the baggage of a bitter history 
and an arsenal of nuclear weapons, learn to live together, peacefully, as 
neighbours. 
In the rapidly changing international situation, both India and Pakistan 
are struggling for national survival and well-being mdividually and with other 
countries. It is but natural and normal that the two "distend" neighbours join 
together for development and welfare objectives. However mutual distrust and 
suspicion continue to persist. Whenever bilateral cooperation gained 
momentum it was soon enveloped by thick clouds of mistrust. This atmosphere 
cannot be removed until the two countries arrive at a basic understanding on 
their political and strategic objectives and regain reciprocal confidence. 
This dissertation entitled "India-Pakistan Relations Since 1998" aims at 
an analysis of outstanding historical problems and events especially since 1998 
between India and Pakistan with a view to comprehending the conditions of 
durable peace and normal cooperation in the subcontinent. This work also 
attempts to examine the factors which were responsible for changing the 
relationship between India and Pakistan and efforts to find out the novel 
pathways for future cordial relations. 
The whole study is divided into five chapters and conclusion. Each 
chapter deals with specific period covering significant events and 
developments between India and Pakistan. Finally, the main findings and some 
suggestions for better Indo-Pak relations have been summed up in the 
concluding chapter. 
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The first chapter begins with the historical background and events 
surrounding partition of British India into India and Pakistan. This chapter also 
ownminot tho gtntiii of lndift>PiiHUtAn rlv»lryi ortgln ef Kftihmtr diijjvti Knrt 
re-analyzing the Nehru-Liaquat Pact and Indus Water Treaty through a new 
perspective. 
Second chapter deeds with India>Pakistan w9rs-l9<5S, 1971, Bnngladosh 
creation and subsequently ends of war and peace agreements-Tashkent Pact 
1966 and Shimla Agreement 1972. This chapter further points out the Cold 
War rivalry between the two superpowers and its hnpacts on South Asian 
countries. 
Third chapter endeavouri to preient Rn overview of Indin-PRltUtftn 
relations in the context of nuclear proliferation. It tries to narrate the nuclear 
programme of both coimtries and nuclear tests of Pokhran I, Pokhran II and its 
reaction from abroad. Besides this, it also describes post Pokhran relations 
between India and Pakistan, the Nuclear Doctrine of both countries and safety 
and security issues. Lastly, this chapter proposes some significant nuclear 
CBMs to mitigate the nuclear menace. 
Fourth chapter attempts to evaluate the India-Pakistan relations since 
the Lahore declaration of 1999. It vividly discusses the major events, setbacks 
and developments between the two countries since 1998. This chapter mainly 
contains confidence building measures, Track Two Diplomacy, Bus 
Diplomacy, Lahore declaration, Kargil crisis, Military coup, Agra Summit, 
Post September (9/11) Indo-Pak Relations, India Parliament attack and further 
standoff, Srinagar Peace initiative, Eid Ceasefire and political, economic and 
strategic peace relation between India and Pakistan since 2001. 
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Fifth chapter tries to explore the aignificnnce of peoge proeeRi between 
India and Pakistan, The important of Composite Dialogvie is the crux theme of 
this chapter. Because the composite dialogue Is the part of the ongoing India-
Pakistan peace process which contains eight core subjects namely Peace and 
Security ineluding CBMi, Jammu and Kodhmir, Siftohen, Wullnr BRrmge 
Project, Sir Creek, Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, Economic and Commercial 
cooperation and promotion of friendly Exchanges in various fields. Finally, this 
chapter also examines the Mumbai terrorist attack (26/11) and Post-Mumbai 
aevolopmenti between India and PQktstnn. 
The method of study has been historical, descriptive and analytical. 
Efforts have been made to collect all the relevant data and interpret it both in 
historical perspective and from the point of current relevance. Most of the 
research materials have been gathered from different Libraries in India. 
Libraries are an important sources of knowledge, much source material is lying 
deep buried uninvestigated in the Libraries and if properly scrutinized many 
problems and their solutions would to light. 
The bases of the present study have been various documents, official or 
otherwise, Authoritative texts on the subjects, Journals, Articles, Newspaper 
reports and Comments, Congressional Records and Parliamentary Debates, 
various other papers published by the government of India and other Foreign 
countries. 
This study pays special attention to significant peace process initiatives 
between India and Pakistan. The present work undertakes to analyse a 
comprehensive understanding of India-Pakistan Relations, challenges and 
opportunities. 
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CHAPTER 1 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Introduction 
International relation in the new era is gravitating towards a more 
complex world order where the forces of conflict and cooperation are 
simultaneously at work. On the one hand, there is consensus for peace and 
development, and on the other, strife and conflict are disturbing the 
international balance. This global reality is also impinging upon the South 
Asian scene. South Asia is a huge landmass home to about one quarter of the 
world's population. The region is economically underdeveloped, caught in a 
dept-trap and dependent on large scale foreign aid and it is amongst the 
poorest, most illiterate part of the world. It generally consists of seven states, 
marked by an asymmetry of power structure; different kind of governance. 
Political behavior and interstate conflict.' India and Pakistan are the major 
actors of the South Asian arena. This region is today one of the world's greatest 
laboratories of political, economic and social change. It embodies all the hopes 
and aspirations and most of the problems of human kind. The home of ancient 
civilizations and new nations. South Asia throughout the centuries has had a 
remarkable degree of geographic, ethnic, linguistic, religious, social and 
cultural unity. Its people have a shared common historical experience, but it has 
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never been united politically or socially. 
India and Pakistan are not spared from the process of conflict and 
cooperation. India-Pakistan rivahy and their improved relations with peace 
process require much prominence in international relations literature. India-
Pakistan relations are grounded in the historical, geographic, demographic and 
economic links between the Republic of India and the Islamic RepubUc of 
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Pakistan, two of the largest countries in the subcontinent. The two countries 
share much of their common histories, culture, languages, religion, and other 
heritage; yet the diplomatic relations between the two are defined by numerous 
military conflicts, suspicion, mistrust, and territorial disputes.'' Generally, there 
are few broad dimensions of India-Pakistan tensions, two nations theory 
leading to mutual mistrust and disharmony, rival allegiance with US and 
USSR, nuclear proliferation, Kashmir and lately Terrorism. The scenario of 
two neighbour's friendship got importance since the end of the cold war with 
nuclear acquisition and other major issues between two states. In the post 9/11 
period witnessed a tremendous change in the global political sphere, this 
complex events similarly affected in the South Asian arena as well. The 
American hegemony and western world order have been the challenges to the 
oriental world. Despite a number of peace confidence and security building 
measures had been signed between India and Pakistan over the past years, the 
deep mistrust, antagonism, fear, allegation, pressure etc continued as a common 
feature between these two countries. As far as the region in the context of Indo-
Pak relation is concerned, requires novel initiatives to promote peace, 
development and security. Only large-scale people- to-people contacts can 
wipe out the trust deficit. Exchanges in the fields of education, sports, culture, 
science and technology need to be greatly enhanced.''Peace process efforts are 
the only way to forward. 
Genesis of India-Pakistan Rivalry 
India and Pakistan together account for one fifth of the world's 
population. Their size and influence have made the continued conflict between 
them a long-standing cause of global concern. Their adversarial relationship 
has been marked by three major wars, rival allegiances with other world 
powers (including China, the former Soviet Union, and US), many military 
skirmishes and violent incidents, and a nuclear arms buildup. Both nations 
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trade accusations of meddling in each other internal affairs and of fomenting 
violence and civil unrest.^  
The domination of British-Raj over the Indian subcontinent lasted for 
almost two centuries. 95% of the people living in the region practiced either 
Hinduism or Islam. The British were in India as the colonial rulers and had no 
intention or interest in the integration of the Hindu and Muslim communities. 
One of the many political steps taken by the British which could be considered 
as a step for 'divide' and 'rule' was the partition of Bengal in 1905, which was 
the basic seed of communalism in Indian subcontinent. In 1947 Great Britain, 
weakened by World War II and faced with growing Indian political resistance 
to British rule, granted independence to its imperial possessions. But 
independence resulted in the birth of not one sovereign nation, but two. 
Partition of India in 1947 was the result of the development of the last one 
hundred years of the complex Indian history. The partition of India created two 
countries, India and Pakistan. 
The decision to divide India was made in part because of the insistence 
of some leaders within India's movement for self -rule. They became 
convinced that Muslim could not thrive in a nation in which they would be a 
minority dominated by Hindus. The "two-nation" theory, espoused by 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah and other leaders, held that Hindus, who constimted the 
majotity only in British India's northeast and northwest comers, should not be 
forced to live together in one nation, but should each be granted their own 
country. In order to press for their demands with the colonial rulers, they 
formed the Muslim League Party in December 1906. Their claim for separate 
electorates was accepted by the British in the Government of India Act of 1909, 
which offered limited political rights to the Indian subjects. The British rulers 
were sympathetic to separate constituencies for Muslims which they hoped 
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would weaken the incipient nationalist movement, spearheaded by the 
Congress Party.* It was realized that two countries and two communities were 
not ready to share same heritage. 
The "two-nation" theory advocated by the Muslim League (ML)led by 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah was strongly criticized by the Indian National Congress 
(INC), India's pre-eminent independence organization (it later became the 
Congress Party). Its leadership dominated Hindus, argued that religion by itself 
could not constitute the basis for creating either an Islamic Pakistan or a Hindu 
India. Critics of "two-nation" theory also noted that Hindus and Muslims had 
lived side by side throughout the region for centuries before British rule and 
could not be readily separated. Indian National Congress leaders, including 
Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, envisioned a imited India under a 
secular state that would enable people of differing religious, languages, and 
ethnic groups to co-exist. But, May 1944 Gandhi-Jinnah talks and the June 
1945 Shimla Conference of top Congress and Muslim League leaders failed to 
break the deadlock between them.' 
However, Britain, after negotiating with Indian National Congress and 
the Muslim League, eventually agreed to divide India. The Parliament passed 
the Indian Independence Act of 1947, calling for division of British-India into 
the independent states- India and Pakistan. The parties agreed to establish 
borders making the North-East and North-West comers of India into a single 
country with two territories- East Pakistan and West Pakistan- located one 
thousand miles apart. The process of division itself, called "partition", and was 
an extra ordinary disruptive and destructive event. Millions of people found 
themselves on the "wrong" side of hostility drawn borders between India and 
Pakistan. Ten million people moved from one new nation to another. Millions 
of Muslims and Hindus were killed in communal riots following the partition, 
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millions of Muslims living in India and Hindus and Sikhs living in Pakistan 
emigrated in one of the most colossal transfers of population in the modem era. 
Both countries accused each other of not providing adequate security to the 
minorities emigrating through their territory.^  Minorities were attacked on both 
sides of the newly drawn international border, and ethnic cleaning was 
commonplace. Memories of these events remain vivid from generation to 
generation, especially among the deeply affected populations of parts of 
northern India and the major cities of what was then the west wing of Pakistan 
and is now the state of Pakistan.^ This served to increase tension between the 
newly-born coimtries. 
Most of the conflict and dispute between India and Pakistan originated 
during the process of dividing the subcontinent. Bitter controversies erupted 
between the two countries after independence about the division of assets, 
demarcation of boundaries, equitable sharing of water resources, and control 
over Kashmir. One of the problems regarding the assets was the division of the 
cash balances, in which the Pakistani side believed their due share had not been 
given to them. Pakistan alleged that this was done with the sinister intention of 
financially crippling the new state. Ultimately, Mahatma Gandhi had to 
intervene and he went on a fast demanding that India give Pakistan its due 
share. Pakistan protested on the question of the division of military equipment, 
most of which was laying in India, and most of the ordinance factories were 
located in the Indian Territory. Pakistan was to get one third of all the military 
equipment as its share. These controversies were reflexive of the bitterness that 
had been granted by the atmosphere at the time of independence. The problem 
of the properties left behind by the Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan and those that 
were left by Muslims in India was a sore point in both the countries. There 
were two other major issues, i.e., the distribution of water between two 
countries and the partition was the question of the five hundred odd princely 
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states. '°The new borders cut across major rivers and irrigation system on 
which both depended on water. 
According to the British plan for the partition of India, all the princely 
states were allowed to decide which of the two countries to join. With the 
exception of a few, most of the Hindu-majority princely-states acceded to the 
Union of India while most of the Muslim-majority princely states joined 
Pakistan. Three princely states decided to stay independent from both India and 
Pakistan; Janmiu and Kashmir in the north, Hyderabad in the south, and 
Junagadh in the west. While the rulers of the latter two were Muslim, the 
majority of their population was Hindu and their accession to India occurred 
through internal revolt or Indian police actions." However, the decisions of 
remaining princely-states would shape the Indo-Pak relationship for years to 
come. The new government's agendas were over loaded. Every issue was to be 
handled with extreme urgency. The tasks of both countries were larger 
especially in the areas of political stability, economic self reliance, social 
development, formation of foreign policies and in general-the whole nation 
building. 
The partition did not emerge as a solution for the problems of the sub-
continent; on the contrary, it became a source for endless new problems. The 
most prominent being the dispute over Kashmir. The original conflict about 
Kashmir was never inevitable. It became an acute problem soon after the 
independence of India and Pakistan because, many partition problems remained 
unsolved.'^  
Kashmir Dispute 
India and Pakistan were partitioned out of the remains of the British 
Indian Empire on the basis of two rival ideological principles: India as a 
secular homeland for the Hindu majority and other religious minorities and 
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Pakistan as a homeland for the subcontinent's Muslims. Since partition New 
Delhi has considered the successful incorporation of Kashmir, India's only 
Muslim majority province, critical to affirming the success of its secular 
experience likewise in the absence of Kashmir's incorporation, Islamabad 
regards Pakistan as incomplete.'^ The dispute over Kashmir is the most central 
and intractable of the problems that have bedeviled India-Pakistan relations 
since the two countries won independence in 1947. For Indians and Pakistanis, 
Kashmir symbolizes the clash between their rival concepts of national identity. 
Pakistanis perceive Kashmir as the one Muslim-majority area of Britain's 
Indian empire that did not become part of Pakistan, conceived by its founders 
as the homeland for Muslims of the subcontinent. Its possession by India 
makes Kashmir "the unfinished business of partition". For Indians, Kashmir's 
Muslim majority makes it a symbol of the country's secular identity. This 
sentiment has grown stronger with time despite the evident unhappiness of 
most Kashmiri Muslims with their tie to India.''* 
Kashmir was Muslim-majority princely state, ruled by a Hindu, Raja 
Hari Sigh. The Maharaja of Kashmir was equally hesitant to join either India-
he felt his mostly Muslim subjects would not like joining a Hindu-majority 
nation-or Pakistan-which as a Hindu he was personally averse to. Hari Singh 
signed a Standstill Agreement (preserving status quo) with Pakistan, but did not 
make his decision by August 15, 1947.'^ 
Backed by Pakistani paramihtary forces, Pashtun tribal warlords invaded 
Kashmir in September 1947. Troubled by the deteriorating law and order 
simation in Kashmir, the Maharaja Hari Singh asked for India's help. Lord 
Mountbatten told Nehru that unless the Mahraja of Kashmir agree the 
instrument of accession, the Government of India had no authority to send 
troops which would construe as invasion of a foreign territory.'^ However, the 
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Indian Government began negotiations with the King for persuading him to 
accede to the Indian Union. The Kashmir ruler had then hesitated to agree the 
instrument of accession to India. But when the hordes of militants from 
Pakistan invaded Kashmir, he signed it on October 27; 1947.''Pakistan's 
decision to send in its troops escalated the conflict to a short war between the 
two states, which lasted until the end of 1948. 
A ceasefire agreement was reached between the two states under the 
auspices of the United Nations (UN), which came into effect on January 1, 
1949. A ceasefire line was established dividing Kashmir, with nearly two thirds 
of the state under Indian control and the rest under Pakistan, which the latter 
called "Azad" or "Free" Kashmir. The ceasefire line was monitored by a UN 
observer mission until 1972, when it was renamed Line of Control (LoC), and 
has been actively manned by the regular forces of the two countries, with 
sporadic shelling, occasional skirmishes, and limited incursions. Three major 
wars (1947-48, 1965, and 1971) and a minor war, Kargil (1999), have been 
fought over control of the territory, but neither coimtry has succeeded in 
changing the line to its advantage.'^  
On Kashmir question, India and Pakistan positions are poles apart. As 
far as India is concerned, the Maharaja's accession to India was final and legal, 
and the UN resolution calling for plebiscite in Kashmir could not be fulfilled 
because Pakistani forces were present in the state-and in any case, a plebiscite 
is made irrelevant by successive Indian elections there. According to Pakistan, 
the accession took place under pressure and violates international law, and 
India is afraid to live up to its promise of a plebiscite; fiirthennore, it points to 
human rights violations by Indian forces in Kashmir, to which India replies that 
such violations are caused by the presence of all illegal and now terrorist 
separatist movement funded and supported from Pakistan." The failure on the 
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part of both India and Pakistan to come to a bilateral negotiated settlement over 
Kashmir has opened the issue for interference of outside powers and states in 
the subcontinent. 
India-Pakistan rivalry has attracted significant international attention 
over the last 60 years. Various Third-Party mediation attempts have sometimes 
produced short-term successes in the form of ceasefires, but as yet have not 
produced a negotiated agreement to end hostilities, much less a successfiil 
implementation of such an agreement. The UN has been involved in diplomatic 
efforts since the beginning of the rivalry. The UN established a five-member 
United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan (UNCIP) in 1948, and a 
shortly thereafter deployed a peace observer force United Nations Military 
Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), which technically is still 
in existence today, although largely ineffective. Many efforts were predicated 
on holding a plebiscite in Kashmir to resolve the conflict, but this has never 
occurred. The UN has appointed a number of special representatives or 
mediators over the years. Similarly, the UN Security Coimcil (UNSC) (and 
periodically the UNGA and EU) has passed resolutions calling for ceasefires 
and negotiations between India and Pakistan. At best, all these efforts have 
produced some short-term abatement in the conflict, but no long-term impact 
on the rivaby. The failure of International Organisation is largely because such 
entities cannot impose solutions on disputants, but depend in large part on the 
cooperation of the conflicting parties. Divisions within the membership of 
those organizations have also limited the scope of initiatives to those in which 
there is consensus; this has largely been confined to limiting conflict escalation 
and not to the configuration of any political settlement.^ ^ 
India-Pakistan relations were disputed not only by their bilateral issues 
but the external powers in one or the other way had affected their relations. The 
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arms aid to Pakistan from U.S. and Pakistan's joining the CENTO and SEATO 
that had provided a sense of secvirity to Pakistan, compelled India to come in 
closeness of USSR for maintaining balance of power in the region. In general, 
Pakistan's purpose in joining the alliances was not contain Communism but to 
strengthen its defence and bargaining position vis-a-vis India, its arch 
adversary. '^ 
Nehru-Liaquat Pact 1950 
The Nehru-Liaquat Pact was signed by Indian PHme Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru and Pakistan's Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in New Delhi on April 
8, 1950. At the time of independence, many communal riots broke out in 
different areas of Pakistan and India. These riots had a great impact on the 
status of minorities in the two nations. The en-masse migration from both the 
countries to each other in 1947 resulted in an ascending curve of cormnunaUsm 
which worsened the already charged atmosphere ''^. Due to brutal killings by 
the majority community, a huge number of Muslims migrated from India, and 
Hindus and Sikhs from Pakistan. This problem escalated during the late 1940s 
and early '1950s. It seemed as if India and Pakistan were about to fight their 
second war in the first three years of their independence. At this critical 
juncture in the history of South Asia, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat 
Ali Khan, issued a statement emphasizing the need to reach a solution to the 
problem. He also proposed a meeting with his Indian counterpart to determine 
how to put an end to the communal riots and the fear of war. 
The two Prime Ministers met in Delhi on April 2, 1950, and discussed 
the matter in detail. The meeting lasted in six days, and on April 8 the two 
leaders signed an agreement. This pact provided a "bill of right" for the 
minorities of India and Pakistan. Its aim was to address three issues: 
• To alleviate the fears of the religious minorities on both sides. 
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• To elevate communal peace. 
• To create an atmosphere in which the two countries could resolve their 
other differences. 
According to the agreement, the governments of India and Pakistan 
solemnly agreed that each shall ensure, to the minorities throughout its 
territories, complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion, and a full 
sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honor. It also 
guaranteed fundamental human rights of the minorities, such as freedom of 
movement, speech, occupation and worship. The pact also provided for the 
minorities to participate in the public life of their country, to hold political or 
other offices and to serve in their country's civil and armed forces. 
Indus Water Treaty 1960 
The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-sharing treaty between the Republic 
of India and Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The treaty was signed on September 
19, 1960 by the then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and the then 
President of Pakistan Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan. The World Bank 
(WB) (then the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) 
(IBRD) is a signatory as a third party. The Indus System of rivers comprises 
three Western Rivers the Indus, the Jhelum and Chenab and three Eastern 
Rivers- the Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi; and with minor exceptions, the treaty 
gives India exclusive use of all of the waters of the Eastern Rivers and their 
tributaries before the point where the rivers enter Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan 
has exclusive use of the western rivers. Pakistan also received one-time 
financial compensation for the loss of water from the Eastern Rivers. The 
countries agreed to exchange data and co-operate in matters related to the 
treaty. For this purpose, treaty creates the Permanent Indus Commission, with a 
commissioner appointed by each country. 
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Mr. Eugene Blake, President of the World Bank, agreed to mediate 
between India and Pakistan on the sharing of waters in 1951. An agreement on 
sharing of canal waters was eventually concluded on September 19, 1960. It 
was provided in the agreement that after an interim period of ten years, which 
could be extended for another three years on the request of Pakistan, the waters 
of all the three eastern rivers would be used by India and of western rivers by 
Pakistan. 
However, the treaty recognizes the need for fixing the delimitation in a 
spirit of goodwill and friendship, and defines the rights and obligations of the 
Government of India and Government of Pakistan concerning the use of water 
of the Indus river system. The treaty set up a permanent Indus Conunission 
composed of two persons, one appointed by each Government. The 
commission will have general responsibility for implementing the provisions 
and will seek to reconcile any points of disagreement that may rise.^ I^n the 
treaty both the Governments recognized their common interest in the optimum 
development of the rivers and declare their intention to cooperate by mutual 
agreement to the fullest possible extent. In the history of Indo-Pak relations the 
Indus-Water dispute is the only dispute where both the Governments have 
shown a positive spirit of cooperation. If in fiiture, they follow the same spirit 
of cooperation and understanding, definitely they could settle all their 
outstanding disputes. 
This agreement was implemented with effect from January 12, 1961. 
The dispute regarding sharing of river/canal water was amicably settled. Nehru 
described it as a memorable event. Although this treaty was not touched or 
violated during the various Indo-Pak wars and conflicts, however, lately; 
Pakistan has complained that India is violating the treaty by constructing a dam 
in the upstream, which is agaiast the spirit of the treaty. 
< .^  y 
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CHAPTER 2 
INDIA-PAKISTAN PEACE AGREEMENTS: 
THE TASHKENT PACT (1966) AND SHIMLA 
AGREEMENT (1972) 
Introduction 
The biftircation of the subcontinent triggered off untold misery and loss 
of lives and property as millions of Hindu and Muslim refugees fled either 
Pakistan or India. Since the founding of India and Pakistan separate states in 
1947. The dispute over 'who should control Kashmir' has been one of the 
world's most enduring and violent conflicts. Both nations were caught up in a 
number of conflicts involving the allocation of assets, evacuee property, 
demarcation of boundaries, equitable sharing of water resources, 'etc. The 
Kashmir dispute was at the root of the first war between India and Pakistan in 
the years immediately following partition of the subcontinent in 1947. And it 
was the primary bone of contention between them when they went to war a 
second time in 1965.^ While the fundamental problems of both countries have 
domestic roots, the projection of the super powers into South Asia severely 
complicated these problems by exacerbating tensions between India and 
Pakistan. 
External Powers as factors in India-Pakistan Relations 
The end of the World War Second brought new political developments. 
Britain withdrew its influence from different areas and the vacuum was filled 
up by the superpowers-US and USSR. The world got divided into two rival 
blocs on the basis of ideology, master-client system, projection of 
socioeconomic power and arms race etc. Two ideological blocs the Capitalist 
bloc led by US and Communist bloc headed by Soviet Union emerged in the 
wake of World War Second. These countries were militarily and economically 
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so strong as compared to other states that they could project their power to 
every nook and comer of the World. Both started striving to expand their 
hegemony and the cold war was the result of their mutual antagonism. The cold 
war strategy demanded the spread of the contairmient policy outside Europe in 
order to broaden the sphere of global security system. The superpower 
competition imposed a bipolar structure on international affairs from 1945 until 
the Soviet disintegration in 1991. Bipolarity forced every cotmtry to make one 
of the three choices -to ally with Moscow to ally with Washington or to remain 
aloof from superpower conflict with amicable relations to both sides. US 
became actively engaged in the security affairs of South Asia. Initially the US 
attempted to be friend both India and Pakistan. As India opted for NAM it 
turned down US proposal to become its satellite to serve its interest, the latter 
found in Pakistan a willing partner. The geographical location of Pakistan 
provided added strategic advantage to US to contain the expansionist policies 
and to encircle Soviet Union and China. Pakistan's strategic location is such 
from where US could fiilfill many objectives; it could contain Soviet Union and 
pursue oil interests in the Persian Gulf. 
Pakistan perception about joining US was absolutely different. The 
obsession of India always chased the policy makers in Islamabad. Pakistan 
from its very birth perceives India a threat for its existence. Pakistan hoped that 
its strategic relationship with US would bring several benefits: (a) a guarantee 
against Indian aggression'' (b) military aid to establish parity with India, ^ and 
(c) pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir dispute.^  It was this Pakistani 
outlook and posture which led Pakistan to appear pro-west and anti-communist 
to give up its erstwhile policy of Non-alignment, ^  seek and accept US military 
aid eventually to join the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (CENTO). 
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When India attained independence in 1947, it wanted to have good 
relations with the both countries. But the directions of India's relationship with 
these two powers took different courses.^ The policies in South Asia of both 
Superpowers have been ideologically agnostic; their propaganda and rhetoric 
have only caused confusion.'The newly independent India, led by the first PM 
Jawaharlal Nehru, refused to be drawn into the Cold War politics of 
competitive Military Alliances promoted by both the Superpowers. India's 
apprehension was that alliance and counter alliances would breed war rather 
than peace.'° Nehru chose the policy of 'Non-Aligiunent' (NAM) which aimed 
to give India the much needed independence of action in the sphere of foreign 
policy and relations. US regarded India's refusal to collaborate as a sign of 
unfriendliness. The US through Cold War brought rivalry to India's doorsteps 
by fonning two military organizations SEATO and CENTO with Pakistan who 
joined these alliances as a key member in 1954. 
The October 1962 War between India and China introduced a new 
element in the Indo-US relations. Within India, there were for the first time 
many voices strongly advocating an alliance with the US against China. 
However, the pro-American good will in India evaporated with the US 
reluctance to openly blame Pakistan for starting the 1965 war against India. In 
addition to US support to Pakistan, US War on Vietnam contributed to certain 
coldness in Indo-US relations in 1960s. Nevertheless, the US needs India's 
support to contain any possible future challenge from China and for this reason, 
US has initiated the policy of strengthening India occasionally. Strong bilateral 
ties between China and Pakistan have been analyzed in India mainly from the 
perspective of a security nexus against India. In short, the contents of India-
Pakistan relations, though generally bilateral in nature, their mutual relations 
and course of actions have been influenced by the actions and pronouncements 
of the outside players. 
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However, Pakistan's primal interest to joining in military alliances was to 
counter Indian domination. Pakistan also took much interest to solve the 
Kashmir issue through UN becmse most of the permanent members of UNSC 
at that time were in favour of Pakistan. But the UN efforts and super power's 
efforts regarding Kashmir issue ended with no result. Super powers exploited 
India and Pakistan as a tool to serve their global interest. 
India-Pakistan War of 1965 
In late fifties India-China differences started which culminated into 
Chinese aggression in October 1962. During Chinese aggression on India in 
1962 Pakistan fiilly supported its newly acquired friend and tried to prove that 
India was wrong. Post 1962 Sino-Indian war, both China and Pakistan 
revaluated their bilateral relationship. Both sides recognized the advantages of 
pursuing a cooperative political and military relationship to achieve their 
strategic objectives in South Asia. "After 1962 Sino-India war, Pakistan 
reaUzed that China could be an ideal friend against India. Earlier that year in a 
joint communique signed in February by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Marshal Chen 
Yi had urged that the Kashmir dispute should be solved according to the 
plebiscite that had been pledged by India.'^  Closed oiUy by their shared 
hostihty to India and disregarding their communist-ant-communist inclination, 
China and Pakistan estabhshed bilateral relations.'^ When the India-China war 
broke out in 1962, India delayed pulling its forces away from the border and 
ceasefire line with Pakistan until the US and Britain offered assurances that 
Pakistan would not take advantage of the situation.'''After the 1962 India-China 
conflict, the US and Britain launched a concerted effort to bridge the gap 
between Islamabad and New Delhi, yet six rounds of talks between 1962 and 
1963 failed to produce any credible result. Kashmir was the site of a second 
India-Pak war, a short conflict was fought in 1965. 
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The India-Pakistan war of 1965 also known as the Second Kashmir War. 
It was the culmination of a series of skirmishes that occurred between April 
1956 and September 1956 between India and Pakistan. The war was the second 
fought between India and Pakistan over the region of Kashmir without a formal 
declaration, the first having been fought in 1947. It is widely accepted that the 
war of 1965 began with the infiltration of Pakistan-controlled guerrillas into 
Indian Kashmir. The war lasted five weeks, resulted in thousands of casualties 
on ceasefire. It is generally accepted that the war began following the failure of 
Pakistan's 'Operation Gibraltar' which was designed to infiltrate and invade 
Jammu and Kashmir. The war in 1965 permits a close examination of Pakistan 
perceptions of the Chinese role in India-Pakistan relations. The 1965 war is the 
first important crisis after the breakdown in Sino-India relations and the 
increased warmth in Sino-Pakistan ties. This event is marked as a development 
in Sino-Pakistan relations.'^  
Since Independence, both nations were in contention over several issues, 
primarily on border disputes. Kashmir was a major divisive issue between both 
the nations, but other border disputes existed, most notably over the Rann of 
Kutch, a barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat. On March 20, 1965, and 
again in April 1965, fighting broke out between India and Pakistan in the Rann 
of Kutch. Initially involving the border police from both nations, the disputed 
area soon witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries' armed 
forces. In June the same year, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson 
successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to 
resolve the dispute. The verdict, which came later in 1968, saw Pakistan 
gaining 350 square miles (900 km') of the Rann of Kutch, as against its 
original claim of 3500 sq miles.'^ After its successes in the Rann of Kutch, 
Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan said to have against a 
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quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir, following a loss 
to China in 1962. 
On August 15, 1965, Indian forces crossed the ceasefire line and 
launched an attack on Pakistan administered Kashmir. Pakistani report cites 
this attack as unprovoked. Indian reports cite the attack as a response to the 
massive armed infiltrations by Pakistan. Following the failure of 'Operation 
Gibraltar' that resulted in territorial gains and rapid Indian advances in 
Kashmir, Pakistan launched a bold counter attack on September 1, 1965 to 
reclaim vital posts in Kashmir lost to India. This attack, called "Operation 
Grand Slam" was intended to capture the vital town of Aknoor in Jammu and 
thus sever commimications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. 
Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, 
Pakistan was on the verge of springing a surprise against India forces, which 
were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India then called in its air 
force to target the Pakistani attack in the southern sector. The next day, 
Pakistan retaliated, and its air force attacked Indian forces and air bases in both 
Kashmir and Punjab. But 'Operation Grand Slam' failed to achieve its aim as 
the Pakistan Army was unable to capture the town. This became one of the 
turning points in the war, as decided to relieve pressure on its troops in 
Kashmir by attacking Pakistan fiirther south.'^ 
However, as the clashes continued, the UN Security Council, supported 
by the United States, Britain, and the USSR, called for an immediate ceasefire, 
which India and Pakistan accepted on September and the war ended on 
September 23. Although the war was brief, it was a bitter one. Neither country 
was a winner. The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding 
territory of the other. The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while 
Pakistan suffered no less than 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 710 
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mile^ (1,840 W ) of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 210 mile 
(545 km )^ of Indian Territory. The territory occupied by India was mainly in 
the fertile Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir sectors, while Pakistani land gains were 
primarily in deserts opposite Sindh and in Chumb in the northern sector. The 
1965 war demonstrated that Pakistan attacked on India by two reasons 
basically. One is that Pakistan thought that India had become very weak 
because of 1962 war with China and India is not in a position to win the war. 
The second reason is that Pakistan believed that if it did not act in a decisive 
manner, the state of Kashmir would be integrated into India and international 
interest for Pakistan's concerns would dwindle. In the 1965 war demonstrated 
the willingness of both sides to use substantial force to achieve particular end. 
However, the Soviet-brokered Tashkent Declaration was signed on January 10, 
1966. It required that both sides withdraw by Febmaiy 26, 1966, to prior to 
August 5,1965, and observe the cease-fire line agreed to on June 30, 1965. The 
1965 conflict was dramatic jolt to the Cold War paradigm, and Tashkent was a 
turning point. It was really the end of a decade of East-West competitive 
globalism in the subcontinent. 
Tashkent Pact 1966: the second agreement after Liaquat-Nehru 1950 
& Indus River 1960 
A meeting was held at Tashkent in the erstwhile Soviet Union from 
January 3 to 10, 1966 to formalize peace between India and Pakistan. The 
Tashkent Summit was held at the initiative of the Soviet Prime Minister Alexi 
Kosygin, and was attended by Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri of India and 
President Mohammed Ayub Khan of Pakistan. During the Indo-Pak war, 
efforts for peace were made by both the super powers in the context of their 
respective national interests. China had openly supported Pakistan and even 
given ultimatum to India, but did not intervene in the war for fear of Soviet 
reaction. Even after cease-fire became effective, tension prevailed. Britain and 
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the United States were trying to pressurize India. Eventually Soviet Union's 
invitation was accepted by both the countries. The Soviet Prime Minister had 
taken initiative in early September. The invitation was accepted in principle by 
Shastri, but Pakistan felt that no useful purpose was likely to be served. Ayub 
was expecting U.S. intervention which never occurred because China's 
growing friendship with Pakistan. It was only in November 1965 that Ayub 
Khan accepted the Soviet proposal for a Summit at Tashkent. Soviet Prime 
Minister was personally present to render such assistance as the two heads 
might require.'^  
Both India and Pakistan had made their objectives and expectations 
clear before Shastri and Ayub Khan went to Tashkent. The President of 
Pakistan had repeatedly announced that he would agree to a "just" settlement of 
the Kashmir dispute. India's Prime Minister had, however, made it clear that 
Kashmir's accession was not negotiable and that it was an integral part of 
India. Indian Prime Minister had hoped that in future force would not be used 
between India and Pakistan. He had also reiterated that "we unreservedly 
accept Pakistan's sovereignty and territorial integrity". The Tashkent meeting 
was unusual because it was for the first time that Soviet Union had taken 
initiative for the settlement of a conflict between two non-communist countries. 
The Soviet effort was blessed by all major powers including the United States. 
In fact, the whole world, except China, desired success at the Tashkent 
Summit. In the meeting both countries stood by their rigid positions. There was 
no progress for 6 days. Finally, after strenuous negotiations, which were often 
on the verge of collapse, the Tashkent Declaration was signed by the two 
countries in the hope and promise of a peacefiil future. It was signed by Shastri 
and Ayub in the presence of Soviet Prime Minister on January 10, 1966. 
Unfortunately, after a few hours, Shastri died of a massive heart attack and 
could not return alive to India. 
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The nine-point Tashkent Declaration contained the resolve by India and 
Pakistan to restore normal and peaceful relations between themselves and to 
promote friendly relations between their peoples. With these objectives in 
view, the following nine points were agreed upon. 
1. India and Pakistan would make all efforts to created good 
neighbourly relations between themselves, and affirmed their 
obligations under the U.N. Charter not to resort to force, but settle 
their disputes through peaceful means. 
2. All armed personnel of India and Pakistan were to be withdrawn 
latest by February 25, 1966 to the positions they held prior to 
August 5,1965. 
3. The relations between India and Pakistan would be based on the 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other. 
4. Both sides would discourage propaganda directed against each 
other, and encourage propaganda for promotion of friendly relations 
between the two. 
5. Normal diplomatic activity was to be restored and the High 
Commission of India and Pakistan were to resume their duties. 
6. Economic and trade relations, communication as well as cultural 
exchanges would be restored between India and Pakistan. 
7. Repatriation of prisoners of war would be carried out by the 
officials of two counties. 
8. Two sides would continue discussions relating to problems of 
refugees, illegal immigrations, and would take steps to prevent 
exodus of people, and return the property and assets taken over 
during the conflict. 
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9. There was need to set up joint Indian-Pakistani bodies to 
recommend further steps on matters of direct concern to the two 
countries. 
Public in India generally welcomed the Tashkent Agreement in the hope 
that it would lead to normalization of relations between the two countries. 
Prime Minister Shastri remarked, after signing the Declaration that, it was "a 
unique experiment in international diplomacy."The German leader Konard 
Adenauer, a critic of USSR, welcomed the Soviet initiative for normalization 
of Indo-Pak relations. The new Prime Minister of Israel Abba Aabn hoped that 
Tashkent principles and attitude would be applied to Arab-Israel conflict 
also.'^Sastri described it as a "unique international agreement in diplomacy" 
while Ayub hailed it as "a new stage in the development of relations betv\'een 
India and Pakistan""*^ 
The Tashkent Declaration was indeed a historic document. For the first 
time it was hoped that India and Pakistan might turn away from the path of 
conflict, and strive to live in peace. However, Tashkent Declaration had 
achieved nothing new at all in terms of permanent settlement of India-Pakistan 
problems. It brought a temporary respite to India-Pakistan hostilities. India and 
Pakistan remained suspicious and unyielding towards each other, and the 
Kashmir dispute remained as unresolved as ever. Pakistan kept on arming itself 
and making violent anti-India propaganda. 
A number of other issues were also responsible for increasing tension. 
Firstly, Pakistan's agreement with China to open the road between Gilgit and 
Sinkiang was not only an unfriendly act, but also an illegal decision because 
the concerned Indian Territory was under unlawful occupation of Pakistan. 
Secondly Pakistan continued to seek the help of the United States, Soviet 
Union and China to pressurize India to concede its demand on Kashmir. 
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Thirdly, there was tension regarding utiHzation of Ganga waters and the 
Farakka barrage being constructed by India. Pakistan's objection was that the 
barrage, if constructed, would leave East Bengal 'dry and desolate'. 
India once again suggested a no-war pact which was, as usual, turned 
down by Pakistan. Ayub called Mrs. Gandhi's offer as an attempt to hoodwink 
the world. India released photocopies of a number of documents which were 
evidence of Pakistan's aid to Mizo and Naga rebels for insurgency in North-
East India. Meanwhile, Pakistan succeeded in getting additional weapon from 
the United States. The India-Pakistan relations reached an all time low in 1971 
with the emergence of crisis in East Pakistan resulting in a civil war in that 
country. There was an exodus of millions of people from East Pakistan, and 
finally a war took place between India and Pakistan in 1971 leading to the 
defeat of Pakistan and its disintegration resulting in the creation of independent 
state of Bangladesh. 
The war of 1971 and the Liberation of Bangladesh 
The turbulent period 1970-71 marked a turning point in international 
politics in South Asia in general and India-Pakistan relations in particular. The 
period witnessed the genesis of an internal political crisis within the united 
Pakistan, the secessionist movement and civil war in East Pakistan, the Indian 
intervention and culminating in the emergence of Bangladesh as a result of the 
Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. The war of 1971 was a major conflict between 
India and Pakistan. East Pakistanis had long complained that Pakistan's 
government and economy was dominated by West Pakistan. Secondly, Bangla 
speaking people were not ready to accept Urdu as national language. The 
movement took a solid form under the leadership of Sheik Mujeeb-ur-Rehman. 
President Gen. Yahiya khan resorted extensive use of force against East 
Pakistanis. Consequently 10 million refugees took shelter in India. 
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As a matter of fact the problem was federative recessive and lingual in 
nature. The Indo-Pak conflict was sparked by the Bangladesh Liberation war, a 
conflict between the traditionally dominant West Pakistanis and the majority • 
East Pakistanis .The war ignited after the 1970 Pakistani election, in which the 
East Pakistani Awami League won 167 of 169 seats in East Pakistan, thus 
securing a simple majority in the 313- seat lower house of the Pakistani 
Parliament. Awami League Sheik Mujibur Rahman presented 6 points and 
claimed the right to form government. After the leader of the Pakistan People's 
Party, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, refused to give Premiership of Pakistan to Mujibur 
Raliman, President Yahya Khan called in the military, which was made up 
largely of West Pakistanis. 
In the meantime, India observed the situation and wholeheartedly 
backed the Mujeeb's movement through Bangla. For India, a non hostile 
Bangladesh was desirable instead of hostile Pakistan in East. By November 
1971 war seemed inevitable; a massive buildup of Indian forces on the border 
with East Pakistan had begun. On the Eastern front, the Indian Army joined 
forces with the Mukti Bahini to form the Mitro Bahini ("Allied Forces"); the 
next day the Indian forces responded with a massive coordinated air, sea and 
land assault on the West Pakistani Army in East Pakistan.'^ 'The Indian army 
quickly responded to the Pakistan Army's movements in the West and made 
some initial gains , including capturing around 5,500 sq miles of Pakistan 
territory (land gained by India in Pakistani Kashmir and the Pakistani Punjab 
sector were later ceded in the Shimla Agreement of 1972 , as a gesture of good 
will). 
The war led to the immediate surrender of Pakistani forces to the allied 
forces of India and Bangladesh known as the Mitro Bahini. Bangladesh became 
and independent nation and the third most populous Muslim country. Loss of 
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East Pakistan demoralized the Pakistani military and Yahya Khan resigned, to 
be replaced by Zulfiqar All Bhutto. Mujibur Rahman was released from West 
Pakistani prison and returned to Dhaka on January 10,1972.^ ^ 
The ShlmlR Agreement 1972 
The Government of Pakistan and the Government of India are resolved 
that the two countries put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have 
hitherto marred their relations and work for the promotion of a friendly and 
harmonious relationship and the establishment of durable peace in the 
subcontinent, so that both countries may henceforth devote their resources to 
the pressing task of advancing the welfare of their people. On July 2, 1972, 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi signed the Simla agreement with Mr.Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 
the first president and Later Prime Minister of Pakistan who had succeeded the 
military dictator General Yahya Khan in 1971. Under this agreement, India and 
Pakistan, among others, committed themselves to "setting their differences 
through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceM means mutually agreed 
upon between them", and that the "basic issues and causes which bedeviled the 
relations between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved by 
peaceful means". In order to achieve these objectives, the Government of 
Pakistan and the Government of India have agreed as follows: 
1. That the principles and the purposes of the United Nation shall govern 
the relations between the two countries; 
2. That the two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peaceful 
means through bilateral negotiations or by any peacefiil means mutually 
agreed upon between them. Pending the final settlement of any of the 
problems between the two coimtries neither side shall imilaterally alter 
the situation and both shall prevent the organization , assistance and 
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encouragements of any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful 
and harmonious relations; 
3. That the pre-requisite for reconciliation, good neighbourliness and 
durable peace between them is a commitment by both the countries to 
peace co-existence respect for each other's territorial integrity; and 
sovereignty and non-interference in each other internal affairs on the 
basis of equality and mutual benefit; 
4. That the basic issues and the causes of conflict which have divided the 
relation between the two countries for the last 25 years shall be resolved 
by peaceful means; 
5. That they shall always respect each other's national unity , territorial 
integrity, political independence and sovereign equality; 
6. That in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations they will 
refrain from the threat of use of forces against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of each other.'^  
The most important point in the Indo-Pakistan relations is that it is the 
Shimla accord of 1972 that can serve as the only viable basis for bilateral talks 
between the two neighbours. The main stipulation of the accord was that two 
countries would try to solve all their disputes through cordial negotiations and 
not allow any third party to intervene. This agreement will be subject to 
ratification by both countries in accordance with their respective constitutional 
procedures, and will come into force with effect from the date on which the 
instruments of Ratification are exchanged. Mr. Bhutto too had shown positive 
response in this direction and said that "Pakistan wants peace with India, not 
because it is afraid but because peace is necessary for the progress of 
nation".^ '^ Both Governments agreed that their respective Heads would meet 
again at a mutually convenient time in the future and that, in the meanwhile, 
the representatives of the two sides will meet to discuss further modalities and 
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the arrangements of the estabhshment of the durable peace and normalization 
relations, including the question of repatriation of prisoners of war and 
civilians, restmiption of diplomatic relations. Pakistan and India renewed 
diplomatic recognitions in 1976. The principal merit of the Shimla Agreement 
was that the two countries decided to renounce the use or threat of use of force 
against each other, to put an end to the era of conflict and confrontation, and 
commit themselves to standing cooperation and peaceful coexistence. This was 
something the world community had welcomed when the accord was signed in 
1972, and all these are more relevant today when both India and Pakistan have 
acquired nuclear strike capabihty.^ ^ 
Post Shimla India-Pakistan Relations 
The war of 1971 disrupted the relations between India and Pakistan. In 
this war, Pakistan was more sufferers because it lost its Eastern wing. The 
breakup of Pakistan and India's unquestioned military might established 
India's superiority not only over Pakistan but in the whole South Asian region. 
Recognizing its inferiority in conventional war, Pakistan felt the threat for its 
security in the sub-continent. So, it made a sense for Pakistan to develop some 
nuclear capability and the programme of nuclear armaments of Pakistan after 
1971 received a considerable impetus after the Indian nuclear explosion of 
1974 at Pokhran. 
With the signing of the Shimla Agreement, a new era in bilateral 
o 
relations began between India and Pakistan. Further, the coming of Janata Party 
in power in New Delhi generated new hopes of cooperation between the two 
countries. This govenmient and its policy created a climate of confidence and 
good will between India and Pakistan. The leaders of both countries, through 
the exchange of visits between India and Pakistan, dispelled the apprehensions 
of the fundamentalist organizations in both countries. Many outstanding 
i » } 
disputes were also resolved between the two countries and the areas of mutual 
cooperation in various fields were expanded. 
However, this hopes and spirit of cooperation received a jolt when the 
Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghan produced a 
crisis not simply for Afghan people but for the South Asian region as a whole. 
It confronted the main regional actors-Pakistan and India with a new political 
and strategic simation to which they reacted in distinctive ways. For India and 
Pakistan, the Soviet invasion seriously changed the regional balance of power, 
and put them in the unenviable situation of having to respond to this new 
development and cope with its consequences in their own ways. Their 
responses, however, came to be formulated not solely on the basis of the 
requirements and aspirations of the Afghan people but they took into account 
their own interests. Their responses differed from each other. Pakistan chose to 
pursue active opposition to the Soviet invasion, and India made no public 
condenmation of the Soviet invasion. Further, the Kashmir, Punjab and Siachen 
glacier issues have been major irritants in India-Pakistan relations. Kashmir 
remains as a perpetual bone of contention since partition. Before 1971, 
Pakistan tried to take Kashmir through military efforts but after the defeat in 
Bangladesh war of 1971, realized that no military action could separate 
Kashmir from India or could make Kashmir an independent state. Thus 
Pakistan changed her strategy to one of creating a climate of unlawftil 
activities, insurrection by giving support to extremists and militants of Kashmir 
and Pionjab. This attitude of Pakistan has created tension between the two 
coimtries. ^^  
Despite the strains on Indo-Pakistani relations that the 1979 Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan created, Pakistan and India-along with Bangladesh, 
Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and the Maldives-set up a cooperation committee in 
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1983 that provided a forum for regular ministerial-level meetings. However, in 
1986, there were major confrontations between the Indian army and its 
Pakistani covmterpart on the Siachen Glacier in Kashmir. This led to dramatic 
troop concentrations between December 1986 and February 1987. By 1988, 
there were some attempts to improve relations, but the secessionist uprising 
that got under way in Kashmir, with Pakistani support, during 1989 has ensured 
that Kashmir remains the key flash point of Indo-Pakistani relations and a 
source of concern in the World community. 
O' } 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE NUCLEAR FACTOR BETWEEN 
INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
Introduction 
Among the many factors which have influenced the course of 
international politics and diplomacy in the last six decades, the most crucial has 
been the nuclear one. Ever since the advent of nuclear weapons, whose 
destructive power was so convincingly demonstrated at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in 1945, they have become a symbol of power and prestige among 
the nations of the world: and possession of nuclear weapons has been given 
special status in international power hierarchy.' In fact, the presence of nuclear 
weapons poses serious ramifications for the bilateral and multi-lateral relations 
among states will be vitiated if any one of them possesses nuclear weapons and 
contributes to the heightening of tensions.' As a region, Asia has the distinction 
of experiencing the world's most rapid rates of economic and population 
growth, the fastest expansion of commercial nuclear power plant construction, 
the entrenchment of terror networks, and the fundamental failure of any state or 
group of states to emerge as a force to advocate regional solutions to nuclear 
security risks facing the Asia-Pacific. 
The proliferation of nuclear weapons trade had started since cold war 
era. In this trade two adversaries emerged in the area of w.f. India and Pakistan. 
This race started because of their different security perceptions. Gradually the 
nuclear factor has overshadowed all other aspects in determining the nature of 
Indo-Pakistan relations. The conflict prone nature of the polhics of the sub-
continent draws greater attention of the strategists to examine the present 
dynamics of India Pakistan relations, fi-om the prospective of their newly 
assumed status in international politics. India and Pakistan openly reject the 
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Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as an attempt to underaiine their sovereign 
rights to possess nuclear weapons.'The nuclear nonproliferation regime has 
experienced failures in Asia. 
Commencement of India's Nuclear Weapons Programme 
Ever since India achieved independence in 1947, its response to global 
nuclear non-proliferation measures has been dominant theme in the country's 
overall evolution of nuclear pohcy. Traditionally, Indian nuclear policy was 
based on ethical considerations .i.e., emphasized on peaceful and friendly 
coexistence. 
Indian nuclear research began in 1944 and Atomic Energy Commission 
was created in 1948. From 1954, steady funding started flowing into nuclear 
research and development under the aegis of the Department of Atomic 
Energy. By the early 1950's Homi J. Bhabha led a consensus among a care 
group in New Delhi on the right to develop nuclear energy. India's defeat in the 
1962 war with China and the subsequent nuclear test by China in 1964 
intensified the debate within India over the nuclear option. The Indian belief 
was that, while nuclear science and technology was common intellectual 
property, the end use of atomic energy was purely a state's sovereign 
prerogative while India continued to champion the cause of global nuclear 
disarmament at various international forum, it was also aware of the 
tremendous potential capability of the atom. India's defence policy shifted 
from idealism to pragmatisms after the 1962 Sino-Indian war.'* 
The 1962 Sino-Indian war was an unforgettable lesson to the Indian 
establishment. It underscored the need to have a strong military with a 
comprehensive capability to deter enemy forces. The Chinese Nuclear Test at 
Lop Nur in 1964 incentived the Indian government into action to kick start 
India's indigenous programme to develop nuclear weapons. Preliminary studies 
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were carried out at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre and plans were 
developed to produce plutonium and other bomb components. The programme 
was shelved after Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru's death. It was revived in 
the year 1969 by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. 
India's Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project (SNEP) faded into the 
background in 1966 with Bhabha's death, but was revived in 1971, culminating 
the peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) of 1974 at Pokhran codenamed 'Smiling 
Buddha'. Security was among the prime considerations leading up to Pokhran-
I, especially in view of the 'US-Pak-China axis' that had developed. More 
important, however, were considerations of domestic prestige. With a bad 
drought, prices and hardship rising, the need was felt to do something to boost 
the country's morale. 
India Pakistan Relations in the Post Polchran-I Period 
The Pokhran-I nuclear test by India drastically transformed the nature of 
bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. It heightened tensions, disturbed 
tranquility in the region and provoked Pakistan to take the root of military 
nuclear policy which finally has turned into a nuclear arms race between the 
two neighbours. It also attracted increased international observation towards 
the South Asian region. On account of this, India and Pakistan got embroiled 
into an intense diplomatic alteration. Pakistan expressed a seemingly 
prejudiced view of the issue and made vociferous claims that its security is in 
jeopardy on account of India's nuclear test. On its part, India demonstrated 
remarkable discreetness and tightly held on to its position that its nuclear 
explosions were conducted for peaceful purposes and it was not directed 
towards any country."' 
In her letter, the Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi stated that "PNE is 
the normal result of the research and study of our scientists and we are firmly 
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committed to the peaceM uses of nuclear energy. India has no military or 
political intentions in carrying out nuclear explosions."* On the other hand, the 
reaction of Pakistan's Prime Minister Z.A.Bhutto was replete with a nuclear 
threat perception from India. He remarked: 'A more grave and serious event 
has not taken place in the history of Pakistan. The explosion has introduced a 
qualitative change in the situation between the two countries."^ Pokhran-I 
nuclear test ushered a covert nuclear competition and vitiated the bilateral 
relations of India and Pakistan. According to Zafar Iqbal Cheema:"Nuclear 
Competition between India and Pakistan has endured a cold war paradigm". 
The chances of denuclearization of South Asia slim because of the level of 
nuclear weapons capability.^  
However, as early as in 1974, Pakistan submitted a resolution at the 29* 
session of the UN General Assembly, which sought to endorse in principle the 
concept of a nuclear weapon-free zone in South Asia. At that point of time, 
Pakistan was already running the nuclear weapon program. It is worth 
remembering that the then President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had called a meeting 
of Pakistani scientists in Multan in January 1972 and had expressed his 
willingness to acquire nuclear weapon for Pakistan. But in the wake of India's 
May 1974 tests, Pakistan tried to gain an image of veiled peacemaker through 
lacking any sincerity. 
India itself had proposed a resolution in the same 29' session of the 
General Assembly in which it recognized that, "In appropriate regions and by 
agreement among the states concerned, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free 
zones could promote the .cause of general end complete disarmament under 
effective international control." India also considered it that proposal that "the 
initiative for the creation of a 'nuclear-weapon-free zone' in the appropriate 
region of Asia should come from the states of the region concerned, taking into 
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account its special features and geographical extent." In reality. South Asia 
could not be treated in isolation for the purpose of creating a 'nuclear weapon-
free zone', as it is only a sub-regional and an integral part of the South Asian 
region. Hence, it is necessary to take in to account the security of the region in 
its entirety. 
Unlike Pakistan, India's adherence to the NFU (No First Use) policy and 
its strategic assets are not country-specific. Therefore, any effort towards 
creating a minimum credible nuclear triad, including qualitative improvement 
in missile systems or other technological advancements, seems related to 
India's national security perspectives beyond, but inclusive, of Pakistan. The 
Indian prospective is both global and regional in nature. India believes that; 
"As long as nuclear weapon exists, the threat of use of nuclear weapons, 
accidentally or inadvertendy, will remain. Only global and complete nuclear 
disarmament, within a time-bound framework, can totally eliminate the danger 
of a nuclear war. This was the cornerstone of India's Action plan for the 
elimination of nuclear weapons unveiled by Late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
in 1988 at the Special Session of the UN General Assembly. While pursuing 
the goal of nuclear disarmament, it is desirable to take immediate steps for 
reducing nuclear danger. There could include measures to de-alert and de-target 
nuclear weapons, legally binding Commitments on no-first-use of nuclear 
weapons and non-use of nuclear weapons against Non-nuclear weapon states. 
Post 1974, however, global criticism and sanctions completely unnerved 
Mrs. Gandhi; subsequently, the nuclear programme went into uncertainty. 
Besides, her successor, Morarji Desai had complete antipathy to the Military 
nuclear prograname. The nuclear programme, was revived in 1980 after Indira 
Gandhi's return to power. However, she hesitated to test, despite the shafts 
being ready. When Rajiv Gandhi came to power, despite initial doubts, he gave 
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the go ahead in 1989 for assembling nuclear devices. The decision to 
weaponries India's nuclear option was taken in 1989 by Mr. Rajiv Gandhi. 
Narasimha Rao attempted to conduct the test in 1995, but failed due to its 
detection by the US. 
Having failed to conduct the test, Rao urged A B Vajpayee when he 
became India's Prime Minister to conduct the test. An essential continuity 
existed in India's Military nuclear doctrine among all its Prime Ministers since 
Indira Gandhi and the conduct of the '98 test was also marked by an all-party 
consensus.' 
Preparations for Pokhran Test -II1998 
The detection of the test preparations by American satellites in 1995, 
had taught a lesson to the Indian scientists. It was decided that preparations for 
the May 1998 tests should be undertaken under a cloud of secrecy so that 
foreign powers should not detect the preparations and try to pressure the 
government. Extensive measures were taken in order to deceive intelligence 
agencies around the world. The decision to test was not disclosed even to 
senior cabinet ministers. The preparations were managed by a closed group of 
scientists, military officers and politicians. Only senior political leaders knew 
about the preparations of test. 
Dr. A.P.J Abdul Kalam, the Scientific Adviser to the Prime Minister, 
and Dr. R.Chidambaram, the head of the Department of Atomic Energy, were 
the chief coordinators for the operation. They were assisted by the 58* 
Regiment of the Army Engineering Corps in preparing the test site. Scientists 
from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Defence Research 
and Development Organization (DRDO) were involved in assembling the 
weapons, moving them to Pokhran, placing them into shafts in the ground and 
laying a network of sensors to gather data during the explosions. 
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Pokhran 11 Test and Reactions from Abroad 
The reactions from abroad started immediately after the tests were 
advertised. The United States issued a strong statement condemning hidia and 
promised that sanctions would follow. The UN also issued a statement 
expressing its disappointment. Canada, which had earher supplied the CIRUS 
nuclear reactor to India which was the source of plutonium for the 1974 test, 
reassured the world that the CIRUS reactor was not in any way connected to 
the 1998 tests. China issued a vociferous condemnation calling upon the 
international community to exert pressure on India to sign the NPT and 
eliminate its nuclear arsenal. With India joining the group of countries 
possessing nuclear weapons, a new strategic dimension had emerged in Asia, 
particularly South Asia. The most vehement reaction to India's nuclear test was 
Pakistan's. Sharp irritation was raised in Pakistan, which issued a severe 
statement blaming India for instigating a nuclear arms race in the region. 
Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif vowed that his country would give a 
suitable reply to the Indians. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission 
(PAEC) carried out six imderground nuclear tests at the Changai test sit at 3:16 
p.m on the afternoon of May 28,1998, just fifteen days after India's last test. 
Pakistan's subsequent tests invited similar condemnations from multiple 
nations ranging from Argentina to Russia, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. The US president Bill Clinton was quoted as saying "Two wrongs don't 
make a right", criticizing Pakistan's tests as reactionary to India's Pokhran-II. 
India's decision to detonate nuclear devices {Pokhran-II) resulted in severe and 
comprehensive economic and technology related sanctions by a number of 
states. Over a period of time, these sanctions proved to have exerted only 
marginal effects on India's economy and technological progress, and most of 
the sanctions were lifted within five years of their enactment. 
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Post-May 1998 India-Pakistan Relations 
Unlike the 1974 nuclear tests the implications oi Pokhran-II for India 
Pakistan relations was deep felt and multi dimensional. It not only stimulated a 
similar response from Pakistan, but the nuclear testing became a debacle issue 
in India and Pakistan. The Indian articulation focused on the threats from 
Pakistan and China while Pakistan targeted India."Since India has directly 
named China as its potential number one threat the former did not delay testing 
of its number bomb. The India-Pakistan rift got support from India-China rift, 
consequently an uneasy situation prevailed.'^ It was expected that overt 
nuclearisation would deter India and Pakistan from engaging in armed conflict 
due to the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons. But paradoxically, the 
proxy war in Kashmir persisted with several instances of open conflict, once in 
Kargil and secondly when the two countries were on the brink of a major 
armed conflict following the terrorist attack on India's Parliament and the 
subsequent mobilization of military on both sides of the border. In this context, 
it is generally considered: Nuclear weapons do not contribute to stability in the 
region and flirther do not eliminate the possibility of a nuclear war in a 
nuclearised environment.'^  
The Krgil crisis of 1999, demonsfrated this: The Pakistan army 
mobilized its number weapons against India without the knowledge of the then 
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif'''This symbolizes the growing complexities in 
their relations, stigmatized by a constant threat of inadvertent use of nuclear 
weapons. The prospects of arriving at an amicable solution to the protracted 
conflict appeared remote. The situation becomes adverse due to the secrecy 
enveloping their nuclear posture and a policy of nuclear brinkmanship adopted 
by few leaders on both sides. If any nuclear conflict occurs between India and 
Pakistan, the amount of human and material casualties will be unimaginable.'^  
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Suddenly the nuclear tests in the subcontinent have brought the Kashmir issue 
to the core which is linked to any nuclear eventuality.'^  
Until India and Pakistan succeed in discovering solid mechanisms that 
could be instrumental in halting any probable nuclear conflict and if the 
paranoiac urge for nuclear might persists in the same frenetic pace, the region 
will be bogged down under a constant threat of a lethal war that would result in 
the emergence of neither victor nor vanquished, but only promises mutually 
assured destruction of both the countries. This uncertainty has also kept the 
entire sub-continent marginalized from the mainstream of socio-economic 
development. A viable solution lies in building concrete trust between the two 
countries, but this is premised upon the amicable solution of the Kashmir 
dispute. As there exists an inevitable interface between the exasperated nature 
of the Kashmir conflict and the nuclear aspirations of India and Pakistan, 
however demure this inter-connection may be. Hence it may be underlined that 
the security, stability and prosperity of entire region and its liberation from this 
nuclear consternation, largely depends upon the unraveling of the Kashmir 
entanglement. 
India's Nuclear Doctrine 
Judging by the official pronouncements in the wake of the May 1998 
tests, India appears set for a pragmatic course of action, including three basic 
components construction of minimum deterrent with a "No First Use" (NFU) 
policy, participation in a possible Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) 
negotiations and the pursuit of arms control rather than disarmament. The 
cabinet committee on security headed by the Prime Minister while approving 
the establishment of Nuclear Command Authority and 'alternate chains of 
command for retahatory nuclear strikes in all eventualities', on January 4, 
2003, summarized the Nuclear doctrine as 
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• Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent: 
• A posture of >fFU and nuclear weapons to be used only in retaliation 
against a nuclear attack on Indian Territory or on Indian Forces 
anywhere. 
• Nuclear retaliation to be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable , 
damage. 
• Authorization of retaliatory attack rests with the political leadership 
through the National Command Authority. 
• Non-use of nuclear weapon against Non-nuclear weapon states 
• In the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, 
by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of 
retaliating with nuclear weapons. 
• A continuance of strict control on export of nuclear and missile-related 
materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cutoff 
Treaty negotiations, and continued observance of the moratorium on 
nuclear tests 
• Continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world 
through global, verifiable and non-discriminatoiy nuclear disarmament. 
As early as in 1994, India had proposed that India and Pakistan should 
jointly undertake not to be the first to use their nuclear capability against each 
other. Even after conducting the nuclear tests Indian expressed its readiness to 
discuss a 'no-first use' agreement with that country, as also with other 
countries bilaterally, or in a collective forum. However, Gen. Musharraf thinks 
otherwise. Interviewed on BBC television in Washington on January 23, 2002, 
General Musharraf was asked to explain Pakistan's reluctance to follow India 
in adopting a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. He replied, "When you 
talk of no-first-use, Pakistan has been offering denuclearization of South 
Asia....so we are going far, far beyond them. It is not an issue of no-first-use, 
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but far beyond that. We want to denuclearize South Asia. We want to sign a No 
War Pact with them. Isn't that better? I think the world conununity should 
insist on that. Pakistan is offering a much better deal."" 
The Indian Prime Minister rejected Pakistan's suggestion for a mutual 
rollback of their nuclear programme as India's nuclear programme is not 
Pakistan-specific. In fact, "the rationale for Pakistan's nuclear weapons 
program continuously harped on is that Pakistan has always been quantitatively 
and technologically weaker than Indian in military terms. India's counter-
argument is that, in terms of the ratio between defence responsibilities and the 
size of the armed forces, especially in terms of territorial defence from external 
aggression, this argument is not valid." 
Origin of Pakistan Nuclear Programme 
Pakistan, for the first time in October 1954, announced its plan to 
establish an atomic research body, and in January 1955 appointed the Atomic 
Energy Committee under Dr. Nazir Ahmad, which recommended the 
appointment of an Atomic Energy Commission. The main objective of this 
commission remained providing research facilities to students. In 1956, the 
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was established. The real thrust 
in Pakistan's nuclear programme came with Dr. I. H. Usmani becoming the 
chairman of PAEC in 1960. Though many identify Zulfikar Ali Bhutto as the 
principal architect of Pakistan's nuclear programme, it was Usmani who set the 
direction of Pakistan's nuclear programme. In August 1955, the U.S and 
Pakistan signed an agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic 
energy. 
The Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) 
was established in the early 1960s at Nelore (near Islamabad) at a cost of 41.3 
million Pakistani rupees, and the U.S. agreed to supply enriched Uranium and 
Plutonium for a research reactor at PINSTECH, which became operational in 
December 1965. The Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) was established 
in 1968 with assistance from Canada. The proposal to purchase a nuclear 
reactor from Canada began in 1962 and an agreement was reached in 1965. 
This reactor was formally inaugurated in November 1972 at a cost of 480 
million Pakistani rupees. The nuclear programme of Pakistan, which had a 
moderate commencement during the 1950s, was firmly established during the 
1960s. However, the main focus was on peacieful uses of nuclear energy rather 
than for military purposes. 
Z. A. Bhutto for the first time in 1965 echoed stated that Pakistan would 
acquire nuclear weapons capacity. 'If India developed an atomic bomb, we too 
will develop one "even if we have to eat grass or leaves or to remain hungry" 
because there is no conventional alternative to the atomic bomb. Put in 
perspective, this statement, which was endorsed by large sections of the 
society, particularly the press was a guarded response to the Indian Prime 
Minister, Lai Bahadur Shastri's statement in the Lok sabha in November 1964 
that he favoured developing nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes. The 
Indian statement in turn was a response to the Chinese nuclear test of October 
1964. In April 1965, Bhabha set up a small group for a project called the 
Subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project (SNEP). Bhutto was aware of these 
developments and in a book published in 1969 predicted that India would 
follow the Chinese test. Seen in this context, the statement 'even if we have to 
eat grasses reflects a response to an emotionally charged domestic debate ready 
to take on India's nuclear programme.'* 
Pakistan's nuclear energy programme dates back to the 1950s, but it was 
the loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in a war with India that reportedly 
triggered a political decision in January 1972 (just one month later) to begin a 
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secret nuclear weapons program. Defence against India is said to be the 
primary motivation for Pakistan's nuclear deterrent. Observers point to the 
peaceful nuclear explosion by India in 1974 as the pivotal moment which gave 
urgency to the program. Pakistan's path to the bomb was through uranium 
enrichment technology, mastered by the mid-1980s. Pakistan gained 
technology from many sources especially US-China. This extensive assistance 
is reported to have included, among other things, uranium enrichment 
technology from Europe, blueprints for a small nuclear weapon from China, 
and missile technology from China. In 1989, the United States learned that 
Pakistan had assembled a nuclear war head, which then led to a cut-off in 
mihtary and financial aid under the 'pressler Amendment'. When India 
conducted nuclear weapon tests on May 12, 1998, Pakistan's government 
responded to two weeks later on May 28 and May 30 with six tests at the 
Chagai Hills test site in Western Pakistan. Test yields were about 10 kilotons 
and 5 kilotons, according to Seismic analysis. The United States imposed 
additional sanctions after the test (these were lifted after the September 11*, 
2001 attacks). 
Most observers estimate that Pakistan has enough nuclear material 
(highly enriched uranium and a small amount of plutonium) for about 60 
nuclear weapons. Pakistan's nuclear warheads use an implosion design with a 
solid core of highly enriched uranium (HEU), approximately 15-20 Kg per 
warhead. Pakistan reported continuous to produce highly-enriched uranium for 
weapons at a rate of at least 100 kg per year. Pakistan has also pursued 
plutonium-based warheads, since the 1990s and continuous to produce 
plutonium for weapons. Pakistan has received Chinese assistance for its 
plutonium programme. The 40-50 megawatt heavy water Khushab plutonium 
production reactor has been operating since 1998. A second heavy water 
reactor is being built at Khushab, which will at least double Pakistan's 
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Plutonium production capacity. Pakistan's nuclear weapons complex also 
includes the 300-megawatt reactor at Chasma, a reprocessing plant at Chasma, 
fuel fabrication plant, tritium production facility, etc. The continued expansion 
of the complex and production of weapons materials indicates plans to increase 
its nuclear weapons arsenal in the near future. 
Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine 
Pakistan strategic doctrine is undeclared, and will probably remain so, 
but prominent officials and analysts have offered insights concerning its basic 
tenets. They have indicated that Pakistan's posture is designed to preserve 
territorial integrity against Indian attack, prevent military escalation, and 
counter its main rival's conventional superiority. "Minimum credible nuclear 
deterrence" is the guiding principle. Statements of high level officials point to 
four pohcy objectives for Pakistan's nuclear weapons; deter all forms of 
external aggression; deter through a combination of conventional and strategic 
forces; deter counterforce strategies by securing strategic assets and threatening 
nuclear retaliation, and stabilize strategic deterrence in South Asia. 
Pakistani officials state that they have already determined the arsenal 
size needed for a minimum nuclear deterrent and they will not engage in an 
arms race with India. Pakistan has also pledged 'no-first-use' against non-
nuclear-weapon states, but has not ruled out first-use against a nuclear-armed 
aggressor that attacks Pakistan. Analysts say this ambiguity serves to maintain 
deterrence against India's conventional superiority. Others argue that keeping 
the first-use option against India allows Pakistan to conduct sub-conventional 
operations while effectively deterring India at the strategic level. Pakistan has 
reportedly addressed issues of survivability through second strike capability, 
possible hard £ind deeply buried storage and launch facilities, road-mobile 
missiles, air defenses around strategic sites, and concealment measures.'^'' 
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Command and Control System of Pakistan 
Pakistan's command and control over its nuclear weapons is 
compartmentalized and include strict operational security. Pakistan's command 
and control system is based on "C4I2SR" (Command, Control, 
Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Information, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance). The system has three components - the National Command 
Authority (NCA), The Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the Strategic Forces 
Commands. The NCA was created in 2000 and for the first time the nuclear 
programme was under military control with oversight. The SPD acts as the 
secretarial for the NCA and coordinates with the strategic forces commands. 
The Army, Air Force, and Navy each have their respective strategic force 
command, but operational control remains with the NCA. The authority to 
lavinch a nuclear strike requires consensus within the NCA. The NCA is a 10-
members body, which consists of the President, the Prime Minister, the 
Chairman of the joint chief of staff, the Ministers of Defense, Interior and 
Finance, the Director-General of the strategic plans division, and the 
commanders of the Army, Air Force and Navy. The NCA chairman, who is the 
President of Pakistan, casts the final vote. 
On December 13, 2007, President Musharraf formulized these 
authorities and structure in the "National Command Authority Ordinance, 
2007". The NCA was established by administrative order, but now has a legal 
basis. Analysts point out that the timing of this ordinance was meant to help the 
command and control system whether political tiansitions and potentially 
preserve the military's strong control over the system. The ordinance also 
addresses the problems of the proliferation of nuclear expertise and persoimel 
reliability. It outlines punishable offenses related to breach of confidentiality or 
leakage of "Secured information", give the SPD authority to investigate 
suspicious conduct. States that punishment can be up to 25 years imprisonment, 
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and applies to both serving and retired personnel, including nulitary personnel, 
notwithstanding any other laws. As a result, Pakistani authorities say that the 
ordinance should strengthen their control over strategic organizations and their 
personnel."' 
Security and Safety Issues over India-Pakistan Nuclear Weapons 
The International Convmunity can work cooperatively with India and 
Pakistan to prevent unauthorized acquisition of nuclear weapons, material, and 
related technology or expertise by terrorists or potential proliferating states. 
The goal is for India and Pakistan to be able to assure each other and the world 
that their nuclear capabilities are secure from unauthorized access. Regional 
and Global communities are concerned that political turmoil increases the 
threat from both insiders and outsiders to nuclear facilities, material, and 
weapons and fear that nuclear weapons and facilities could fall into the hands 
of terrorists or a hostile government. Perceptions of greater political volatility 
and ambivalent attitudes toward terrorist organizations heighten the concern 
about nuclear sectirity in Pakistan. In addition, Pakistan's lack of a "no-first-
use" nuclear doctrine could imply greater dispersal of nuclear weapons and 
delegation of authority to field operations, both of which complicate the 
problem of providing security. However, even though India has disavowed first 
use of nuclear weapons, it threatens massive retaliation against nuclear attack, 
which imphes a high degree of readiness. 
Pakistan claims that its nuclear facilities and materials are secure. With 
concern mounting in the U.S. and the world over the safety of Pakistan's 
nuclear arsenal, Mr. Zardari asserted that the atomic weapons were safe and 
secure. "Nothing should concern anybody as far as nuclear or other instruments 
of such sort," Mr. Zardari said, adding that he had complete authority over the 
Army and the intelligence agency ISI ^^ . However, it resents implications that it 
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cannot secure its nuclear weapons and materials and objects to public 
statements made by both the United States and India about its political 
instability. It is deeply suspicious of U. S. offers of assistance, fearing that the 
United States wants access to its most sensitive sites to undermine Us nuclear 
program. Suggestions that nuclear material and weapons should be removed 
from Pakistan in case of political instability raised serious concerns about U. S. 
intentions.^ ^ 
Since late 1980s nuclearistion of the subcontinent has faciloitated the 
revival of Kashmir disputebetween India and Pakistan.The available evidence 
suggests that from the late 1980s until late 2003, senior Pakistani actively 
proliferate fissile material enrichment starter kits, materials, and the blueprint 
of an actual warhead. They also arranged o^r trouble shooting and training 
services for their Iranian, Libyan and North Korean clients. Even while 
admitting to describe Dr. AQ Khan as a rogue individual and sought to assign 
him exclusive responsibility for what is perhaps the greatest proliferation 
scandal in history. 
Safety and security concerns also aboimd in India's nuclear complex. 
Former Indian defense and nuclear personnel have reportedly been employed 
by Libya and Iran, although none in any Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
related activities. The Indian government has also prosecuted private sector 
companies for illegal sales of WMD-related dual-use equipment and 
technologies to Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. In addition, there exist 
concerns that several Indian nuclear power reactors and nuclear waste storage 
and handling sites are vulnerable to theft and sabotage. Although the 
allegations against Indian scientists in Libya and Iran remain unsubstantiated, 
New Delhi recently tightened domestic administrative procedures governing 
the conduct of government scientists seeking employment abroad. More 
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recently, the Indian parliament passed legislation to strengthen export control 
laws designed to prevent the transfer of WMD and their associated 
technologies from India. In response to fears concerning potential terrorist 
attacks, the Department of Atomic Energy has begun reviewing the safety of 
major nuclear facilities and begun implementing measures to enhance their 
security. 
As the United States prepared to launch an attack on the Afghan Taliban 
after 9/11, President Musharraf reportedly ordered Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is 
redeployed to "at least six secret new locations." This action came at a time of 
uncertainly about the future of the region, including the direction of U. S.-
Pakistan relations. In President Musharraf speech justifying his decision to 
assist the United States against the Taliban, he cited protection of Pakistan's 
nuclear and missile assets as one of the reasons for the dramatic policy shift. 
Pakistan's leadership was uncertain whether the U.S. would decide to conduct 
mihtaiy strikes against Pakistan's nuclear assets if it did not do so. Risk of 
nuclear war in South Asia ran high in the 1999 Kargil crisis, the 2002 conflict 
with India at the Line of Control and revelations about the A. Q. Khan 
ProHferation network inspired a varietj' of reforms to secure the nuclear 
complex. 
In the fall of 2007 and early 2008, Pakistan faced another crucial 
moment in its history and some observers have recently expressed concern 
about the security of Pakistan's arsenal if political instability persists. Former 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said in an interview on November 5, 2007, that 
while President Musharraf says he is firm control of the nuclear arsenal, she is 
afraid this control could weaken due to instability in the country. Former 
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
Mohamed El Baradei, has expressed fears that a radical regime could take 
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power in Pakistan, and thereby acquire nuclear weapons. Experts also worry 
that while nuclear weapons are currently under firm control, with warheads 
disassembled, technology could be sold off by insiders during a worsened 
crisis?^ 
Missile Competition between India and Pakistan 
In spite of the pre-notification agreement, missile tests by one country 
are always followed by the other, almost in reply to each other. On 4 February 
2007, India successfully tested a Brahmos cruise missile, which has a range of 
200 km and can be launched from ships, submarines and aircrafts. In response, 
Pakistan tested its Half 11 ballistic missile on 31 March which has a range of 
250km and the capacity to carry a single warhead of upto750 kg with the 
declared purpose of studying the control and guidance system of the missile, 
On 12 April 2007, India successfully tested its Agni 111 ballistic missile which 
has a range of 3,500 km. Pakistan believes that Agni 111 is more capable than 
any ballistic missile with Pakistan and said it would therefore upgrade its 
Shaheen 11 missile.Another important point is that testing missiles having 
greater range and capability than those in the other's arsenal will remain an 
important goal for both countries. Therefore, despite trade agreements, 
confidence building measures and efforts to have a common gas pipeline, both 
countries will continue to build up their weapon systems. 
This missile competition between India and Pakistan could be very 
dangerous, not just for the stability of both countries but also for the region. 
Their nuclear posture is premised on recessed deterrence, implying that 
warheads are stored separately from delivery systems. The missiles are placed 
on alert status only when there is likelihood of conflict, like when the Indian 
Parliament was attacked in 2001. The missiles of both the countries were 
moved nearer to the border and placed on alert. Many analysts have pointed out 
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that this recessed deterrent posture is destabilizing, because nuclear weapons 
being placed in an active readiness state in short timeframes has the risk of 
accidents and raisperceptions. However, nuclear weapons are vulnerable to 
attack in their recessed state. There is also no early warning system, which 
raises the chances of accidental war. During the Cold War, the time taken by a 
missile to travel between the US and USSR was 25 minutes. Therefore, policy 
makers had little time to decide whether the missile launch was for real or not. 
In the case of India and Pakistan, a missile could travel from one country to the 
other in 3-5 minutes. Thus, in the Indo-Pak context there is no time for policy 
makers to decide whether the attack is real or by accident, which could result 
nuclear retaliation by the other party. A weak nuclear weapons command and 
control structure makes this situation very dangerous. 
This issue is not limited to accidental war. During the Cold War the 
increase in missile strength (and capability) led countries to search for missile 
defence, thereby destabilizing the whole region. India has showed interest in 
getting missile defence systems from the US, Russia and Israel to neutralize 
Pakistani missiles. Pakistan responded by developing cruise missiles like 
Babur. On 25 August 2007 it tested the cruise 'Raad', which Pakistan claimed 
was difficult to detect. Even if India purchases a patriot missile defence system, 
it would remain vulnerable to Shaheen missiles. Both India and Pakistan are 
relying on missile-based nuclear deterrence, which would jeopardize all other 
measures to develop friendly relations and seek a peaceful resolution to the 
Kashmir problem. The riddle will also bring China into the picture because 
India, China and Pakistan share common borders and India could find itself 
being threatened by both neighbours. Pakistan and China could also engage in 
nuclear buildups and strategic military cooperation; has always helped Pakistan 
with its missile programs. Later in 1998, India and Pakistan backed away from 
their confrontation and met in high-level negotiations to discuss confidence-
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building measures for averting the risk of nuclear war, but failed to reach a 
specific agreement on halting a nuclear arm race.^^he solution to this missile . 
race is not missile defence, but CBMs and arms contt-ol. It is imperative that 
India and Pakistan realize a missile race would be disadvantageous to both 
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countries; hence tliere is need to stop this missile competition. 
India-Pakistan Nuclear CBMs 
In 1988, Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and Indian Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi met at the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation (SAARC) summit in Islamabad; India and Pakistan signed the 
agreement on Non-Attack of Nuclear Facilities and installations; agreement 
were also reached on cultural cooperation and "avoidance of double taxation on 
incomes derived from international civil aviation transactions"?* Further, India 
and Pakistan agreed to "refrain from under taking, encouraging or participating 
in directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the distraction of, damage 
to any nuclear installation or facihty in the other country". The term 'nuclear 
installation or facility' includes nuclear power and research reactors , fuel 
fabrication, uranium enrichment isotope separation and reprocessing facilities , 
as well as any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fiiel and 
materials in any form and establishments storing significant quantities of 
radioactive materials. And the two countries also agreed to inform on January 1 
of each calendar year. Of the latitude and longitude of its nuclear installation 
and its facilities and whenever there is any change. This practice is in regular 
use ever since it came into force from January 1,1991, and the practice did not 
stop even during the crisis period of 2002. However, "each side has questioned 
the completeness of the others list". 
Subsequently, and forward movement in nuclear Confidence Building 
Measures (CBMs) was witnessed during the Indian Prime Minister's visit to 
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Lahore in 1999. The memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by the 
foreign secretaries of the two countries at Lahore in 1999 mentioned that "the 
two sides shall engage in bilateral consultation on security concepts, and 
nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence-building 
in the nuclear and the conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict." 
The two countries agreed to provide each other with advance 
notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and envisaged a bilateral 
agreement in this regard. India and Pakistan at Lahore also committed to 
continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conduction 
fiirther nuclear test explosions. With a view to reaching bilateral agreements 
based on mutual deliberations and technical consultations , the two countries 
under the Lahore MoU included many significant issues such as national 
measure to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear 
weapons, notification in the event of any accidental or unauthorized use of 
nuclear weapons , notification in the event of any accidental, unauthorized or 
unexplained incident, prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of 
navigation by naval vessels and air craft belonging to the two sides, review of 
the existing communication links ( e.g., between the respective Directors-
General of Military Operations .), and periodic review of existing confidence-
building measures. 
The two sides would also engage in bilateral consultations on security, 
disarmament and non-proliferation issue within the context of negotiations on 
these issues in multilateral fora. The expert level talks led by Sheel Kant 
Sharma, and his Pakistani counterpart, Tariq Usman Hyder, during Jime 19-20, 
2004, cuhninated in a joint statement on nuclear CBMs with some repetition of 
important issues under the Lahore MoU. The joint statement recognizes "the 
nuclear capabilities of each other, which are based on their national security 
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imperatives, constitute a factor of stability." The important issues covered in 
the joint statement are up gradation of existing hotline between Director 
General of Military Operations (DGMOs), new dedicated and secure hotline 
between foreign secretaries to prevent misunderstanding and reduce risks 
relevant to nuclear issues. 
The provision in the joint statement of June 20, 2004, that "both 
countries will continue to engage in bilateral consultations on security and non-
proliferation issues within the context of negotiations on this issue in 
multilateral fora" seems to reflect the shared view of India and Pakistan to 
work together against the existing discriminatory International regimes and 
policies of disarmament. While agreeing to reaffirm a unilateral moratorium on 
further nuclear tests, the joint statement also shows consciousness for "their 
obligation to their people and the international community." It is perhaps 
indicative of the two countries endorsing international concern related to 
nuclear security in South Asia.^^Despite the assurance by the nuclear-weapon 
states that they will not the first to initiate a war, the continuing standoff 
between the nuclear power states have kept the fear alive. The best approach 
would be to reduce the fear of 'first strike' in the adversaries' mind, a 
combination of 'no first use', de-alterated arsenal and meaningful confidence 
building measures would be a preferred option. 
Nuclear weapon status of South Asia would inevitably make more 
complex the managements conflict and military risks. Nuclear weapon in the 
sub-continent is a reality. Hence, a range of measures is required to put into 
place, both to make the conflict threshold stable and to reassure the states in the 
region. Nuclear CBMs would be first such measures. Nuclear weapon states in 
the region need to demonstrate their commitment to prevent arms race and 
ability to manage nuclear capability with responsibility. Nuclear safety should 
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be the emphasis of such measures the countries could also make allowances for 
the need for mutual technical assistance in the event of inadvertent nuclear 
accidents. 
The crisis resolution ability is vital here, which refers to the ability to . 
resolve a crisis as soon as it erupts. While crisis prevention is likely to be 
difficult in the current situation, crisis management and crisis resolution has 
been adroitly handled in the region in the past. Nuclear missile risk reduction 
measures are vital for crisis resolution given the weaponized deterrence of the 
two countries. Elementary logic would inform here that if the risk of use of 
nuclear weapons is to be reduced, the potential for arms conflict across its fiill 
spectrum may be drastically reduced. This is turn would require discussion on 
military doctrines, defence expenditures, conventional force reduction, and 
philosophy of the use of force besides creating for greater transparency in 
military postures.'"' 
The apprehension of strategic stability being fragile in the region 
remains the cause of concern for many observers of South Asia across the 
world. While both India and Pakistan believe in each other's deterrent 
capability, both of them have identified security vulnerabilities pertaining to 
possible accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. To assuage 
international and regional concerns related to the risk of miscalculations and 
misperceptions, there is need for evolving mutually agreed frameworks of 
bilateral confidence-building. The two countries different of perceptions related 
to nuclear security are likely to continue as long as Pakistan does not shed 
ambiguity in doctrinal formulations. By maintaining ambiguity, Pakistan wants 
to keep the nuclear threshold high in the region. Mutual consultations on 
security concepts and nuclear doctrines may help to bridge the gap of mutual 
mistrust. Such consultations may be veiled under official secrecy, but they also 
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accompany mutual assurance in public. A significant step in this direction 
could be to mutually develop some postulates on nuclear signaling at 
appropriate levels in the respective govenunents. 
However, some bumps on the road ahead may be related to issues 
affecting stability in the region, like Pakistan's control over cross-border 
terrorism, its efforts to derail the peace process on issues related to Kashmir 
and its own internal domestic weaknesses. Agauist this backdrop, the linking of 
nuclear confidence-building to other issues of traditional hostility between 
India and Pakistan may slow down the process of nuclear confidence-building 
in the region. It does not, however, exclude the fear of nuclear material and 
technology falling into the wrong hands in Pakistan. 
In essence, the issue of nuclear terrorism can be addressed effectively at 
multilateral levels rather than at the bilateral levels of India and Pakistan. The 
earlier CBMs such as to provide advance notification of ballistic missile test-
flights, maintain a unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear testing 
till the sovereignty right is not jeopardized, the joint declaration of August 
1992 on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and existing commimication 
links between DGMOs or Prime Minister's offices, have shown workable 
precedents which lay emphasis on mutual benefits in security matters. But a 
review of the effectiveness of past measures would help ascertain the 
authenticity of prevailing communication links to control escalation. There 
remains an element of uncertainty as to how Pakistan would react in case of a 
conventional military conflict. However, it can be said that despite rhetoric, 
neither side wants a nuclear conflict. To re-ensure nuclear stability, the recent 
diplomatic initiatives by India and Pakistan towards confidence-building that 
have resumed under the composite dialogue process since January 6, 2004, are 
progressing well, but still have a long way to go.^' 
i ss > 
REFERENCES: 
1. Maj Gen (Retd) D. K. Palit and P. K. S. Namboodiri, Pakistan's Islamic 
Bomb, Vikas, New Delhi, 1979, p. V. 
2. T. Shivaji Rao, Environmental Impact, paper presented at a symposium 
on the Nuclear Power, Costs and Relevance of an Energy Resources 
cited in Seminar 370, June 1990, p.51. 
3. Ferguson Joseph and Tarleton Gael, Nuclear Asia, Conference Brief 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2005, p.2. available at 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub694.pdf 
4. Rajain Arpit, Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia : China, India and 
Pakistan, Sage Publications, New Delhi - Thousand Oaks - London, 
2005, p.208. 
5. H. M. Kimiar Sanjeev, Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: 
Perspectives on India - Pakistan Relations, Uppal Publishing House, 
New Delhi, 2007, p. 147. 
6. Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, May 19,1974. 
7. Patriot, New Delhi, June 8, 1974. 
8. Cheema Zafar Iqbal, Supra, No. 16, pp. 103-04. 
9. http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd63/63nr07.htm 
lO.Laniece Henri and Huria Sonali, Indo-Pak Nuclear Tests: Ten Years 
After, Report of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) 
Workshop Organised on 16"" May 2008. 
U.Mahmood Tehmina, India and Pakistan's Nuclear Explosions: An 
Analysis, Pakistan Horizon, institute of international affairs, Karachi, 52 
(1), January 1999, pp.39-46. 
12.Paranjpe Srikant, India, Pakistan and Nuclear Tests, The Symbolism 
and Priorities, World Affairs, 38 (21), May 13, 2000, p.l3. 
0')= 
n.Wadhra Charan D., Costs of Economic Sanctions: Aftermath of 
Pokhranll, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 33 No. (26), June 27, 
1998, p. 1607. 
14. Ibid. 
15. Ibid. 
16.Shahabuddin Syed, Will Nuclear War Resolve the Kashmir Problem?, 
Mainstream, Vol. 40 (27), June 22,2002, p. 102. 
n.Depankh, Supra, No-36, p. 14. 
IS.Mishra Rajesh Kumar, India-Pakistan: Nuclear Stability and 
Diplomacy, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), Vol-29, 
No-1, January-March 2005, p.l 18. 
19.Rajain Arpit, Nuclear Deterrence in South Aisa: China, India and 
Pakistan, Sage Publications, New Delhi, Thousand Oaks - London, 
2005,p.281. 
20. Kerr Paul, Nikin Mary Beth, Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
Report for Congress, Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and 
Security Issues, Order Code RL34248, June 20, 2008, p-CRS-1 
21.Ibid.p-CRS-4 
22.Ibid.p-CRS-5 
23. The Hindu News Paper, Vol.132, No. 108, Thursday, May 7, 2009. 
24. Pregenezer Arian L., Security Nuclear Capabilities in India and 
Pakistan: Reducing the Terrorist and Proliferation Risks, The 
Nonproliferation Review, 2003, p. 124. 
25.Kampam Gaurav, Seven Years After the Nuclear Tests: Appraising 
South Asia's Nuclear Realities, Monterey Institute of International 
Studies, June 2005, pp. 4-5. 
26. Wayne C. Mc Williams and Harry Piotrowski, The World Since 1947: 
History of International Relations, Viva Books, New Delhi, 2008, p. 
533. 
^ ^ ( 60 ) -
27.Kerr Paul, Nikin Mary Beth, CRS Report for Congress, Pakistan's 
Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, Order Code 
RL34248, June 20, 2008, pp-CRS-6-7. 
28. P. R. Chari, Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema and Stephen P. Cohen, Four Crises 
and A Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia, Harper 
Collins Publishers, New Delhi, 2008, p. 34. 
29. Kumar Neha, Tit-for-Tat Missiles Tests by India and Pakistan, Institute 
of IPCS, Article No-2370, September 14, 2007. 
30.Mishra Rajesh Kumar, India-Pakistan: Nuclear Stability and 
Diplomacy, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, Vol-29, No-1, 
January-March 2005, p. 120. 
31.Raju Adluri Subramanyam, Reconstructing South Asia an Agenda: 
Gyan Publishing House, New Delhi, 2007, p.87. 
i 6, y 
CHAPTER 4 
INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS 
SINCE LAHORE DECLARATION 
Introduction 
Inl988 andl989 Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Rajive Gandhi 
continued rapprochement policy on the expectation of peaceful and cordial 
relations between India and Pakistan. The end of the Cold War provided India 
and Pakistan the opportunities to develop the concept of cooperation and 
coexistence in their mindsets; they proceeded in the direction of peace, security 
and solidarity in their practices. The desire of peace, recognition of the futility 
of confrontation and the utility of Confidence-Building Measures, the 
cumulative impact of 'track two diplomacy' and the intent to succeed in a 
dialogue process have all strengthened the peace processes in recent years. 
Track Two Diplomacy and People to People Contact 
Since President Zia-ur-Rahman of Bangladesh circulated a letter 
proposing the establishment of the SAARC in 1980, the process of regional 
cooperation and conflict resolution has attracted the interest of the non-
government community in South Asia. Many initiatives involving academics, 
former government officials, grassroots workers, technical experts, the media, 
trade and industry have been launched to promote people to people confidence 
building measures. The rising awareness of the implications of the arms race, 
particularly in the nuclear sector, has recently led to a change in the emphasis 
from cooperation to conflict resolution.' 
'Track II diplomacy' occupies a specialized position as it entrusts the 
non-state institutions to play an important role by involving some interface 
with the governments and the non-state players in a conflict resolution game. 
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Thus track two diplomacy is a process of non-state or un-official dialogue 
between diiputing statoi initintod with tho help of a third pRrty or oitigenn 
having access to their governments who could influence public opinions. Such 
possibilities always exist between two democratic states. In the South Asian 
context, th« retired bursRuornts nnd military offieeri, doholftni, mediR pdmonH 
and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) have taken the role in 'Track II 
Diplomacy'. It need political acceptability of the states involved for pursuing 
these measures without which CBMs would be inclined to operate in a 
vacuum.^  
Track two diplomacy is a process of active interaction between 
individuals in countries in dispute who in their private capacities exchange 
innovBtive idenn and vfinwHS plnHnlfele options with or withmit the prler 
knowledge of the authorities and governments of their respective countries. 
However, these types of interactions and exchanges are not officially 
authorized or mandated from either of the governments. Government officials 
at the very least, under Track-II diplomacy, have the benefit of the valuable 
feedback and input that could possibly be expanded in Track One dialogue with 
some modifications or alterations. Track II diplomacy is often defined as a 
process of unofficial dialogue among non-official representatives of the parties 
locked in a dispute.'' 
The basic objective of Track II is to prevent conflict and to facilitate the 
process of conflict resolutions. Being influential persons most of the members 
of the Track II concept have either direct access to their governments or are in a 
position to effectively influence the public opinion in their respective countries. 
The governments are informed either directly or by suggestions floated through 
the media. The major objectives of the Track II diplomacy are ; to make 
attempts to resolve ongoing disputes; to discourage and prevent the emergence 
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of new disputes; to make efforts with a view to bring the two estranged 
countries and societies closer by introducing innovative and workable 
confidence CBMs. Indeed, it is the most difftcuU objective to Bttain, especially 
if the dispute has lasted for more than a decade/ 
Track II diplomacy is more important for India and Pakistan. At a time 
when India and Pakistan are neither at war nor in peace, CBMs between the 
two neighbours require initiated. This could be achieved through enhancement 
of cultural, educational and sporting contacts, relaxation of visa regimes and 
evolution of practical mechanism to deal with the humanitarian issues of the 
civilian prisoners and fishemien held in either country. The wider the support 
among the inflectional section of the society, traders, businessmen, politicians, 
media persons and other opinion makers, the greater the chance of success. 
Even though there is a tremendous desire among the people of India and 
Pakistan for freer contacts, the political will to promote this has been lacking 
on the part of their governments. 
Both India and Pakistan that only pay lip services to the idea of friendly 
exchanges is evident from the fact that despite several agreements in the past, 
virtually nothing has been achieved. It can be recalled that, during the 1980s, 
India and Pakistan took some steps to strengthen good neighbourly relations. In 
March 1983, the two countries agreed to set up a joint commission to promote 
cooperation in non-military and non-political fields. In 1989, in the third 
meeting of the Indo-Pak joint commission, discussion was once again held for 
promoting tourism and extending better visa facilities. A three year cultural 
exchange programme was approved for cooperation in various fields such as 
education, art, culture, sports, exchange of newspapers and periodicals, 
participation in each other's film festivals, and exchange of books and films 
delegations and radio and TV professionals. It was also agreed that school text 
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books would be revised to ensure that there is no misperception in them about 
either country. The complementarities of India and Pakistani needs in the field 
of education; science and technology, vocational training and cultural contacts 
are obvious. Nevertheless, during his visit to India in 2005, President 
Musharraf and PM of India decided to revive the joint commission of 1983. If 
the strategy is to make friends, India need unilaterally encourage visits of 
ordinary people, journalists and academicians. Fortunately, some of these have 
been started. India may encourage intellectual intimacy through scholarship 
distribution. Research Centers including Indian Council of Social Science 
Research (ICSSR) required research budget for collaborative social sciences to 
contribute to improving the Indo-Pak relations from the non government sector. 
Whoever might be in power in Pakistan, some unilateral actions by India will 
surely help in improving trade and business with Pakistan.' 
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) 
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) are those steps or agreements on 
which the states agree with mutual benefit in mind, and states have faith that 
such agreement shall be obeyed by all the concerned. It could include diverse 
arrangements - such as hotlines, people-to-people exchanges, and prior 
notifications of military exercises - that can help reduce tensions and promote 
good neighbourly relations. These steps or agreements ultimately develop trust 
between the states and help in having peace and stability in the region. The 
goal of confidence and security building measures is to reduce or eliminate the 
cause of mistrust, fear, tensions and hostilities. But the most important aspect 
of Confidence Security Building Measures (CSBMs) is to create a climate in 
which even the most complicated issues are subjected to analysis and 
discussion aimed at resolving them. 
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With the phenomenal and rapid spread of chemical, lethal and nuclear 
weapon in the world, the CBMs seem to bo only a panacea in the hands of 
nation states through which they can cure their security and non-security 
maladies. They work effectively until their sovereign and territorial integrity is 
threatened. The moment the border of a country's is crossed, the credibility of 
confidence-building measures is questioned and discredited. They show their 
strength where they are least needed but they do not yield ftuits where they are 
most needed. Hence, better the stability, greater the chance of success. Even 
during the cold war, the CBMs were viewed as a tension reduction measure 
between the super power, the USA and the USSR. CBMs have been 
undermined many times in the past in the case of India and Pakistan because of 
which they fought four wars in 1947-48, 1965, 1971 and 1999. CBMs have 
exceedingly confined to military and political textual agreements in the 
bilateral relations of the countries. However, these political and military CBMs 
either have not sustained or have remained totally emasculated and ineffective.^  
These CBMs have been addressed mostly to those who have serious stake 
holding in perpetuating the conflict. The fate of many of these crucial CBMs 
has often been determined by inept and highly unstable political regimes, 
insecure military generals and inward looking bureaucrats. 
However, notwithstanding the above lacunas in confidence-building 
process, this is the time to ponder over the vital question new CBMs. The two 
critical interventions in this regard could be firstly by promoting people to 
people contacts and secondly by designing layers of economic exchanges and 
interactions. Concerning the first point, India and Pakistan have intensified 
their effort in order to enhance people-to-people contact at different levels. In 
April 2005, they linked both Kashmirs with Sri Nagar and Muzaffarabad 
through bus service. In the similar vein, both the governments linked Munabao 
of Indian Rajasthan with Khokhrapar in Sindh of Pakistan by train, and 
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Amritser-Nankanasaheb by bus. Peace has now increased in Kashmir. It has 
helped people to improve their per capita income. Tourists are flowing into 
Kashmir in large number.'' 
A look at the history of relations over six decades shows that India and 
Pakistan have in fact moved forward on CBMs even as state-to-state relations 
remained poor. A major drawback of Indian diplomacy in Pakistan has been a 
consistent failure to create any Indian consistency. In other neighbouring 
countries, India has created a strong Indian constituency based on traditional 
goodwill, constant and varied interactions and institutional exchanges. But 
there is none in Pakistan. As a result, the orientation of entire Pakistani civil 
society and people at grass roots has remained exclusively state driven. 
However, the Indian and Pakistani relationship is complex and works at many 
levels. The complexity of the Indian and Pakistani relationship provides 
glimmers of hope that progress can occur in some areas of interaction even 
while there are major setbacks in others. 
Bus Diplomacy between India and Pakistan 
In the mid nineties, the amplitude of discord between India and Pakistan 
intensified owing to several reasons. Significantly, the outbreak of militant 
activities ushered in with the proxy war of Pakistan in Kashmir, leading to 
further deterioration of the situation in the valley. The dialogue process also 
was rendered to be atrophy, due to the outbreak of the proxy war. Moreover, 
nuclear testing by India and Pakistan and the subsequent developments further 
pushed the bilateral relations between the two countries, to a downcast and a 
heartsick posture. 
In this crucial moment the then prime minister A B Vajpayee took 
various confidence building and diplomatic measures to bridge the relations 
between India and Pakistan. The first significant step in this direction was the 
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decision to start a bus service from New Delhi to Lahore. On February 19, 
1999 the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee embarked on a historic • 
visit to Pakistan, traveling on the inaugural bus service connecting the Indian 
capital of New Delhi with the major Pakistani city of Lahore, establishing a 
major transport link for the peoples of both nations. The inaugural bus also 
carried Indian celebrities and dignitaries such as Dev Anand, Satiish Gujral, 
Javed Akhtar, Kuldip Nayar, Kapil Dev, Shatrughan SinhaAND Mallika 
Sarabhai. He was received amidst great fanfare and media attention at the 
Pakistani border post of Wagah by his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif, 
with whom he had been at loggerheads a year before over the nuclear tests 
controversy. The summit was hailed worldwide as a major breakthrough and 
milestone in bilateral relations and a historic step towards ending conflict and 
tensions in the region. The objective was not only to boost and uplift the 
declining stature of bilateral relations; it was also a diplomatic innovation, 
primarily to brace people to people contact and to bring uniformity of interest 
between citizens of the two countries. 
The notion was that the new step would facilitate the citizens on both 
sides of the border to fathom the exact nature of disputes between their 
countries, so that broad framework could be evolved for discovering feasible 
solutions to the exasperated conflict. It was a very small step, but not less 
exciting, for that in a situation where in people-to-people contact , were 
snapped almost completely, its symbolic significance is not be minimized.^The 
ingenious step was positively received by Pakistan an after a few weeks of 
official deliberations, India and Pakistan on 12* February 1999, signed a 
formal agreement for New Delhi-Lahore bus service.' The noble endeavor of 
the Indian Govenmient was embellished with the aimouncement that the Prime 
Minister of India A B Vajpayee would travel to Lahore in the maiden run of the 
newly laimched bus service and this became like icing cakes and cookies. 
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Vajpayee's visit to Pakistan was the first by an Indian Prime Minister in 
a decade-the last one was by Rajive Gandhi in July 1988. On his arrival at 
Wagha, Vajpayee described the visit as a "defining moment" in South Asian 
history. It was a 24-hour visit, but as Vajpayee claimed: "It was brief, but 
substantive".'''it was hoped that the little step taken in the right direction would 
make a soothing impact upon the complex milieu of Indo-Pakistan relations. It 
was felt that, Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpaee's bus trip to Lahore across 
the Attri Wagha border would mark the beginning of new dawn in Indo-
Pakistan relations." 
Lahore Declaration-1999 
The Lahore Declaration was the first major political agreement between 
the two nations since the 1972 Shirala Agreement that formally established 
peaceful relations in the aftennath of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 and 
committed both nations to resolving bilateral disputes by peaceful dialogue and 
co-operation. Bilateral relations were transformed and tensions heightened 
when India conducted the Pokhran-II nuclear tests on May 11 and May 13, 
1998, establishing itself as a nuclear weapons power. Pakistan soon responded 
with its own nuclear tests in Chagai Hills, bringing the specter of nuclear 
conflict to South Asia. 
The Lahore Declaration was a bilateral agreement between India and 
Pakistan signed on February 21, 1999 by the then-Prime Minister of India Atal 
Bihari Vajpayee and the then Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif at the 
conclusion of a historic summit in Lahore, Pakistan. The Lahore Declaration 
signaled a major breakthrough in overcoming the historically strained bilateral 
relations between the two nations in the aftermath of the nuclear tests carried 
out by both nations in May 1998, but would soon loose impetus with the 
outbreak of the Kargil War in May 1999. 
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The Lahore Declaration contains major policy objectives. These 
includes mutual consultation over CBMs regarding nuclear and conventional 
forces; advance notification before ballistic missile tests; reducing risks of 
accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; prior notification by either 
side in the event of any such incident and adoption of measure to reduce the 
risk of such actions. The two leaders reaffirmed their faith on the moratorium 
on further nuclear tests unless extraordinary situations jeopardize their security 
interests. All these areas of mutual concern require concrete action to work out 
agreements to implement the plan of action on the agreed areas. Especially in 
the sphere of advance notification on missile tests, an immediate agreement is 
necessary to dispel doubts and apprehensions about such tests. Moreover, and 
agreement on reduction of accidents and unauthorized or unexplained incidents 
that might lead to a nuclear war is of prime importance given the level of 
mistrust and suspicion that a characterize Indo-Pak relations. Thus, some level 
of confidence in the nuclear and missile related areas has become extremely 
important. 
The MoU and joint declaration have identified significant issues which 
need further discussion for concrete action. It reinforces optimism in both 
sides. However, the necessary steps required to implement can be time 
consuming. The joint statement focuses on areas of mutual interest and 
comprise: the periodical meetings of Foreign Secretaries to discuss issues of 
mutual concern, consultation on World Trade Organization (WTO) related 
issues, cooperation in the fields of information technology, further liberalizing 
the visa and travel regime, appointment of a two-member committee at 
ministerial level to examine humanitarian issues relation to civilian detainees 
and missing prisoners of war.'^  
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However, the Lahore process turned to be a fiasco. The jubilant 
optimism that dawned at the time when a bilateral agreement was reached 
between India and Pakistan at Lahore after a pause of over two decades was 
doomed in the recreant act of Pakistan in Kargil which again prostrated the 
geniality of relations between the two. As noted by Devesh Kapur: ''At the end 
of 1999, India's relation with Pakistan was at a lowest level not seen since 
1971. The optimism that marked Vajpayee's historic Lahore visit in February 
1999 proved short lived, when Pak intruders were found occupying the high 
mountains well within the Indian side of the line of control, in the Kargil 
sector of Kashmir." '^  
The Karga Crisis May 1999 
After the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, there had been a long period with 
relatively few direct armed conflicts involving the military forces of the two 
neighbors-notwithstanding the efforts of both nations to control the Siachen 
Glacier by establishing military outposts on the surrounding mountains ridges 
and resulting military skirmishes in the 1980s. During the 1990s, however, 
escalating tensions and conflict due to separatist activities in Kashmir, some of 
which were supported by Pakistan, as well as the conducting of nuclear tests by 
both countries in 1998, lead to an increasingly belligerent atmosphere. In an 
attempt to defuse the situation, both countries signed the Lahore Declaration in 
February 1999, promising to provide a peaceful and bilateral solution to the 
Kashmir conflict. 
The Kargil War, also known as the Kargil conflict, was an armed 
conflict between India and Pakistan that took place between May and July 1999 
in the Kargil district of Kashmir. The cause of the war was the infiltration of 
Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of 
the Line of Control (LoC), which serves as the de facto border between the two 
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states. During and directly after the war, Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely 
on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind by casualties 
and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff 
showed involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces, led by General Ashraf 
Rashid. A part of Kashmir is under Pakistani control. This part is known as 
Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) in India and as Azad Kashmir (free or 
independent Kashmir) in Pakistan. Through this Pakistan was able to deploy 
Kashmiri fighters to fight alongside its regular forces. 
Pakistan's misadventure in Kargil came as a surprise to India, because 
after the signing of Lahore declaration, the perception in the India clique and 
media was that Indo-Pakistan relations had been brought back on rails. But this 
proved to be a serious misunderstanding. The diplomatic initiative so 
magnanimously launched was in Pakistan when intruders perforated the line of 
control and captured the mountains of Kargil sector. The Pakistani Government 
keeping close nexus with militant groups of Kashmir was dubbed by veteran 
South Asian observer Stephen Cohen as "brilliant militarily but disastrous 
politically caught India by surprise".'"* 
One of the primary reasons for the outbreak of Kargil conflict was the 
truculent terrorist activities place in the region that created a war like situation. 
It demonstrated an escalation of the already existing tension. The Kargil 
intrusion does not connote a detached event. Infiltration across the line of 
control when the snow dissipates in the summer is not an unprecedented 
happening. Nor the Kargil fixation of the Pakistani military is secret to the 
India armed forces and the intelligence set up. Since the war of 1971, shelling 
across the line of control has been a regular affair.'* But the Kargil crisis was 
distinct from the regular intrusions because it was an obvious attempt made by 
Pakistani army to physically occupy the territory on the Indian side. 
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Some of the fundamental causes of Kargil crisis include the 
geographical difficulties of the region. It is one of the coldest and highest areas 
in the world. Hence defence of Kargil poses a serious challenge to Indian 
security forces. Such bottlenecks have not only led o the recent Kargil crisis but 
he recurring of more Kargil type intrusions is always impending. Besides, the 
lacuna in India's intelligence set up and the failure of surveillance techniques 
have also been exposed. As the crisis escalated, the diplomatic maneuvering 
intensified. President Clinton called the India and Pakistani Prime Ministers on 
June 14-15 urging both sides to resist widening the conflict.'^ At this critical 
juncture senior Indian official informed Washington that India might be 
compelled to escalate operation. Deeply concerned about this prospect, Clinton 
sent commander in chief of US Central Command Gen. Anthony Zinni to 
Pakistan to end the Kargil operation. Finally it came to an end with loss of 
humanity and other paraphernalia both sides." 
But it is a distorted view that the outbreak of conflict in Kargil was 
basically due to the failure of intelligence. It seems that the lack of co-
ordination between the administration, military and intelligence contributed to 
the Kargil crisis. Above all, the most significant cause was that the intuitions of 
Indian elite regarding the motives of Pakistan were inaccurate. The Indian 
coterie demonstrated a lack of insight when it was in a hallucination that after 
the Lahore peace initiative and the declared nuclear status of both the countries, 
Pakistan would not engage in a military venture with India. But this proved to 
be shattered and India again confronted with an unprovoked incursion in 
Kashmir. The Indian military force launched a severe offensive against the 
intruders. The operation 'Vijay' as it was called, aimed at driving out the 
intruders without crossing the line of control and ensuring that the issue was 
not international. Hence the Indian army maintained strict military restraint. 
Thus, after nearly three months of military operation the Indian security forces 
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were able to drive out the intruders and recapture the seven strategic heights of 
Kargil sector. 
But for this, the nation had to bear a heavy loss in terms of the lives of 
soldiers and it imposed a severe economic burden upon the country. Indication 
this, the Indian Prime Minister stated: "Operation Vijay was a great success 
fought at the cost of approximately 400 and over 600 injured. We owe it to 
these martyrs to learn from the mistakes made, so that assaults on our 
sovereignty do not become a recurring feature".' 
In the Kargil crisis India not only achieved a military victory, but it was 
also crowned with a diplomatic victory. The nation got an unequivocal support 
from the international community and its diplomacy and the pohcy of military 
restraint was widely acknowledged. On the other hand, Pakistan receives a 
scathing response for its defiant action in Kargil and was severely condemned 
for its infernal war crisis, disrespecting the LoC, augmenting tension on the 
border, disregarding the spirit of Shimla accord and the Lahore declaration and 
it was diplomatically isolated. Pakistan criticized by other countries for 
allowing its paramilitary forces and insurgents to cross the Line of Control. 
Pakistan's primary diplomatic response, one of plausible deniability linking the 
incursion to what it officially termed as "Kashmiri freedom fighters", was in 
the end not successful. Veteran analysts argued that the battle was fought at 
heights where only seasoned troops could survive, so poorly equipped freedom 
fighters would neither have the ability nor the competence to seize land and 
defend it. 
G8 nations supported India and condemned the Pakistani violation of the 
LoC at the Cologne summit in Germany in 1999. The European Union also 
opposed Pakistan's violation of the LoC. China, a long-time ally of Pakistan, 
did not intervene in Pakistan's favour, insisting on a pullout of forces to the 
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LoC and setting border issues peacefully. Other organizations like the 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum too 
supported India's stand on the inviolability of the LoC. Faced with growing 
international pressure, Sharif managed to pull back the remaining soldiers from 
Indian Territory. The joint statement issued by Clinton and Sharif conveyed the 
need to respect the Line of Control and resume bilateral talks as the best forum 
to resolve all disputes. Thus, the Kargil crisis was a trouble turned into a boon 
for India, in terms of international support that it was able to gamer, especially 
from the U.S. 
The crisis brought complex implication for indo-Pakistan relations. Due 
to the increased military buildup, the tensions in Kashmir heightened, above 
all, India lost all he faith it had on Pakistan because of its perfidy despite 
India's abiding exactions to promote peace in the region. In the end, despite 
numerous similarities between the Indians and Pakistanis that favour a closer 
interaction and friendly ties between them, there are a few issues which have 
set them wide apart. Kashmir definitely ranks the top most among the subjects 
of discord between the two. Kargil has of late assumed a prominent position in 
the hst of those matters, seeking perpetuate Indo-Pakistan division.'^  
The October 1999 Military Coup 
Nawaz Sharif had surrounded himself by friends and family members. 
His respect for independent law courts and a free press was limited. The 
government ordered tax investigations of those editors who published critical 
articles. In 1997, a mob of Nawaz Sharif s supporters ransacked the Supreme 
Court of Justice, smashing part of its furniture. He even replaced President 
Leghari who had voiced support for an independent judiciary, by an old family 
friend from Lahore, Rafiq Tarar. The only institution not yet under his control 
was the army. When Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat, gave a 
{n} 
critical speech in October 1998, he was replaced within two days. Nawaz 
Sharif wanted to appoint another family friend, General Khwaja Ziauddin, who 
aUbougb being Rrmy engineer bfld no exporionco in the coro RStivitiod of Uie 
military. He would thus not have been acceptable to the anny. Despite serious 
doubts, Sharif appointed General Pervez Musharraf as a last resort. Ziauddin 
became director general of the secret service, Inter Service Intelligence (ISI). In 
spring 1999, the Kargil incident caused a major split between the Army Chief 
and the Prime Minister. The Pakistan army had crossed the line of control and 
secured some strategic points in the snowy mountains of Kashmir around 
Kargil .The troops had made significant territorial gains.^ " 
Army was not at all happy at Sharif s decision to withdraw the forces 
rendering the military a loser in the whole power game. Series of events, from 
General Karamat's sacking to Sharif s Shariah Law to Kargil withdrawal, had 
led the army to believe that Sharif was trying to offset Army's influence in 
country's affairs. Army had started to plan a coup. At the army's headquarters 
in Rawalpindi, it had been decided that if Sharif took another step against the 
Army's will, he will be overthrown. Sharif was aware of the whole scenario 
and knew where to look for help. In September 1999, he sent his brother 
Shahbaz to Washington to inform them that all was not well in Islamabad. 
According to Bruce Riedel, special adviser to the President of United States, 
Shahbaz was interested in making Washington realize that his brother needed 
Washington's help to say in power."' He told Clinton that a military coup was 
inevitable, but Washington denied and such intelligence information. Clinton 
told him that Washington won't interfere in the internal affairs of any other 
country, a claim that could be found falls in many other examples. 
The final nail in Sharif s coffin arrived on the evening of 12"* October, 
1999 when Musharraf was aboard a plane on his way back from Sri Lanka, he 
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provoked the army to rebel by sacking him. Sharif made the grave mistake of 
not taking the army in confidence before committing such attempt. Musharraf s 
plane was bound for Karachi when Sharif sacked him. Karachi airport's run 
way lights had been turned off and the runway was blocked by fire vehicles. 
Musharraf was called to the cockpit of the plane and was told about the whole 
situation. He was told that his plane won't be allowed to land anywhere in 
Pakistan jeopardizing the lives of hundreds of people in that plane. The pilot 
told him that the plane did not have much fuel to continue to Dubai and 
Musharraf won't agree to land in India. 
He asked the pilot to inform the authorities about the situation and how 
it could end hundreds of innocent lives. Sharif was made aware of this fact, and 
he asked General Ziauddin, the newly appointed army chief, to take over the 
Nawabshah airport in northern Sindh, and ordered the plane to be refueled and 
forced to leave. By this time Army had become aware of the ground realities 
and took charge of the things. They took over Sharif s residence and put him 
under house arrest. The newly appointed army chief was with Sharif and he 
was taken into custody as well. The next step that army took was to take over 
Karachi Airport and inform the pilot to come back to Karachi. Musharaff was 
made aware of the ground situation, but he was not ready to believe it. He 
considered it as a plant to capture him. He ordered the plane to stay in air 
despite the fact that the fliel was going down. It was not until he had talked to a 
close friend who was a general in army that he decided to land in Karachi.^ ^ 
The aftermath of the whole 12* October scenario came in the shape of 
the military coup. The list of reasons may go on and but the fact remains that 
the incidents that led to 12* October, include the running over of the Supreme 
Court by Sharif s supporters, removal of General Jehangir Karamat, the nuclear 
tests of May 1998, Shariah law and Kargil war. Sharif stood alone amidst the 
- - - ( " ) - -~ - --
Military, US and Pakistan public, did not help him because they were annoyed 
at him for nuclear tests and Kargil war." 
India-Pakistan Relations during Musharraf Period 
Eight years of Musharraf era has been a sea change in the Indo-Pak 
bilateral relationship. This change has become possible, perhaps even 
inevitable, in the new world that witnessed after September 11, 2001 but 
Musharraf, can also take a large measure of credit for this change. This was not 
an easy road for Musharraf to travel. He did not start the process of bilateral 
relationship with India on a clean state, which indeed was as messy as it could 
get. General Musharraf, when he staged his coup against Nawaz Sharief, was 
more unpopular in India than perhaps any Pakistani leaders since Jinnah 
created the new country. He was the architect of the Kargil adventure and 
immensely proud of his role in it. The change in Musharraf s approach to India 
was neither easy nor sudden. He initially thought that Kargil was a very 
successful operation from Pakistan perspective, and perhaps still does, as it put 
the international spothght on the Kashmir issue. 
Musharraf started his India file by virtually rejecting the Lahore 
declaration (1999) and Shimla Agreement (1972) as the basis for resolving all 
bilateral disputes between India and Pakistan. He maintained this position, 
along with an almost arrogant swagger, during the Agra Summit in July 2001, 
when he refused to accept any reference to the ending of cross-border terrorism 
in Kashmir and cancelled the rest of his trip to India. 
However, the eight years under Musharraf seen some tremendous strides 
in all aspects of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan. Travel between 
the two countries is more normal than at any time since the creation of two 
countries; buses, trains and air services has been expanded. The people-to-
people contact has had the desired effect. Another leader could not have made a 
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complete about-turn in his policies towards India as Musharraf did. A civilian 
leader would ahnost certainly have been vetoed by military, including ISI, in 
any radical departure from historical positions vis-a-vis India in general and 
Kashmir in particular. Musharraf s personality, especially his penchant for 
taking quick decisions and decisive actions xmder the changed circumstances in 
which Pakistan found itself following the US 'war on terror' undoubtedly 
played a significant part in changing the direction of India-Pakistan relations. 
The Agra Summit-2001 
The Agra Summit was a two-day Summit held on July IS"' and 16*, 
2001 between Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister 
Atal Bihari Vajpayee. It was organized with the aim to resolve long-standing 
issues between India and Pakistan. However, the Summit collapsed after two 
days and no formal agreement could be attained. The two sides remained 
inflexible on the core issue of Kashmir, despite five long and arduous one-to-
one rounds between the two leaders and hours of discussion between the two 
delegations. Despite the failure of the talks. General Pervez Musharraf joined 
Vajpayee to call on the two countries to bury their past. He also invited the 
Indian Prime Minister to visit Pakistan as he felt that the issues between 
Pakistan and India were much more complicated and could not be resolved a 
short time. 
The decision of the Prime Minister received lot of admiration and hopes 
were expressed that the Agra Summit would open new avenues for establishing 
a harmonious relationship between the two countries. But the antagonists 
debated the logic of holding a summit meeting with General Musharraf who 
had master minded the Kargil misadventure and he was also not a 
democratically elected head of state. So the validity of Musharraf as the leader 
of Pakistan was questioned. But these arguments did not stall the peace 
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initiative and it was decided that the summit meeting would be held on 15 and 
16* July 2001 at the historic city of Taj- Agra. The reason for holding the 
summit in Agra indicated the willingness of the Government to bring an 
atmosphere of informality to the deliberations of the summit. 
The primary motivations driving the decision of Vajpayee led 
Government to invite Musharraf for a summit level meeting was divers. 
Prominent among them being the keermess to maintain continuity in peace 
process, after the Government's decision not to extend the cease-fire in the 
Kashmir valley, and pressures by the international community specially the US 
Government to initiate a dialogue with Pakistan that broke off after Kargil 
War.^ '' For Pakistan President Mr. Musharraf the invitation was a boon in 
disguise as he got a much needed opportunity to prove the legitimacy of his 
regime and show to his opponents at home and abroad that his regime was 
actively engaged in the direction of resolving the deadlock with India. 
The Summit began with a high note on 15* July 2001. But there was 
mutiny abode that cast a shadow on the deliberations and debilitated the spirit 
of the summit. At the outset there was no unanimity between India and 
Pakistan over the issues to be discussed. If India emphasized that cross border 
terrorism is the prominent issue in the agenda for discussion Pakistan asserted 
upon the single point agenda of Kashmir. This divergent approach to the 
summit forestalled the singing of any joint declaration, at the end of the 
summit. The differences between the two countries over the issue of 
participation of Hurriyath in the summit also played its own part in 
jeopardizing the enthusiasm. While India opposed any third party entry in the 
dialogue process, Pakistan indicated its willingness to involve the Hurriyats in 
the summit by inviting them for tea party hosted by Pakistan's high 
commissioner. 
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Even after two days of intensive deliberations, India and Pakistan were 
not successful in bringing out a joint declaration, because of their differences 
over Kashmir and cross border terrorism and the summit had to be continued 
for the third day. But even this proved to be futile and the summit had to be 
called off without singing any agreement. The critics call the summit a failure, 
because India went into it without any structured agenda and that is why 
general Musharraf high-jacked h by his single point agenda of Kashmir and 
hence the peace initiative of Vajpayee Government was a failure. 
But this was a myopic and pessimistic viewpoint. It can be said that the 
summit was not a failure but to put in the words of India's former foreign 
minister Jaswanth Singh it was 'inconclusive'. The summit was not a total 
failure, its utility hes in the fact that it facilitated the maintenance of continuity 
in the peace process and provided a broad framework for fiiture dialogue. As 
Vajpayee recognized in his speech describing the summit for the Indian 
Parliament, India and Pakistan need agree on a process for discussing their 
problems. A viable process would provide Pakistan with a setting for 
discussing Kashmir from the start, but would also accommodate the broader 
agenda prized by India. It would need the sustained personal backing of 
Musharraf and Vajpayee to survive the inevitable crisis that would interrupt it. 
Both countries would need steady leadership to persevere until they can sustain 
the strategic compromise a genuine settlement requires.'^ ^ 
India-Pakistan Relations after ll"' September 2001 
On 11* September 2001, the US was subjected to ghastly terrorist 
attacks in Washington, New York and Pennsylvania. It is reported that these 
terrorist strikes were masterminded by Osama Bin Laden who had the backing 
of Taliban regime of Afghanistan. When the US's requests to the Taliban to 
hand over the culprit were fruitless, it resorted to military action against the 
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Afghan Government which led to the dismantling of Taliban regime. The event 
ushered in the reviving of US-Pakistan rapprochement, because the US 
required Pakistan for providing logistical and strategic support in its operations 
against Afghanistan. Thus Washington indicated a tilt towards Islamabad and 
this was golden opportunity for the military establishment in Pakistan as 
General Musharraf could get legitimacy to his military junta from the west. 
Further it was felt that the US-Pakistan relations, which had reached a nadir 
after Kargil crisis would be revitalized. Hence, Pakistan decided in favour of 
supporting the US operations in Afghanistan. 
Indo-Pakistan relations did not remain uninfluenced by these 
developments in South Asia. After the global coalition against terrorism was 
formed under the leadership of the US, it was hoped that the situation in 
Kashmir would witness qualitative changes as the terrorist structures in PoK 
would be dismantled and Pakistan would take concrete steps to end fomenting 
of terrorism from its soil. But it is an irony that no improvement has been 
sighted. The terrorist activities in various parts of India remain unremitting. 
Pakistan seems to have not come under the pressure of the US, Primarily due to 
U.S.'s preference for Pakistan, for the sake of preserving its own strategic 
interests in the region. There may also be a reincarnation of U.S. Pakistan 
military alliance that characterized South Asian politics in the entire period of 
cold war. Shortly after the stunning terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 the 
US began a campaign against the forces of international terrorism. In his 
speech of September, George W. Bush referred "our war on terrorism begins 
with Al Qaeda but it does not end here"^* US immediately approached General 
Musharraf about Pakistan's role in the coming conflict. Surprisingly General 
Musharraf agreed to support the US in this direction. Musharraf stated that his 
decision was necessary to obtain objectives of Pakistan for Pakistan security 
economy, nuclear energy and Kashmir. India also offered unexpected 
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assistance-Indian intelligence also offered unprecedented cooperation including 
substantial information about Al-Qaeda and Taliban. But this effort reflected to 
capitalize on the changing international environment to create a deeper 
strategic relationship with US. US delayed in responding Indian offer 
reestablished close relations with Pakistan-consequently dashed Indian hopes. 
Thus the post September 11 scenario has brought intricate effects on the 
bilateral relations of India and Pakistan. In this regard, the triangular 
relationship between India, Pakistan and the US will be a major determinant of 
the nature of Indo-Pakistan relations in the future. The tensions between the 
two countries have aggravated because of these antecedents and there is 
likelihood that the atmosphere in Kashmir may worsen, as there is every 
chance after the US operations in Afghanistan may permeate into Kashmir if 
Pakistan does not adopt adequate measures to avert such probabilities. Thus the 
most conspicuous consequence was an upsurge of tensions in Kashmir, leading 
to clashes between India and Pakistan which have been locked in dispute over 
Kashmir for over 50 years. ^ ' 
Terrorist Attack on India's Parliament 
On 13* December 2001 Indians were startled with a shock when the 
heart of Indian democracy and emblem of the country's sovereignty and 
strength, Parliament complex was attacked by five terrorists belonging to the 
Pakistan based militant outfits Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba. The 
event sent an air of consternation in the sub-continent and the two nuclear 
neighbours were on the verge of another lethal war the consequences of which 
were inconceivable. Indo-Pakistan relations that had been recovering from the 
jolt of Kargil crisis were exposed to a convulsion that perturbed all hopes of 
restoring an environment of cordiality between the two countries. The top 
leadership in India expressed anguish and there was an open pronouncement 
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India's patience had been crossed. 
The Indian government handed over a list of twenty terrorists who were 
suspected to be sheltered in Pakistan and demanded their immediate 
extradition. But Pakistan did not act in a manner that was desirable and 
Pakistan's Procrastination exasperated Indian leadership. The ensuing events 
forced the weather between India and Pakistan reach to ebb. Both countries 
ordered the biggest mobilization of their armies in fifteen years up to a total of 
one million troops on each side of the border.'^The international community 
including the US was shocked by the developments in South Asia. The Bush 
administration urged the leadership in New Delhi to maintain restraint. 
Although the international community expressed profound disquiet over the 
matter, it showed the sense of disclaimer. In fact India's attempts to build a 
persuasive case to the world community against Pakistan's sponsorship of 
terrorism appeared to evoke only lukewarm international resonance.'^ 
Fortunately, for South Asia the situation did not flare of into a full-scale 
war and Indian military buildup only became a political brinkmanship without 
any desired outcomes. Instead it increased the economic burden because the 
centre had to incur heavy expenditure for stationing a mammoth array at the 
border. The event resulted in the serving of diplomatic ties between the two 
countries, with all links being blocked; including the Samjhauta Express, 
Delhi-Lahore bus service and air roots. The year 2002 was marked by rigorous 
military exercises on both sides of the border and heightened tensions. Any 
way wise counsels prevailed and considerable demilitarization on both sides 
led to gradual relaxation of the stress. 
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2001-2002 India-Pakistan Standoffs 
The 2001-2002 India-Pakistan standoffs was a military standoff between 
India and Pakistan that resulted in the amassing of troops on either side of the 
International Border (IB) and along ihe Line of Control (LoC) in the region of . 
Kashmir. This was the second major military standoff between India and 
Pakistan following the successful detonation of nuclear devices by both 
countries in 1998 and the most recent standoff between the nuclear rivals. The 
other had been the Kargil War. 
Offensive military buildup was initiated by India in response to a 
militant attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001 during which 
fourteen people, including the five men who attacked the building, were killed. 
India claimed that the attacks were carried out by two Pakistan based militant 
groups fighting Indian rule in Kashmir, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-
Mohammad (JeM) both of whom, were backed by Pakistan's ISI agency, a 
charge Pakistan denied. In the western media, coverage of the standoff focused 
on the possibility of a nuclear war between the two countries and the 
implications of the potential conflict on the United States-led War on 
Terrorism. Tensions de-escalated following international diplomatic mediation 
which resulted in the October 2002 withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops 
from the International border. 
As both India and Pakistan are armed with nuclear weapons, the 
possibility a conventional war could escalate into a nuclear one were raised 
several times during the standoff Various statements on this subject were made 
by India and Pakistani officials during the conflict, mainly concerning a no first 
use policy. India's Foreign Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh said on June 5 that 
India would not use nuclear weapons first, while Musharraf said on June 5 he 
would not renounce Pakistan's right to use nuclear weapons first. In December 
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2002, Musharraf said he warned India "not to expect a conventional war from 
Pakistan" if troops crossed the Line of control in Kashmir. He later said he 
meant a guerrilla war. India's Defence Minister replied that India could "take a 
bomb or more but when we respond there will be no Pakistan." 
A Defence InteUigence Agency report in May 2002 estimated that a 
nuclear war between India and Pakistan could, in a worse-case scenario lead to 
8-12 millions deaths initially and millions more lately from radiation 
poisoning. There was also concern that a June 6, 2002 asteroid explosion over 
Earth, known as the Eastern Mediterranean Event, could have caused a nuclear 
conflict had it exploded over India or Pakistan. After failure of the Agra 
Summit (July 2001) and the disastrous attacks on the twin towers of New York 
(11 September 2001), the security sensitivities of India and Pakistan had 
increased against each other.^ ^The terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament 
worsened the situation. The international border as well as the Line of Control 
(LoC) then saw a massive deployment of India and Pakistani forces in an 
eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation and the two countries remained locked in an 
impasse until October 2002.^ 'Again this critical juncture, Indo-Pak relations 
were jolted by the televised speech of Pervez Musharraf which he delivered to 
the Pakistani nation on 12* January 2002. In his address, while he promised to 
dismantle the terrorist infrastmcture from the soil of Pakistan, he equated the 
terrorist activities in Jammu and Kashmir with the acts of freedom 
fighters.^ ^This weakened the political atmosphere and generated doubt and 
distrust regarding the possible peacefiil environment in the South Asian region. 
No improvement in the relations between India and Pakistan became 
possible until December 2002 when the withdrawal of troops from both sides 
was announced. The efforts towards the normalization of relation began in 
April 2003 when Indian PM Atal Behari Vajpayee, during his speech in 
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Srinagar, extended the "hands of friendship" towards Pakistan. In the same 
year, the two countries resumed their diplomatic relations, reopened air and 
railway links as well as Delhi-Lahore bus service. A cease-fire also came into 
effect along the LoC in November 2003. Later the two countries also agreed to 
resume sports links. The year 2003 was marked with progress in structuring 
and preparing the ground for composite dialogue between India and Pakistan.^ ^ 
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CHAPTER- 5 
INDIA AND PAKISTAN PEACE PROCESS 
Introduction 
India and Pakistan, two nations united by history but divided by destiny, 
has traveled a long way in attempt to bring peace to the highly volatile valley. 
Bilateral relation between India and Pakistan has been a source of concern for 
the international community for long and attract international security unlike 
any other bilateral relationship. It says something about the state of Indo-Pak 
bilateral relations that more than six decade after their emergence as 
independent entities the two states have yet to find a suitable modus vivendi to 
deal with each other on a day-to-day basis about their mutual problems and 
concerns. Such has been the brittleness of this process that keeping the 
dialogue going on, until now, been regarded as more important than achieving 
concrete, enduring results. However, some significant developments are indeed 
taking place in the Indian sub-continent in the context of Indo-Pak peace 
process. ^ Peace process are by their very nature long term measures. Yet, the 
ultimate objective of strategy is to bring the conflict into a speedy end. This can 
be done through peace process. ^ 
Peace Process in the shape of confidence-building measures (CBMs) are 
recognizable as "arrangements designed to enhance...assurance of mind and 
belief in the trust-worthiness of states...confidence is the product of much 
broader patterns of relations than those which relate to military strategy. In fact 
the latter have to be woven into a complex texture of economic, cultural, 
technical and social relationships".'' This suggests military and non-military 
initiatives undertaken by antagonistic states to reduce tensions and enhance 
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mutual confidence. CBMs are designed essentially to increase understanding 
by reducing suspicions. They are separable into military and non-military 
CBMs and into those having a unilateral, bilateral or international content. 
Military CBMs are also classifiable into transparency, communications and 
constraint measures to perform the related functions of information, 
notification, observation and stabilization. ^CBMs can further be catalogued 
into provisions enabling information exchange, mutual access to observation or 
arrangements to handle incidents and crises. 
Indo-Pak Bilateral Cooperation 
India and Pakistan have a far better record in terms of bilateral 
initiatives; indeed their record is rather impressive. From 1947 to the late 
1990s, India and Pakistan were involved again and again in bilateral 
peacemaking. India and Pakistan engaged in bilateral cooperative efforts 
several times each decade: a series of negotiations on no-war and joint defence 
agreement (1949-50, 1953, 1956, 1959, 1968, 1974, 1977, and 1980-82); 
Indian interest in some form of confederation (in the 1950s); the Delhi Pact on 
the treatment of minorities 91950); the settlement of border and territorial 
claims (1958 and 1960); the Sala Dam agreement (1970); the post 1971 war 
agreements on the normalization of relations (the Simla Pact, 1972); the return 
of Pakistani prisoners of war (1974); Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh 
(1974); and various Pakistani proposals for a regional nuclear regime (1974, 
1980s, and 1991). In addition, in 1988, the two countries signed an accord on 
the non-attack of nuclear facilities. In the early 1990s as noted earlier, India 
and Pakistan nearly resolved the Siachen, Sir Creek, and Wular Barrage 
disputes. When those efforts failed, the two coimtries came back to the 
negotiating table for the "six plus-two" talks in 1996 and concluded the Lahore 
Declaration in February 1999,* 
={ 92 )== 
It is worth noting here that India and Pakistan have even come close to a 
negotiated solution on the most intractable issue -Kashmir-on at least two 
occasions. The first time was in 1955 when Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru and his Pakistani counterpart, Mohammed Ali, came to an agreement to 
divide the state of Kashmir along the line of control and to hold a plebiscite in 
the Kashmir Valley. The two leaders eventually failed to persuade their cabinet 
colleagues to go along with the agreement.^  Inl972, there is evidence that 
Indira Gandhi and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto came to a similar agreement-a partition 
of the state along the line of control. Bhutto argued for more time to prepare 
Pakistani public opinion for the deal. However, in the end he backed out of the 
secret agreement, and once again a major attempt to solve Kashmir ran agroxmd 
of domestic political weakness.* 
Though the peace process followed a tumultuous period-Kargil conflict, 
a coup in Pakistan and a military build-up on the border following a terrorist 
attack on the Indian Parliament and hence an intense global pressure to cool 
off-it had its origins in the Gujral Doctrine.' The doctrine, which drew its 
premise from Jawaharlal Nehru's Panchsheel principles, marked the beginning 
of a more liberal, broad-approach to foreign policy issues. Such a stance 
eschewed aggressive intent and adopted economic, political and social aspects 
of a bilateral relationship as cornerstone of India's foreign policy. In many 
ways, the new policy was a turnabout from the military-centric posturing and 
policies that had become counter-productive in times of sweeping geo-political 
changes in the post-Cold War age. 
Gujral, free of the compulsions of party politics and the traditional aggressive 
rhetoric, took courage to break the ice and decided to talk to the 'enemy' face 
to face. The first of a series of meetings tool place on March 28-31, 1997, 
followed in quick succession by Gujral's meeting with Prime Minister Nawaz 
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Sharif, and between the two Foreign Secretaries, all of which culminated in a 
comprehensive agreement. Both the countries agreed to stop the fiitile rhetoric 
against each other, liberalise visa procedures, release prisoners, and put Tulbul 
navigation project. Sir Creek and Siachen disputes on the table, increase 
people-to-people contact and work towards a better bilateral trade and 
commerce.'" 
Indo-Pak Peace Process since 9/11 
The attack on the World Trade Centre (WTC) on 11 September 2001 
had security and other far-reaching consequences on international, regional and 
national politics. Peace and security were threatened. The grouping and 
regrouping of nation states soon started with the solemn promise of rooting out 
the terrorist menace. India was also not free from terrorist attack. There was the 
dastardly act of terrorism committed on the Jammu and Assembly on T' 
October and on the citadel of India's democracy i.e. Parliament on 13"" 
December 2001. Because of this, Indo-Pakistan relation went down all-time 
low in the chequered history of both the countries. But the situation improved 
in course of time. Indo-Pak relations are undergoing drastic transformation. 
During the post 9/11 period, India and Pakistan have engaged with each other 
intensely and purposively. The engagement has created an atmosphere of trust 
and confidence in the bilateral relations. The relations between these two 
countries are better today than in the past. 
Political and Strategic Relations 
The year 2003 became the watershed in the history of Indo-Pak peace 
process as it prepared grounds for the fiimre to initiate dialogues. The two sides 
stepped towards the process of normalization through dialogues. The revival of 
the peace dialogue between India and Pakistan in 2003 was an outcome of wise 
and objective political calculations of Pakistan and India. In the aftermath of 
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the post-9/11 period, many breakthroughs have been achieved on the strategic 
and military fronts. In October 2003, the government of India first made the 
proposal to the government of Pakistan for the establishment of a 
communication link between the Indian coast guard and Pakistan Maritime 
Security Agency. This proposal was very important because the International 
Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) between India and Pakistan had not yet been 
ratified. So many fishermen from both sides strayed into each other's territorial 
waters. The communication link could lead to the early exchange of 
information between the two sides regarding apprehended fishermen who 
inadvertently strayed into each other's territories. 
In December 2004, both countries agreed to immediately intimate arrest 
of fishermen made by each country. The communication link would facilitate 
the early intimation, which in turn would lead to the early beginning of the 
process of providing consular access, nationality verification and repatriation. 
On 11 May 2005, all outstanding issues on the establishment of communication 
link were resolved leading to a consensus document. Both countries hoped that 
the communication link would provide a formal mechanism for exchange of 
information regarding violation, search and rescue operations, control of 
pollution, natural disasters and calamities, smuggling and drug trafficking."in 
another gesture of cross-border solidarity, India granted Pakistan on its request 
the permission to fly helicopters in the peacetime no-fly zone on October 15, 
2005 to facilitate the earthquake relief work. The Ministers of External Affairs 
Natwar Singh from India and Khurshid Mehmut Kasuri fi-om Pakistan signed 
an agreement for notifying each other before testing ballistic missiles on 3 
October 2005.'^ In spite of tense circumstances in the political scenario of both 
the countries after 11 September 2001,they were firm in keeping one of their 
vital promises in the nuclear area of exchange of the least of nuclear 
installations and establishments on each new year's day, which had come into 
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being between them after a proti-acted dialogue in 1992. Over the years, they 
have refrained from attacking each other's population centers, hospitals and 
other humanitarian institutions. Certamly, it can admit, although Pakistan's 
domestic political situations have become tense during some period, the Indo-
Pak relations have been improved considerably in strategic areas. 
Economic Cooperation 
India and Pakistan have to intensify their ties in the economic field. As it 
is a tough task to address the bilateral issues only through the political and 
diplomatic approach, trade and conmierce can work as a tool of resolving 
conflicts between both the countries. There are immense possibilities for 
cooperation in energy and power sectors and agricultural fields. Being both 
India and Pakistan developing economies and populous, they are dependent on 
each other to meet their foot stocks and other domestic goods. In addition to 
this, there is strong presence of both indigenous and multinational companies 
that are driving the trading activities in Pakistan. They have their production 
bases both within and outside the country for which Pakistan has been a captive 
market. Pakistan's import varies from tea to cement, rubber tires, 
pharmaceuticals and machineries. At the same time, it is a leading nation in 
exporting textile, leather and sporting goods.'^ Both the countries can extend 
cooperation in some of the above areas in order to meet their domestic 
requirements.'Vet, there are several points that need be taken into account 
while extending cooperation. 
Firstly, the non-extension of most favoured liation (MFN) treatment to 
India which is mandatory for a member of the world trade organization, the 
inclusion of hardly 600 plus items in the freely importable lists from India and 
several other non-tariff barriers based on misplaced apprehensions are all 
accurate indicators of pressures guilt on Pakistani policy makers by powerfiil 
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non-state actors.'^ Secondly, the complex sources of foreign aid to Pakistan, 
mostly as tied, have changed the entire directions and compositions of its 
foreign trade. This naturally confines Pakistan to purchase all the aid related 
materials from the donor countries.'thirdly, Pakistan has shifted its trade 
focus increasingly to countries offering machinery on supplier's credit bases. 
The late Mahbub ul haaq, a well known Pakistani economist, estimated in 
1960s that the prices of commodities supplied to Pakistan under a number of 
tied credit agreements had exceeded the lowest quoted price in the international 
market by up to 170 per cent.^This has deprived the Pakistani consumers from 
other competitively priced sources and made Pakistan an artificer's high cost 
economy. Finally, because of the very nature of political systems and regimes, 
the private sector has remained highly patronized, supervised and regulated in 
Pakistan thereby blunting any independent decision making capacity on cross 
border economic interactions. 
Although SAARC cannot be used to address the bilateral contentious 
issues, it could be an effective forum to enhance the level of cooperation in 
both trade and energy sectors between India and Pakistan. Even for solving 
bilateral political disputes, trade and commerce require flourish between them. 
There are several non-governmental initiatives including the SAARC 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Coalition for Action on South Asian 
Cooperation, Center for policy Dialogue and South Asian Regional Energy 
Initiatives. All these initiatives have shown the huge potentials of both 
countries in trade and energy sectors. In order to boost the economic and trade 
relations, a joint technical committee need be set up to study energy related 
issues. Despite the tension subsisting between India and Pakistan, the scope 
and need for the economic cooperation never be undermined as this is the only 
way these two countries can live together and co-exist. There is urgent need of 
liberalizing monetary transaction rules and export-import policy band visa rules 
to facilitate smooth flow of commodities across the border. In this way, it 
would drastically reduce the export-import cost and in turn, the people of both 
coimtries would get the essential commodities at reduced price. However, it has 
to be admitted that until major disputes are settled, it is difficult to expect a 
harmonious blending of political and economic relations between these two 
countries. 
Srinagar Peace Initiative 
On April 18-2003 the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, 
in the capital of Jammu and Kashmir Srinagar, retrieved the peace process 
which had been tombled after the terrorist attacks on parliament and offered to 
hold a dialogue with Pakistan if the latter reciprocated by showing an 
inclination for discovering ways and meaios for attaining a lasting harmony 
between the two countries. The diplomatic move of the prime minister brought 
in renewed expectation on both sides and the step received a remarkably 
positive response from all quarters in Indian and Pakistan. 
The then Indian Prime Minister, Vajpayee made a candid decision, 
considering the psychological torment which he had to undergo after the 
Lahore and Agra initiatives were miscarriage. It was reported "a dramatic 
transformation seemed to have come over the India-Pakistan discourse, with 
Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee's third and final call for friendship with 
Pakistan. What else one should make out over the threat of Vajpayee to retire 
of the peace move did not succed".'^ The Prime Minister declared that this was 
his last bid to give peace a chance and to find an ultimate solution to bring 
amity in the region which is embroiled in an inveterate pugnacity between the 
two countries. The Indian leadership which had borne and obstinate posture 
after the decemberl3 terrorist attacks and had declared that there will be no 
dialogue with Pakistan until cross border terrorism ended, displayed splendid 
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ductility in offering the peace initiative. Both India and Pakistan were able to 
manumit themselves from their hard line positions and obsessions. There 
appeared a sensational change in the texture of relations between the two 
countries, from the probability of a collapse of diplomatic bonds and outbreak 
of military conflict, to an emphasis to resolve all dominant issues with 
realization that an overnight settlement of the contentious issues like Kashmir 
is impossible. Need was felt for devising a step by step approach in order to 
bring a structured frame work for a sustained dialogue. 
The initial move in the peace process saw the declaration by the leaders 
of both the countries to restore diplomatic links, revive all transport 
connections and resume sports ties. However the dialogue process was very 
slow and the transport links, tool a long time to resume. This was due to the 
perpetual series of terrorist violence in Kashmir and other parts of the India, 
despite the process of constructive engagement. To invigorate the peace 
process, the then BJP government promulgated the Deewali Peace Offer, 
consists a package of twelve Confidence Building Measure drafted by the 
cabinet committee on security for normalizing relations with Pakistan. Indian 
tool Pakistan and the diplomatic community based in New Delhi by surprise 
when it announced on October 22-2003, 12-point proposal to resume the peace 
process with the neighboring country.'* 
The proposed measures included, starting a bus service from Srinagar to 
Muzaffarabad (capital of Azad Kashmir), re-starting the ferry service between 
Mumbai and Karachi which was stopped at the time of 1965 war and 
introduction of new rail/bus service between Khokra-par in Sindh and 
Munnabao Rajasthan. The package spelt the desire on the part of Indian 
government to start talks on the resumption of Samjhauta express and 
increasing the frequency of buses from Delhi to Lahore. Apart from this the 
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then Indian forging minister, Yashwant Sinha proposed the setting up of a 
hotline between the coast guards of the two countries. These were similar to the 
proposals made by the then Pakistani Prime Minister Mir Zafarullah Khan 
Jamali on May 6-2003 which had not been accepted by Indian. Jamali also had 
proposed for the increase of the frequency of Lahore-Delhi bus service, 
Anyway, Pakistan accepted the Indian package but with some controversial 
conditions. For instance, regarding Srinagar Muzaffarabad bus service, 
Pakistan insisted that the check posts must be manned by UN forces and the 
people on both the sides must carry UN documents. 
However, the differences have been resolved and the bus service was 
successfully begun by the present Indian government, reflecting the continuity 
in India's foreign policy, despite regime change. In addition to this, it has been 
proposed by the present Indian Prime Minister Manmohan singh to connect 
two holy places, Amritsar in the side of Punjab and Nankanasahib on the 
Pakistani side reacting to the change of guard at the center in India, Pakistan 
hoped: it is expected of the new government in Indian to take forward the peace 
initiative and work towards a resolution of all outstanding issues between the 
two countries including Jammu and kashmir '^' 
The present government has engaged in noble exertions to keep the 
peace process that was initiated by the previous government headed by A.B 
Vajpayee. This provides credence to the point that India's foreign policy is 
characterized by change and continuity. Despite the change in regime and a 
new government with a different party in power, the fundamental tenets of the 
nation foreign policy remains intact. This also indicates that consideration of 
national interests have over determined partisan consideration, in the context of 
India's relation with Pakistan. The existence of conamon consensus among 
political parties on crucial issues of foreign policy is also evident. 
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Anyhow, in spite of all this, the basic character of India Pakistan relations has 
not been transformed. One of the primary reasons for this is the nnrelenting 
terrorist violence which has been a major hurdle for the peace process. 
Terrorism still exists as a major factor that has contributed in magnifying the 
intricacies in the bilateral relations. The July 11 terrorist attacks in Mumbai and 
the finger pointing towards Pakistan by India, signifies this notion. This event 
had a vicious impact on the diplomatic ties between the two countries, 
ultimately leading to the cancellation of the foreign secretary level meeting 
scheduled on 21 '^ July 2006. The Joint Terror Mechanism proposed by the 
leaders of the countries at their meeting in Havana and the four point solution 
suggested by general Musharraf to resolve the Kashmir entanglement, have 
been described as chimerical Hence Hindi- Pakistan relation still remains in a 
labyrinth. 
The Eid Ceasefire of November 2003 
For the first time in the 57 years of confrontation Pakistan ordered a 
unilateral ceasefire in November 2003. Perhaps the best gift the governments of 
the India and Pakistan have given to their people on Eid Ul Fitar 2003 is the 
declaration that their troops will observe ceasefire along the international 
border (from Madhopur to Sangam), Line of control or LoC (from Sangam to 
Pt,Nj9842 to where the line is drawn) and the actual ground position line or 
AGPL (from Pt.NJ9842 to Indiara col in Siachen). The offer was made by 
Pakistan's Prime Minister Zafarullah khan Jamali, during the course of his 
address to nation on 23 November 2003, when his government completed one 
year in power. The government of India wasted no time in accepting offer with 
an open heart. 
A million-dollar question is being asked: why did Pakistan spring a 
sudden cease surprise. The most significant factor impinging on Pakistan's 
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thinking and desire to talk with India on all outstanding issues, as opposed to 
focusing mainly on Kashmir, is the United States."After 9/11, Pakistan has 
reemerged as a vital strategic ally for the US. However, the new US posmre is 
different from that of the cold war Phase and has brought complications for 
Pakistan in many ways. All major foreign policy decisions for Pakistan flow 
from its involvement in the "war against terrorism". Pakistan has been under 
tremendous pressure from the US to go in for talks. This pressure hinges on the 
American thinking that tensions between India and Pakistan could escalate to 
the nuclear level. The latest US intervention in the aftermath of the Indian 
military mobilization post -13 December 2001 was apparently instrumental in 
ending the crisis situation by June 2002. The Us effort was geared towards 
getting a commitment from Pakistan that it would end cross-border infiltration 
permanently, which was evident from the much-published speeches that 
general Musharraf was forced to give during this period.^^ This move was in 
turn expected to extract from India a resolve towards substantive dialogue with 
Pakistan on various bilateral issues, including the Kashmir issue. Besides 
continued economic assistance from the US and its allies-Europe and Japan-the 
US remains an important factor in shaping Pakistan's foreign policy thinking. 
In the wake of revelation about Pakistan's supply of nuclear technology 
to countries like North Korea, Libya and Iran, die Americans have made it 
clear to Musharraf that the failure to act resolutely against al -Qaida and the 
Taliban could have very serious consequences for his country. The sea change 
in the global climate vis-a-vis terrorism in the context of 9/11 and the two 
attempts on Musharraf s life in December last year must have further carried 
home to the general the idea that softness towards fundamentalists could be as 
fatal as trying to ride a tiger. India's nuanced diplomacy has clearly made 
general Musharraf change his stand. Perhaps die actual psychological pressure 
on Pakistan began building up after 18 April 2003, when Vajpayee offered 
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India's hand of friendship to Pakistan. Although there have been irritants like 
General Musharraf s accusation against India in the UN General Assembly in 
September 2003 and Vajpayee's strong replay, the processes of normalization 
moved on track, slowly but steadily. 
Pakistan sought to create the right kind of atmosphere for SAARC 
summit to be held in Islamabad in the fnst week of January 2004. Pakistan also 
wanted to showcase the summit to convince the world that, far from being a 
state sponsor of terrorism or a failing state, it is a reasonable neighbour. In the 
context of the ceasefire, there is also a view that with the onset of winter, 
Pakistan felt there was no point in keeping its s forces deployed on the LoC and 
Siachen as infiltration during winter months is difficult anyway. 
The reason of India's initiative of peace move was that, Vajpayee 
wanted to go down in history as a one who wanted peace with Pakistan. Also, 
there was international pressure to normalize relations. By unilaterally taking 
the peace initiatives into Pakistani camp, Vajpayee had braved Critics within 
the Rashtriya Swyamsevak Sangh (RSS) as well as appositive rebuff from 
Musharraf, and raised his stature in the international arena. However, it 
involved risks, too. With a general election round the comer, his credibility 
could be damaged if terrorists sabotaged the peace initiatives. As far as 
Musharraf s change if heart is concerned, with Xhsjihadi policy collapsing and 
international pressure mounting, he was using the peace initiative to rebuild his 
credibility. He stood to gain by getting India to restart dialogue on Kashmir. 
His personal standing was to rise. He was to get focused on economic growth. 
However, it involved risks too. Hardliners might have eliminated him for not 
delivering on Kashmir. 
In sum the US pressure and presence in the region, political will, 
Conflict fatigue, three assassination attempts on Musharraf and the groundswell 
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of public support for peace in India, Pakistan and Kashmir were the reasons 
behind the quest for peace.^ "* 
Composite Dialogue process Post 9/11 
The composite dialogue process was another breakthrough in Indo-Pak 
peace process during the post-9/11 period. The composite dialogue process, 
which started from February 2004, touched upon eight contentious issues that 
had been the areas of concern for both the countries. They included peace and 
security including CBMs in nuclear areas, Jammu and Kashmir, Sir Creek, 
Tulbul navigation, WuUar barrage, friendly exchange, economic and 
commercial contact, and drug trafficking.^ ^The leaders of both the countries 
expressed satisfaction and decided to carry forward the dialogue process when 
they met in New Delhi while attending SAARC Summit. Along with the 
composite dialogue, several joint statements were signed in 2006. During the 
NAM (Non-Align Movement) conference in the Cuban capital Havana, PM of 
India and President of Pakistan signed the joint statement in September 16, 
2006.^ ^Acccording to the statement; the foreign secretaries should meet shortly 
in New Delhi to continue the composite dialogue. It was also agreed that 
consultations should be arranged for the early solution of the Siachen issue, the 
experts should meet immediately to agree on coordination of the joint survey of 
Sir Creek and the adjoining area without prejudice to each other's position on 
the issue, the survey should commence in November 2006, the experts should 
start discussions on the maritime boundary and the two sides would facilitate 
implementation of agreements and understandings already reached on LoC-
related CBMs, including bus service, crossing points and truck service. In 
Havana, the President of Pakistan renewed invited the Prime Minister of India 
to visit Pakistan. The prime Minister said that he looked forward to a 
purposefiil visit at a time to be determined through diplomatic channels. 
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In the composite dialogue held in Islamabad, the experts discussed on 
conventional CBMs. The Pakistan side presented a draft agreement to the 
Indian side on the prevention of incidents in the sea in order to ensure safety of 
navigation by naval vessels and aircraft belonging to the two sides. The two 
sides agreed on the following CBMs: 
I. Finalization of Border Ground Rules for implementation along the 
international border. 
II. Modalities for holding quarterly flag meetings, and on the basis of need 
at sector level commanders in already agreed areas. Modalities for 
communication in this context should be further discussed. 
III. Elaborating, consistent with its intent, the agreement reached on no 
development of new posts and defense works along the LoC. 
IV. Finalization of an agreement on speedy return of inadvertent line 
crossers^^ 
The 4* round of the Expert Level Dialogue on Nuclear CBMs was held 
in Islamabad on 25-26 April 2006. The two sides expressed their satisfaction 
on the signing of the Agreements on pre-Notification of Flight Testing of 
Ballistic Missiles and the operationalisation of the hotline link between the two 
Foreign Secretaries. These measures were, inter alia, intended to prevent 
misunderstanding and reduce risks relevant to nuclear issues. 
However, Pakistan is grappled with twin challenges of satisfying the 
United States of destroying terrorist infrastructure on the one hand and taking 
steps in the direction of advancing Indo-Pak peace process on the other. 
Despite this negativism and pessimism, the silver lining is that the two 
countries stubborn to resolve their bilateral dispute amicably. Although it is 
true that all unsettled disputes are responsible for making the bilateral relations 
more tense and unstable, both the nations are determined to frustrate the 
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increasing threats of terrorist attacks in the post 9/11 to realize the necessity of 
permanent peace and security in South Asia. 
Though no particular date for resolving various outstanding issues 
including Janunu and Kashmir between India and Pakistan can be fixed, it can 
safely be said that both India and Pakistan are in the right direction towards 
resolving their bilateral disputes after the incident that happened in the World 
Trade Centre on 1 September 2001. 
India-Pakistan and Present Composite Dialogue 
Since independence and partition in 1947, the relationship between India 
and Pakistan has proven to be the most dangerous political and military 
confrontation in South Asia. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the end of the cold war, it has been the most precarious and unpredictable 
region in the international system. After having engaged each other in conflict 
in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999 there was recognition in both governments that 
their relations had reached the nadir, and unless remedial measures were took, 
they would reach the point of no return. September 11, 2001 was a defining 
moment in the process of Indo-Pakistani normalization. Fearful of the 
emergence of India as a major destination for international investment and its 
growing geopolitical partnership with Washington, many in members of the 
business and political elite in Pakistan argue it would be better to seek a deal 
with New Delhi now, while Pakistan remains a valued ally of the Bush 
administration in its 'war on terrorism', rather than to risk having to deal with a 
strong India in the future. Moreover, share Musharraf s view that the military 
promotion of Islamic fiindamentalist extremist in Afghanistan and Kashmir has 
redounded against their interests, bringing Islamabad into conflict with 
Washington after September 11 and fuelling increasing sectarian strife within 
Pakistan itself. Fears among the Pakistani elite are that the jihadi groups are 
{ 106 } 
turning against the regime.^^It was, thus, after the 2003 cease-fire, that relations 
between the two countries improved. 
The 12* SAARC summit of 2003 saw a change m the history of this 
conflict. Specific suggestion were made by the PM of Pakistan in the context of 
India and Pakistan relations to resume civil aviation links, road and rail links, 
sports events etc. Pakistan also assured that it would take specific measures 
against cross-border terrorism and dismantle its infrastructure that supported 
terrorism. The two leaders believed that constructive dialogue would promote 
their common objectives of peace, security, and economic development. 
However, India has made it clear on several occasions that a sustained dialogue 
would necessarily require an end to cross-border terrorism and dismantling of 
its infrastructure in Pakistan. It was decided that discussion on nuclear and 
other CBMs could be held within the composite dialogue. 
The current process of composite dialogue began in January 2004 when 
Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari 
Vajpayee met in Islamabad on the sidelines of the SAARC Sunrniit.^ '^  Both 
leaders agreed to commence the composite dialogue in February 2004. They 
were confident that a resumption of the composite dialogue would lead to the 
peacefiil settlement of all bilateral issues, including Jammu and Kashmir, to the 
satisfaction of both sides. Thus, the issues constituting the composite dialogue 
were as follows: 
• Peace and Security including CBMs 
• Jammu and Kashmir 
• Siachen 
• Wullar Barrage project/ Tulbul Navigation Project 
• Sir Creek 
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• Terrorism and Drug Trafficking 
• Economic and Commercial Cooperation and, 
• Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in various fields 
Peace and Security CBMs 
The nuclear and conventional CBMs between India and Pakistan are 
based on the framework of the Lahore MoU (1999) and the Joint Statement 
made on 20 June 2004. The Expert Level talks were held in Islamabad on 14-
15 December 2004. This meeting's agenda was to prevent misunderstanding 
and reduce risks relevant to nuclear issues, an early operationalisation and of 
the up gradation of the hotline between the Director General of Military 
Operations (DGMOs) and the establishment of a secure hotline between the 
two foreign Secretaries was sought. '^ In October 2005, India and Pakistan 
reached an agreement that requires either party to inform the other 72 hours in 
advance before testing ballistic missiles within a 40-km radius of the 
international border as also the Line of Control. In the same meeting, India also 
handed over a Memorandum of Understanding, on how both parties could go 
about reducing the danger of accidental or unauthorized nuclear weapon usage, 
which was eventually signed on February 2007. 
A hotline between the two Foreign Secretaries was established in 2004. 
Also, the ceasefire on the LoC, which has been in place since 2003, continues 
to be maintained. There was an accidental transgression when Pakistani forces 
allegedly opened fire in the Tangdhar sector, but the ceasefire continues to hold 
even when the two parties were at odds, as occurred after the Mumbai train 
blasts in 2006, when the Pakistani Rangers and the BSF continued holding their 
quarterly meetings. The naval authorities on both sides have also established a 
hotline mainly to avoid arresting fishermen from either side who stray 
accidentally into each other's waters, which has considerably reduced arrests 
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on both sides. The coast ground authorities on both sides are now debating the 
possibility of holding joint search and rescue operations and collaborating in 
marine pollution control. Besides this, the Judicial Committee on Prisoners, set 
up after External affairs minister's visit to Islamabad in January 2007, 
comprises retired judges from both the countries and it held its first meeting on 
February 26,2008.^ ^ 
Before the composite dialogue began, there was only one bus service on 
the Delhi-Lahore route, connecting India and Pakistan, since 1999. Thereafter a 
trans-LoC bus service was begun on the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad route in 2005, 
followed by the Poonch-Rawalkot service in 2006.The establishment of the bus 
service was an emotional occasion for people in Punjab, who have for long 
sought easy and unhindered aecess to visit their shrines in Pakistan. Moreover, 
memories of the violence and bloodshed that accompanied partition have 
receded. The easing of travel restrictions and greater people to people contact 
have resulted in better human understanding and a desire to promote normal 
good neighbourly cooperation." Although the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad service 
was suspended following the earthquake in 2005, these bus services have 
greatly helped to bring together many families who were separated in 1947. 
Besides bus services, train services have also been resumed with the Samjhauta 
Express linking Amritsar and Lahore, and the Thar Express linking Khokhrapar 
in Sindh with Munabao in Rajasthan. Air cormections are also increasing, with 
the February (2008) meeting leading to a doubling of passenger flights. Border 
Ground Rules for the international border have also been finalized. The 
frequency of the flights from four points of call-Delhi, Mumbai, Karachi and 
Lahore was increased from 12 to 28 and the number of designated airlines from 
1 to3. 
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jRmmu nnd Kitiihinlr 
Kashmir too has seen the spillover effect of the generally cordial 
relations between the two countries since 2004.The continuance of csBsofire 
along the LoC has brought tremendous opportunities to the region for well 
relations between the two countries, and has led to the return of tourism to the 
Valley, which has also revived hopes of an economic resurgence in the region. 
The bus services across the LoC have indicated the willingness of both 
countries to work on this issue, a resolve which has also been expressed in the 
meetings. On the domestic front, the dialogue process has led the state of 
Jammu and Kashmir to become more integrated with the national mainstream. 
Although no noticoBblo progrcsi hfti been madp yot, the CBMi hflvo pnved tho 
way for reconciliation. In 2006, president Musharraf had made a proposal 
which included demilitarization of the region, self-governance, and so on. But, 
India did not agree; it argued that before any such measures are undertaken, 
there must be a complete stoppage of terrorist activities in the region. Both 
sides want to resolve the issues, bit the resistance comes from hardliners in 
Pakistan, who feel any cooperation would be a concession to India. 
Siachen 
The demilitarization of Siachen is an integral part of the composite 
dialogue, especially after Prime Minister Singh publicly expressed the hope in 
2005 that the highest battlefield in the world could be converted into a 
'mountain of peace.' While publicly neither side has reached any agreement on 
this issue, it is beUeved that the issue has reached an impasse. India has argued 
that any agreement on this issue could only follow recognition of the Actual 
Ground Position Line. Pakistan is not in agreement here, for such a position 
would require it to give up territory, specifically the Saltoro ridge. It would like 
the position on the ground to revert to the pre-1984 status. In 2007, India took a 
positive step to normalize the situation with the Indian Army hosting a civilian 
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trek in Siachen to promote it as a tuourist destination. Pakistan, of course 
objected to this step, since it considers the area to be an active war zone. Due to 
these differences there has been no tangible forward movement in talks on 
Siachen. Prof. Stephen Cohen has described the Siachen conflict as a fight 
between two bald men over a comb. In his view, "Siachen.. .is not militarily 
important...They (Indian and Pakistani armies) are there for purely 
psychological reasons, testing each other's 'will'." 
Sir Creek 
Indian and Pakistani delegations met in New Delhi on 6-7 August2004 
to discuss the "demarcation of the international boundary between the two 
countries in the Sir Creek area." Both sides had resolved to settle this dispute in 
a speedy manner, given their obligations \mder the UN Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS). Any delay in the delineation of the maritime boundary, 
could lead to the continental self of the both countries coming under the 
purview of the international Seabed Authority. Thus, in 2005, a joint survey 
was launched in the horizontal section of the marshy Sir Creek, for both parties 
to ascertain their particular claims. A follow-up survey took place in January 
2007, which also saw the participation of hydrographers and navies of both 
states, covering the land and the coast areas. Both sides disagree on how to 
proceed towards delineation. While India contends that the boundary should be 
in the middle of the estuary, Pakistan pushes for it to be on the southeastern 
bank. In the formal meeting of the issue, in May 2007, both parties exchanged 
maps marked with their respective claims, and gave explanatory notes to that 
effect. It is now for the authorities on both sides to decide on how to proceed 
forward. ^^  
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Tulbul NftvlgNtlon Projoot/ Wullnr BRrriigo 
The Tulbul Navigation Project is located on the Jhelum river in Jammu 
Bod KftilunJr unci h«i boon tho CRWHO of dj»ftgroomon» linoo 1914, whon lndl« 
first proposed building a barrage at the mouth of the WuUar lake, near the town 
of Sopore in the Valley. The dispute arose when Pakistan alleged that this 
barrage would critically hinder the flow to Pakistan. It was considered by them 
tobo a violfltion of tho IndMi Wfttom Trooty of 1960< Indlii robuffod thoso 
allegations and stated that the primary reason for building the barrage was to 
make the river navigable in the summer months. Pakistan was unsuccessful in 
proving its case to the Indus Water Commission in 1986; hence, India went 
Rhend with the opn«trwotic>n on tho project. Since then, more than ten round* of 
talks have been held on the issue, of which the last three have been under the 
rubric of the composite dialogue. Yet, not much of substance has been 
resolved, and both parties have decided to take the issue further in the 
forthcoming rounds of the dialogue process. 
The two parties had also come into conflict on the Baglihar project, with 
Pakistan claiming that even this construction on the Chenab River was a clear 
violation of the Indus Water Treaty. And when the two sides were unable to 
resolve their dispute bilaterally (though the dialogue made provision for it), 
Pakistan chose to take the matter to the World Bank, which, in turn, appointed 
Raymond Lafitte, a civil engineer, as the adjudicator in the matter. In his 
verdict in 2007, while a compromise was reached on one of the points of 
contention (related to the elevation of intakes for the turbines) Lafitte held that 
any other changes were only a matter of calculation and that India's designs 
were compliant with the basic principles of the treaty.''* 
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Terrorism 
Official statements to tackle terrorism were issued along with efforts to 
curb drug trafficking on 29-30 August 2005 in New Delhi. One of the driving 
fBotors (for India) to agree to a composite dialogue was to address the Issue of 
cross-border terrorism. But incidents of terrorist attacks by Pakistan-based 
elements have not stopped. Hence, when such incidents occur, its impact is felt 
on the dialogue process. For instance, after the series of train blasts in Mumbai 
in July 2006, domestic pressure led India to suspend the foreign sccretaiy-level 
talks. However, the process resumed after a summit meeting between PM 
Manmohan Singh and President Musharraf, which led to creation of a joint 
framework to address this issue. Subsequently, the creation of the Joint Anti-
Terrorism Mechanism (JATM) marked a sea change in India's position on the 
issue, moving firom India being the victim and Pakistan the perpetrator, to 
Pakistan becoming a partner. The JATM meets at the Additional Secretary 
level, and is intended to implement counter-terrorism initiatives and 
investigations. The first meeting was held in March 2007, to coincide with 
initiation of the fourth round of the composite dialogue, it also discussed ways 
and means to cooperate in counter-terrorism measures and investigations. At 
the meeting, which was held seven months after the July 2006 bombings in 
Mimibai, the two sides agreed that specific information would be exchanged 
for (a) helping investigations on either side related to terrorist acts and (b) 
prevention of violence and terrorist acts in the two countries. The most recent 
meeting was held on June 24, 2008." But, Mumbai terrorist attacks on 
November 26, 2008, once again derailed the composite dialogue and 
challenged the stability of tlie JATM. The establishment of the JATM needs a 
long way towards institutionalizing counter-terrorism threats, and its relevance 
to the composite dialogue process. 
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DrugTrnfflcklng 
The illegal trafficking of narcotics has been a major cause for concern. 
The dialogue on this issue resumed in August 2004, when both party discussed 
the procedures for sharing information and cooperation between the relevant 
authorities in the two countries, culminating in negotiation of a MoU to 
institutionalize cooperation in this area. This commitment was reiterated in the 
July 2007 meeting. However, despite these efforts, the situation has worsened, 
for India since the 2007 report of the International Narcotics Control Bureau 
reveals that the quantity of heroin entering India from Pakistan has, In feet, 
increased, with the law and order agencies in northwestern India seizing ever 
increasing consignments that are being smuggled from Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, However, of greater concern is the finding in tho report tbftt, from 
being the final destination, India is becoming a transit point for drug trafficking 
to Bangladesh and Southeast Asia. To meet this menace, a regional policy 
agency a la Interpol, was suggested in the 7'*^  SAARC summit, which would go 
a long way towards addressing concerns in this area. 
Economic and Commercial Cooperation 
On this front, the concept of a South Asia Free Trade Area (SAFTA) 
remains in stasis. Pakistan has indicated that it would operationalize SAFTA 
only in accordance with its current bilateral trade policy, which permits only a 
limited number of items being imported from India. Pakistan has yet to 
reciprocate India's granting it (Pakistan) the Most Favored Nation (MFN) 
status, which implies that realizing the target of $ 1.7 billion. Despite a new 
government coming to power, India has not yet been accorded MFN status. 
However progress in related areas continues, with cargo trucks being allowed 
for trade through the international border, as of October 2007. This measure 
will benefit agricultural products, since only perishable items are allowed to be 
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transported. Steps have also been taken to establish reciprocal banking 
establishments on both India and Pakistan. 
Another aspect of economic cooperation is the Iran-Pakistan-India gas 
pipeline. Ever since the project was suggested, there has been much talk on 
how it has the potential to bridge the trade deficit. However, given the domestic 
situation in Pakistan, the international community's equations with Iran, and 
India's indecisiveness, not much progress has been made on this proposal. 
Initially, India had asked Pakistan to settle the transit fee issue, since most of 
the pipeline would pass through Pakistan. But there was disagreement on 
India's suggestion of a fee of $.15 per million British thermal unit (mBtu) and 
Pakistan demanding $.493, although both sides agreed to work on it. Further 
meetings were held between the petroleum ministers of both countries on 
issues like establishing committees, transit fees, tariffs, and so on India has also 
become a part of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan - and now, India -
gas pipeline project, which is funded by the Asian Development Bank, and is 
expected to deliver 45 million cubic meters of gas per day to India. 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI), supply 3.2 billion cubic feet 
per day (90MMSCMD) and gas flow are expected from 2015. In July 2008, 
Pakistan has allowed the import of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) buses from 
India under its trade policy for 2008-09. The import of CNG buses has been 
allowed along with that of 135 other items that have been added to the positive 
list for imports from India. With this, the number of items that the government 
permits for import from India goes up to nearly 2,000. Pakistan reportedly has 
plans to import 8,000 CNG buses for public transport in Karachi, Lahore and 
Islamabad. •'* 
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Promotion of Friendly Exchanges 
People- to -people interaction between the two states has grown rapidly. 
The starting of the bus services and rail links across the border has provided 
greater opportunities to citizens on both sides to travel. Although there were 
incidents like the bomb blast on the Samjhauta Express and there were fears 
that the ensuing tensions would threaten these interactions, the links were kept 
open. As a result, the visits of social leaders and members of the civil society 
have contributed tremendously to the relaxation of tensions on both sides of the 
border and are expected to go a long way in furthering the composite dialogue 
process. 
Statement, India-Pakistan in Havana, Cuba, 16/09/2006 
1. President General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan 
Singh had a cordial, frank and detailed exchange of views on all aspects 
of India-Pakistan relations. Desirous of carrying forward the dialogue 
process, the leaders reiterated their commitments and determinations to 
implement the joint statements of January 6, 2004, September 24, April 
18,2005 and September 14,2005. 
2. The leaders agreed that the peace process must be maintained and its 
success was important for both countries and the future of the entire 
region. In this context, they directed their Foreign Secretaries to resiraie 
the composite dialogue at the earliest possible. 
3. The two leaders met in the aftermath of the Mumbai blasts. They 
strongly condemned all acts of terrorism and agreed that terrorism is a 
scourge that needs to be effectively dealt with. They decided to put in 
place an India-Pakistan anti-terrorism institutional mechanism to 
identify and implement counter-terrorism initiatives and investigations. 
4. The leaders decided to continue the joint search for mutually acceptable 
options for peaceful negotiated settlement of all issues between India ( „.) 
and Pakistan, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, in a sincere 
and purposeful manner. On the Jammu and Kashmir issue, there have 
been useful discussions. There is a need to build on convergences and 
narrow down divergences, 
5. The two leaders also directed the Foreign Secretaries on the following: 
• The Foreign Secretaries should meet shortly in New Delhi to 
continue the composite dialogue 
• To arrange consultations for early solution of the Siachen issue, 
• Experts should meet immediately to agree on coordinates for joint 
survey of Sir Creek and adjoining area, without prejudice to each 
other's position on the issue. The survey should commence in 
November 2006. The experts should start discussion on the maritime 
boundary. 
• The two sides will facilitate implementation of agreements and 
understandings already reached on LOC-related CBMs, including 
bus services, crossing points and truck service. 
6 The president of Pakistan renewed his invitation to the Prime Minister 
of India to visit Pakistan. Thanking the President, the Prime Minister 
indicated that he look forward to a purposeful visit at time to be 
determined through diplomatic channels.^ ^ 
Decisions taken at the conclusion of the Fourth Round of the 
Composite Dialogue between the Foreign Secretaries of 
India and Pakistan, Islamabad,14/03/2007 
Peace and Security 
• Expedite negotiations to conclude an agreement on prevention of 
incidents at Sea. 
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• To fully observe the ceasefire. 
• Conclude and sign an Agreement on Modalities for the conduct of 
Quarterly Flag meetings at the Sectors to be agreed upon. 
• Conclude and sign a framework agreement on Speedy Return of 
Inadvertent Line Crossers. 
• Conclude an agreement on No development of New Posts and Defence 
Works along the LOC. 
• Proposed drafts for new border control guidelines along the International 
Border. 
Nuclear CBMs 
• Hold discussions on security doctrines. 
Jammu and Kashmir 
• Ensure implementation of the already agreed Jammu and Kashmir 
related CBMs 
• Ensure operationalisation of Truck services 
• Ensure operationalisation/ rationalization of the five crossing points 
Siachen 
• Defence Secretary of the two countries assisted by respective Directors 
General (Military Operations) to meet to hold talks. 
People to people contacts 
• Conclude during the fourth round bilateral Visa Agreement, Agreement 
on Places. 
• The committee on Prisoners composed of four judges from each side to 
ensiue humane treatment and expeditious release of prisoners on both 
sides.'*" 
iu.y 
Post-26/11 India-Pakistan Relations and Developments 
Given the tenuous nature of the relationship, and the persistent threat of 
terrorism from Pakistan-based groups, the Mumbai attack of November 2008 
undoubtedly posed the most serious challenge to the peace process. The attack 
triggered a frenzy of political statements and diplomatic moves in India to build 
pressure on Pakistan to act against terror infrastructare in Pakistan. India made 
it quite clear any revival of the process would depend on Pakistan's 
commitment to contain terrorist groups targeting India. The India leadership 
insisted that Pakistan must produce tangible results in arresting and punishing 
those who carried out the Mumbai attacks as a precondition for the resumption 
of the Composite Dialogue.'"Yet, seven months after the attacks, India and 
Pakistan issued a joint statement about their intention to talk which, as 
expected, kicked up an unholy row, more visceral in India than in Pakistan. It 
would be therefore instructive to study how, and why, both the countries 
persisted with finding, amidst threats and counter-treats, a common ground to 
shake hand at Sharm-el Shaikh. 
There were a few 'acts of omission' which characterised India's post-
Mumbai response and offered a tentative insight into how events would 
develop in the immediate future. The most significant was the troop 
deployment which did not take place. The government spoke of "keeping all 
option open"^^but made no visible move to launch a possible war. Unlike in 
2002, after the December 13, 2001 attack on Indian Parliament, when hundreds 
and thousands of men were moved to the borders to position for a conflict, the 
armed forces this time were merely put on 'war alert'.''^ Within weeks, if not 
days, the war rhetoric too was tempered down.''''The second missing dot was 
the telling absence of any formal statement from the government about serving 
diplomatic and other ties with Pakistan. Neither was the Delhi-Lahore bus 
service terminated nor the Samjhauta Express; the air-link also remained ( .„ ) 
intact.'''ln short, the attack had not completely disrapted the engagement 
between the two neighbours as was widely perceived. This 'continuity' was 
also amply reflected in the Indian government's official stance -it wanted 
Pakistan to act against terrorist groups and not launch an attack on Pakistan. 
The conmiunication channels between the two countries too remained 
open and, in fact, became the solve vehicle for keeping up with the 
engagement. In just over a month from the attack, the first formal exchange 
began on January 5, 2009. Pakistan's reaction was unprecedented-it admitted 
on February 12, 2009 that the Mumbai attack was indeed planned in Pakistan 
and arrested LeT Operational Commander. It also handed to India a list of 32 
questions to assist in investigations .'**Intractions at Track-II level resumed 
within months of the attacks"^ and helped pave the way for the first series of 
meetings between the top leadership. The first such interaction was on June 17, 
2009, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met with President Zardari on 
the sidelines of the summit of Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Russia on 
June 17, 2009. Later, Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani on the sidelines of the 
IS*' Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) Summit in Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt 
where the controversial Joint Statement was issued. What kicked off the intense 
debate in India were two references in the statement. The first one read 'action 
on terrorism should not be linked to the Composite Dialogue process and these 
should not be bracketed'. The second one mentioned Pakistan possessing 
'some information on threats in Balochistan and other areas', for all purposes, 
an euphemism for Indian role in facilitating the Insurgency in Balochistan. 
The Sharm-el-Sheikh stand can be explained by acknowledging some of 
the variables in the India-Pakistan equation which have been witnessing visible 
elements of chemge. Such a stand, contrary to conventional wisdom, betrayed 
three important realizations on the part of India; one, that Pakistan was no 
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longer in control of all the terrorist and extremist groups operating from its 
territory''^  and second, that the army could not be considered a willing partner 
in the peace process indefinitely. The third, which flowed natuially from the 
above considerations, that the traditional military-centric stand would only 
benefit the terrorist groups and sections of the Army, both harbouring, and 
surviving on, deep animosity towards India. The urge to persist with the 
dialogue-mode is also rooted growing belief that only a stable civilian 
government in Pakistan can offer a more stable and useftil engagement. 
However, the prospect of an enduring bilateral relationship built on mutual 
trust post-Mumbai attack seems remote, if not impossible. The terrorist attack 
has damaged the fragile sense of cooperation between the two countries and 
exposed the peace process being hostage to the Pakistani state as well as non-
state actors engaged in terrorist activities. Thus it is clear that without the 
Pakistan Army giving up its support for anti-India terrorist groups, all efforts to 
build bridges between the two countries will remain doomed. 
India and Pakistan held their first official talks since the 2008 Mumbai 
attacks on 25* February 2010; a meeting was not for an immediate 
breakthrough but may help thaw their frigid relations. The foreign secretaries 
of India and Pakistan met for structured talks with an aim of ending the chill in 
the relations caused by Mumbai attacks. Foreign secretary Nirupama Rao 
headed the Indian delegation while the Pakistani delegation was led by her 
counterpart Salman Bashir. The approach of the Indian and the Pakistani sides 
presents a study in contrast, although both saw the other as desperately keen for 
talks to resume. India always held dialogue as a trump card to force Pakistan to 
respond to its demands to curb the activities of terrorist groups. On its part, 
Islamabad presumed that India "panicked" at the prospect of regional isolation 
on its part after placing itself brilliantly to seek leverage with the US from its 
"strategic assets" - The Taliban - in the endgame in Afghanistan. Both sides 
agreed on the need to "remain in touch" with each other to restore trust and 
confidence. India focused on cross-border terrorism, Pakistan raised the issue 
of Kashmir, Baluchistan and the water dispute. The Indian side also voiced 
concern over the beheading of a Sikh by Taliban in Pakistan. Besides focusing 
on terror and the need to successfidly prosecute those arrested by Islamabad for 
the Mumbai blasts, India submitted three dossiers which Pakistan assured it 
would seriously examine. On terrorism, Pakistan suggested a comprehensive 
security concept which included intelligence sharing, temperance in the 
induction of military systems and greater restraint in statements from both 
sides. India need pursue an active policy of creating and expanding a 
constituency for peace in Pakistan, which, in the longer run, could probably 
undo the stranglehold of those state as well as non-state entities which are 
pushing the country towards a failed State syndrome. 
Confidence Building Measures between India and Pakistan 
Today the two countries are guardedly optimistic on the prospect of 
resolving their differences. Since January 2004, India and Pakistan have 
initiated a cautious peace process. The year 2004 witnessed substantial 
improvement in the contact between the two societies, including unprecedented 
visits of media persons to Jammu & Kashmir on both sides of the Line of 
Control. At a time when a new spirit of reconciliation has gripped India and 
Pakistan recently, the importance of keeping alive and widening people to track 
of engagement against all odds is vital. The two government's facihtation of 
the process suggests that they too recognize its value. The India-Pakistan 
Forum of ParUamentarians (IPFP) has been formed to achieve this objective. In 
this regard, the Forum, would seek to realize a comprehensive mechanism of 
mutual exchange and engagement, and will work towards sensitizing and 
creating favorable public opinion to ensure peaceful relations between the two 
south Asian neighbours. 
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The Forum with a broad based agenda in areas as diverse as, trade & 
investments, terrorism, security and non-proliferation, culture, science & 
technology, IT, etc, will provide a valuable platform to initiate substantive 
dialogue process between the lawmakers of the two countries with the 
objective to understand each other's approach and viewpoints on crucial issues 
to facilitate the ongoing confidence building measures. There are a number of 
avenues where cooperation would be appreciated and such cooperation would 
generate tremendous amount of good-will among the people of the two 
countries. High priority issues such as cross-border terrorism, prospects of 
better bilateral trade, relaxation of respective visa regimes, nuclear confidence 
building measures, and greater civil society interaction would be discussed and 
debated upon by the parliamentarians of the two nations. Besides 
parliamentarians, the forum would also encourage regular interactions between 
non state actors, especially the private sector, civil society groups and 
professional organizations, business communities, research and policy 
institutions to explore alternative policy options through Track-II diplomacy to 
widen the horizons of mutual understanding. 
On economic matter, many previous attempts to improve economic ties 
between India and Pakistan unfortunately have been derailed by periodically 
heightened political tensions between the two countries-be it Kargil in May 
1999, since the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, or 
most recently, the Mumbai attack in November 2008. Although successive 
Indian and Pakistani governments have often repeated the desire for peaceful 
relations, reaching a comprehensive agreement the settler's outstanding 
disputes still seems far off But this does not mean that steps toward better 
economic relations cannot be taken. With new governments in both India and 
Pakistan, there is once again a window of opportunity to improve economic 
ties. A lowering of tensions between India and Pakistan-an inevitable benefit of 
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strengthened economic ties-would improve the security cUmate for investment . 
and economic development in both countries. It is clearly in the interest of both 
countries, and the world for that matter, to find a political resolution to the 
India-Pakistan problem, and increased trade can well be the starting point for 
this objective."*' 
However, it is India and Pakistan has agreed to strengthen their trade 
links as a means to normalizing relations between the two countries. Bilateral 
trade between Pakistan and India almost doubled to cross the one billion dollar 
mark this year (2010). This was attributed to the launch of a South Asian Free 
Trade Area Agreement (SAFTA) and the opening of rail and road links 
between both the countries. The establishment of relations along with SAFTA 
has brought changes in customs tariffs and reduced trade-related barriers, 
leading to restoration of direct trade linkages and reducing the treinsaction 
costs. The IPFP is a step symbolic of the recent positive developments between 
the two nations. The forum is aimed at playing a crucial role in strengthening 
and supporting initiatives by giving the Parliamentarians an opportunity to 
focus on issues such as improving trade, reinforcing cultural ties, and boosting 
regional cooperation. The IPFP serves as a charmel through which the 
Parliamentarians can further strengthen their resolve towards creating a 
conducive environment for a better tomorrow in the subcontinent, of which 
both the nations are an integral part. The IPFP's vision, is thus, envisaged at 
opening the doors of confidence in the Parliaments of the two countries, 
minimize differences at every level and enable India-Pakistan relations to reach 
greater heights. 
India and Pakistan put Composite Dialogue back on track 
In April 29, 2010, on the sidelines of SAARC leaders Summit in 
Bhutan, India and Pakistan have agreed to resiraie full-fledged dialogue which 
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has been disrupted since the Mumbai terror attacks in November 2008. India's 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Pakistan counterpart, Yusuf Raza 
Gilani, agreed on the need to normalize relations, dogged by more than six 
decades of hostility since both gained independence from Britain. They 
deputed their foreign ministers to meet a later date to discuss the resumption of 
a wide-ranging formal dialogue that began in 2004 but was suspended after the 
Mumbai attacks that killed 166 people. The two Prime Ministers agreed that 
relations between the two countries should be normalized and the channels of 
contacts should work effectively to enlarge the constituency of peace in both 
coimtries. The two leaders crafted a simple but elegant formula for breaking the 
current impasse, thereby ensuring that the process of engagement-stuck for 
several months-now has some chance of moving ahead. 
With the "composite" nature of the dialogue becoming a pohtical 
stumbling block, India and Pakistan wisely decided to transcend the confines of 
nomenclature and form. The process they engage in may eventually take the 
form of composite dialogue or, more likely, is an improvement over the same. 
But that will depend on two factors, both equally important: the results of the 
review the two sides conduct, and their ability to reduce the trust deficit. For 
India, the restoration of trust depends on very simple metrics. New Delhi's 
overarching priority is to get Islamabad to honour its commitment to prevent 
terrorists from using Pakistani territory to laimch attacks on India. Mr. Gilani 
reiterated this promise in Bhutan but Manmohan Singh government will need 
more than mere words in order to convince skeptics at home.^ ° 
The current thaw is based on the assiraiption that the absence of 
engagement is making it easier for the miUtary establishment in Pakistan to 
justify the continuation of its links with anti-Indian extremists. Prime Minister 
Singh's decision to agree to the resumption of dialogue is based on the 
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principle of trust but verify. If terrorist groups continue to speak and operate 
with impunity, chances are any substantive talks the two sides begin on issues 
like Kashmir or Siachen will flounder. After all, the oxygen of trust is needed 
to scale those daunting heights, which no leader has managed to ascend so far. 
As the two sides review the relationship, they will try and come up with a 
framework that can build on what the composite dialogue has accomplished so 
far while transcending its limitations. On the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir, 
the back channel has proved to be a more effective platform for serious 
negotiation than the front channel operated by the two foreign secretaries.-, 51 
It is India's long-term interest that democracy in Pakistan gets stabilized 
and empowered. This means, every effort must be made to work with Prime 
Minister Gilani and his government, while keeping lines of communication 
open with other political leaders. There have also been suggestions in several 
high-level Track-II meetings that a dialogue between the intelligence chiefs of 
both countries could serve a useful purpose. There are issues that need to be 
discussed and evaluated when the foreign secretaries and ministers take stock 
of where the relationship stands. 
Conclusion 
The Indo-Pak composite dialogue is a desirable approach but is prone to 
derailment if attempts are made to find instant solutions to old and complex 
problems. There is no alternative to an incremental peace process through 
political, economic and military confidence building measures. Dramatic 
gestures or a few summit meetings between top leaders caimot bring peace, 
which is only possible incrementally. India and Pakistan have a long way to go 
before they can resolve their major problems. 
The main achievements of the composite dialogue process have been in 
the area of CBMs designed to enhance India-Pakistan contacts and 
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connectivity. Many such CBMs were put in place even before the 
commencement by restoring snapped links and in upgrading them, enhancing 
people-to-people contacts and providing an institutional mechanism for the two 
sides to discuss their differences. It has also improved the international rating 
of the two countries. However, India's involvement in the dialogue process has 
not been fully reciprocated. One must note that Pakistan, instead of availing of 
the dialogue process to resolve its differences with India on, for instance, 
Baglihar, had opted for the appointment of a neutral expert. Above all, it needs 
recognition that the dialogue process has not succeeded in resolving any of the 
major issues in dispute like Pakistan's involvement in terrorist activities 
directed against India, Janraiu and Kashmir, Siachen, Tulbul, Sir Creek and 
grant of the Most Favored Nation status to India. 
Progress on these essential issues has been thwarted by the unreasonable 
position taken by Pakistan. On Jammu and Kashmir, it is content with 
maintaining the status quo, and would seek a change, only if it is contrary to 
Indian pohcies; on Siachen, while it has, at times, been agreeable to the pull 
back of forces on both sides, it has consistently been averse to any 
authentication of present positions on maps; and on the grant of MFN status to 
India, it refuses to even contemplate it, though India has accorded Pakistan this 
privilege. Above all, on terrorism, Pakistan refuses to provide any satisfaction 
to India and has remained imrestrained in promoting such activities. 
This approach by Pakistan is dictated in part by its determination not to 
allow any significant progress in any area, other than some CBMs and in 
people-to-people contacts, unless there is movement towards a resolution of the 
Kashmir issue, which changes the status quo to the detriment of India. Under 
these circumstances, the contention that the composite dialogue has lead to an 
improvement in relations between the two countries thus far would be tested by 
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its failure in addressing the major issues of contention between Pakistan and 
India. The key to a stable Asia lies in how India and Pakistan, with the baggage 
of bitter history and an arsenal of nuclear weapons, learn to live together, 
peacefully, as neighbours." 
The Composite Dialogue led to a ceasefire along the line of Control, 
encouraged possibilities of bilateral trade, Inspired greater people-to-people 
contact and helped create conditions conducive for mature negotiations. The 
Mumbai terrorist attack (26/11) pushed the peace process close to the brink of 
failure but was not completely scuttled, due to the tenacity and composure of 
the top leadership in both the countries. The peace process cannot be held 
hostage to acts of terrorism and India and Pakistan, need keep the 
communication channels open even during the worst of crises, and not let non-
State actors and their State sponsors derail or dictate foreign policy objectives 
of sovereign nations." In fact, dialogue is the only way forward to open 
channels of communications and restore trust and confidence. Alongside 
composite peace process, forward movement on trade, investment and energy 
sector cooperation would produce mutual gains that could enlarge the 
constituency for peace in both countries. None of this will work, however, if 
the leadership in India and Pakistan succumb to the temptation of playing to 
domestic galleries. Going by the record of the past few years, terrorist will 
attempt to destroy this latest attempt to restart the dialogue. Acting with 
maturity and restraint in the face of provocation will pay more dividends in the 
long run. 
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CONCLUSION 
On the basis of this discussion one can now attempt to draw a broad 
conclusion with suggestions about the factors responsible for shaping the 
nature of this relationship and the causes of friction and tension and 
possibilities of cordial peace ties in the foreseeable foture. 
The South Asian region is a civilizational entity. The countries and 
people of the region have a history of share. Most of the countries emerged 
with shared colonial past, similar political experience and common social 
values. There exist many bonds like ethnic, linguistic religions and social 
similarities, administrative, legal and military system which links the countries 
of the region. But despite these existing similarities and links amongst them, 
they have failed to evolve consensus on important issues like regional security, 
stability, mutual friendly relation, and unity, and than anything else, they have 
been involved in constant conflict with each other which have made the region 
one of the most conflict susceptible zones. Politics of the region since its 
decolonization have been dominated by differences and contradictions rather 
than cohesiveness, historical and political ethos. The region, like many other 
regions of the Third world, is economically underdeveloped. It is amongst the 
poorest, most densely populated, most illiterate parts of the world. The plight 
of the countries of the region is that they are economically very fragile, caught 
in a dept-trap and dependent on large scale foreign aid. The troubles of the 
zone of South Asia, its tensions, mutual suspicion, mistrust and occasional 
hostility have been one of the conspicuous features of the region. There exist a 
large number of conflicts of varying degrees and nature both at inter and intra-
state levels, which have many of their roots in colonial and post-colonial 
policies and strategies of superpowers. 
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Perpetual conflicts among the different states of South Asia in general 
and India-Pakistan conflict in particular, to a large extent served the interests of 
the superpowers to expand their sphere of influence and thus serving their 
national interest. It is an undeniable fact that India is far superior to Pakistan in 
ahnost every respect. Pakistan from very beginning, being conscious of its 
regional inferiority, has strived hard to counter-balance India's regional 
superiority by obtaining extra-regional support and intra-regional linkages 
explicitly designed to deal with India. India on the other hand has always 
sought to structure the region free from extra regional involvement in order to 
preserve and protect the pre-eminent position it enjoys in the region, 
India and Pakistan are the real actors of South Asian arena. Bom out 
from furnace of animosity, the twin brothers have a history of unique relations. 
There is much in common between Republic of India and Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan. The diplomatic relations developed soon after independence but these 
relations did not ensure a good enduring friendship. India-Pakistan relations 
have a historical root, gone through cycle of ups and down since their 
bifurcation on the basis of two nation theory. The blaming process started soon 
after the partition when during the world's biggest migration both India and 
Pakistan were imable to provide security to minorities. In the begimiing both 
India and Pakistan faced the problems of boundaries disputes, the problems of 
rehabilitation of refugees and the settlement of their properties, the treatment of 
minorities in both the countries, currency problems, the distribution of military 
stores and equipments of British India, and problems of Indus water disputes 
etc, but these problems were for time being. Later on, by and large, these 
problems were solved through talks, meetings and agreements like Nehru-
Liaquat Pact 1950 and Indus Water Treaty 1960 etc by both the countries. 
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However, the princely states Hyderabad and Kashmir created a big 
problem between the two coimtries. Both the states posed serious problems for 
the question of accession. The two states Hyderabad and Kashmir amounted to 
polar opposites of each other. Hyderabad had a Muslim ruler but a 
predominantly Hindu population. The conditions were reversed in Kashmir. 
The rulers were from minorities in both the states and both rulers hoped to 
become independent states after the departure of the British. These two factors 
led to difficulties in Indo-Pakistani relations because each side had a 
commitment to the states involved in the two states. Pakistan, because of its 
Islamic character, felt compelled to show its sohdarity with both the Nizam and 
the Muslims of Kashmir. Similarly India felt equally moved to identify with the 
Hindu of Hyderabad and the Maharaja of Kashmir. It felt to discredit the 
Nizam's claims to independence, because if this claims were given any 
credence, it could lead to the disintegration of the Indian Union, as the 
monarchs of the various princely states could all start asserting their demands 
for autonomy or independence. By the same token, Pakistan felt constrained to 
discredit Hri Singh's claims to independence for fear of appearing to forsake 
their Muslims in a territory for which they felt responsible. 
From the geographical and Muslim dominated point of view, Pakistan 
wanted that Kashmir should accede to Pakistan but this did not happen because 
India sent her troops to Kashmir on the invitation of Maharaja and Kashmir 
acceded to India. This step of India was vehemently criticized by Pakistan. On 
the other hand Pakistan's claim over Kashmir was criticized by India. 
Furthermore the carnage that accompanied partition embittered the protagonists 
on both sides to such a high degree that the possibilities of misunderstanding 
increased dramatically. Each side had reason to mistrust the other and any 
generosity of spirit perished. 
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This study leads one to evaluate that the India-Pakistan relations have 
been the victim of psychological malaise, behavioural disorder and both the 
countries have been suspecting about each other's motive since 1947. So, 
Pakistan's foreign policy has been India-oriented and India's foreign policy, 
Pakistan-oriented. Pakistan always feared that India would destroy its very 
existence either directly or through internal subversion in Pakistan. This kind of 
psyche was the resuU of historical, domestic various complexes and 
deficiencies, and external factors. 
Till 1965, both India and Pakistan had gained substantial combat 
experience, the Pakistanis in fighting the Indians and the Indian fighting both 
the Pakistanis and the Chinese. Additionally, the armed forces of both sides had 
acquired substantial amounts of military hardware, some of it very 
sophisticated. The arms buildup, coupled with Pakistan's membership in 
CENTO and SEATO, had drawn both super powers into the sub-continent. 
Finally the Chinese invasion of 1962 on India had led to major infusion of U.S 
arms into India and had strained US-Pakistan relations. But it was a short 
period relation. Pakistan took much interest to solve the Kashmir issue through 
U.N. because most of the permanent members of Security Council at that time 
were in favour of Pakistan. But the U.N. efforts and super power's attempts 
regarding Kashmir issue ended with no result. Super-powers exploited India 
and Pakistan as a tool to serve their global interests. 
In the past, many steps between the two countries were taken for 
improving relations. The Nehru-Liaquat Pet (1950) mitigated the rigorous 
tensions between India and Pakistan by agreeing a bill of right for the 
protection of minorities in both the coimtries. In the history of India-Pakistan 
relations the Indus-Water dispute is the only dispute where both the 
Governments have shown a positive spirit of cooperation. In the treaty both the 
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Governments recognized their common interest in the optimum development of 
the rivers and declare their intention to cooperate by mutual agreement to the 
possible extent. Another biggest achievement between India and Pakistan was 
that the Tashkent Agreement (1966), which signed between the two countries 
through the mediation of Soviet Union. The importance of Tashkent 
Agreement lay that it represented important concessions on both sides. Both the 
countries agreed to withdraw from the territory that they had seized in conflict. 
But in spite of all these achievement, Tashkent Declaration 1966 had achieved 
nothing new at all in terms of permanent settlement of India-Pakistan problems. 
It brought a temporary respite to India-Pakistan hostilities. India and Pakistan 
remained suspicious and unyielding towards each other, and the Kashmir 
dispute remained as unresolved as ever. 
The turbulent period 1970-71 marked a turning point in international 
politics in South Asia in general and India-Pakistan relations in particular. The 
war of 1971 disrupted the relations between India and Pakistan. In this war, 
Pakistan was more sufferers because it lost its Eastern Wing. The breakup of 
Pakistan and India's unquestioned mihtary might established India's 
superiority not only over Pakistan but in the whole South Asian region. 
Recognizing its inferiority in conventional war, Pakistan felt the menace for her 
security in the sub-continent. Therefore, Pakistan made a sense to develop 
some nuclear capability and the programme of nuclear armaments since 1971. 
But Pakistan took it a considerable impetus after the Indian nuclear explosion 
of 1974 at Pokhran. As Pakistan came apart, its claim on Kashmir also eroded 
in a major way. The inability of the West Pakistan to convince their brethren in 
the East to remain in the same polity, made it exceedingly difficult for the 
Pakistani leadership to lay a claim on Kashmir on the basis of its religious 
composition. Naturally, India took advantage of the discrepancy between fact 
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and reality. For India a harmless Bangladesh was desirable rather than hostile . 
Pakistan. 
With the signing of the Shimla Agreement, a new era in bilateral 
relations began. The greatest merit of the Shimla Agreement was that the two 
countries decided to renounce the use or threat of force against each other, to 
put an end to the era of conflict and confrontation, and commit themselves to 
standing cooperation and peaceful coexistence. Further, during the period of 
1977-79 the bilateral relations were improved India with her neighbours in 
general and Pakistan in particular. The Janata Government and its policy 
created a climate of confidence and goodwill between India and Pakistan. The 
leaders of both countries, through the exchange of visits, dispelled the 
apprehensions of the fundamentalist organizations in India and Pakistan. Many 
outstanding disputes were also resolved between the two countries and the 
areas of mutual cooperation in various fields were expanded. 
However, this hopes and spirit of cooperation received a jolt when the 
Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghan produced a 
crisis not simply for Afghan people but for the South Asian region as a whole. 
It confronted the main regional actors-Pakistan and India with a new political 
and strategic situation to which they reacted in distinctive ways. For India and 
Pakistan, the Soviet invasion seriously changed the regional balance of power, 
and put them in the unenviable situation of having to respond to this new 
development and cope with its consequences in their own ways. Their 
responses, however, came to be formulated not solely on the basis of the 
requirements and aspirations of the Afghan people but they took into account 
their own interests. Their responses differed from each other. Pakistan chose to 
pursue active opposition to the Soviet invasion, and India made no public 
condemnation of the Soviet invasion. The US became General Zia's staunchest 
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supporter since Pakistan was the channel for military aid to the Afghan 
Mujahidin, then engaging the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. General Zia was 
the first Pakistani leader truly committed to a programme of Islamization. In a 
dubious triftl, tho Lnhoro High Court oonvlotfed Bhuuo of oonipirwiy to commit 
murder, and he was hanged in Rawalpindi on April 4, 1979. Further, the 
Kashmir, Punjab and Siachen glacier issues have been major irritants in India-
Pakistan relations. Kashmir remains as a perpetual bone of contention since 
partition. Before 1971, Pakistan tried to take Kashmir through military efforts 
but after the defeat in Bangladesh war of 1971, realized that no miUtary action 
could separate Kashmir from India or could make Kashmir an independent 
state. Thus Pakistan changed her strategy to one of creating a climate of 
unlawfiil activities, insurrection by giving support to extremists and militants of 
Kashmir and Punjab. This attitude of Pakistan has created tension between the 
two countries. 
In spite of irritant atmosphere over India-Pakistan relations, myriad 
peace bridge had been brought between two countries. A major breakthrough 
was made by the agreement to establish a Joint Commission to promote 
bilateral cooperation in 1982. The Joint Commission is certainly step forward 
in promoting cooperation between the two countries for mutual benefit in 
economic, trade, industrial, education, cultural, consular, tourism, travel, 
scientific information, and technological fields. The commission also suggested 
for the exchange of academicians from each other country. Another important 
point is the division of conunission into four sub-commissions each dealt with 
specified fields. The formation of SAARC of which India and Pakistan are the 
two major partners and some other regional and international organizations 
held out some hope of not only multilateral cooperation but also bilateral 
improvement between India and Pakistan. The people of both countries require 
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initiatives to promote peace, friendship, development and security in the 
subcontinent. 
The Gujral Doctrine (1996-97) sought to improve relations with India's 
neighbours without strict reciprocity and on the principle of accommodation to 
smaller powers. With regard to Pakistan, it emphasized the role of confidence-
building measures, ongoing dialogue, the avoidance of holistic propaganda, and 
people-to-people contacts. The May 12, 1997 Sharif-Gujral meeting in 
Maldives, led to an understanding "to release civilian prisoners, estabUsh a 
hotline to facilitate communication, relax travel restrictions, and to instimte a 
series of working groups to address major issues, including Kashmir, for the 
foreign-secretary-level talks, scheduled for near time". That talks held at 
Murree, (Pakistan), resulted in a joint statement which detailed the two 
countries commitment to resolve outstanding issues in an integrated bilateral 
manner. 
The deep seated antagonism between India and Pakistan on several 
times culminated in the form of wars-1947-48, 1965, 1971. When fighting 
erupted again in 1999, the stakes were higher than ever, since both countries 
had tested nuclear weapons the year before. Although the nuclear issue began 
to gain prominence since 1970s, the nuclear tests of India-Pakistan in May 
1998 set the stage for an invigorated nuclear debate in the region. Tension 
mounted over the question of when and how India-Pakistan might escalate the 
minor-war, which put the world on alert since both had tested nuclear devices 
in May 1998 and subsequently declared themselves to be nuclear weapon 
states. This critical juncture is the primal source of this study. Tensions have 
flared again in the region, especially in 2001-2002. The 2001-02 border 
confrontation was witnessed by a massive Indian military mobilization 
following two major terrorist attacks. India and Pakistan were close to war on 
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at least two occasions, although no organized fighting took place. By then the 
world had entered the post-9/1 lera, and South Asia had acquired, in American 
eyes, a new significance. Willingly or unwillingly Pakistan administration had 
to ready to support US against terrorism. General Musharraf expressed that he 
would not longer let the soil of Pakistan be as an area of terrorism. However, 
eventually Pakistan became a frontline ally of US in its war on terror game 
against al-Qaeda. 
These crises have important global implications, the fu-st and most 
alarming being their nuclear dimension. The nuclear tests of 1998 and 
declaration of nuclear power by both states persuaded many outsiders that 
South Asia, especially Kashmir, had became a nuclear flashpoint. Second, the 
crises contradict several important theories of international politics, notably th@ 
notion that democracies and nuclear weapons states are reluctant to go to war 
against each other. Third, in view of Indian's and Pakistan's respective 
positions as a rising Asian power and a militarily powerful Islamic state- and 
hence their potential role in shaping the world order - their management of 
these crises could serve as one indicator of their future relationship with one 
another as well as with other states. And fourth, these crises yield some 
important doctrinal and strategic lessons, not only for the two south Asian 
states but also for other regions and potential pairs of nuclear-armed rivals. 
India and Pakistan, two nations united by history but divided by destiny, 
very close by geographically but far in thinking has travelled a long way in an 
attempt to bring peace between them. The Lahore Declaration signaled a major 
development in overcoming in the historically strained bilateral relations 
between India and Pakistan in the aftermath of the nuclear tests carried out by 
both nations in May 1998 that escalated cloud of tension in the region. The 
Lahore Summit was hailed world wide as a major breakthrough and milestone 
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in bilateral relations and a historic step towards ending conflict and tensions in 
the region. The objective was not only to boost and uplift the declining stature 
of bilateral relations: it was also a diplomatic innovation, primarily to brace 
people to people contact and to bring uniformity of mterest between citizens of 
the two coimtries. Though the peace process followed a tumultuous period-
Kargil conflict, a coup in Pakistan and a military build-up on the border 
following a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament, India and Pakistan relation 
went down all-time low in the chequered history of both the countries. 
These crises brought complex implications in Indo-Pakistan relations. 
But the situation improved in course of time. The global pressure and US 
presence in the region, political will, conflict fatigue, three assassination 
attempts on Musharraf and the groundswell of public support for peace in 
India, Pakistan and Kashmir were the reason behind the quest for peace. The 
Agra Summit organized in 2001 with the aim to resolve long-standing issues 
between India and Pakistan. Notwithstanding the Agra Summit could not 
wipeout whole core issues between India and Pakistan, it at least offered a 
chance to sit close and opened an avenue to fiiture peace talks. 
During the post 9/11 period, India and Pakistan have engaged with each 
other intensely and purposively. The engagement has created an atmosphere of 
trust and confidence in the bilateral relations. After complex tension gulf, India 
and Pakistan have been in peace talks to solve all outstanding issues including 
Kashmir since 2002. The relations between these two coimtries further 
ameliorated by the November 2003 Eid Ceasefire. The year 2003 became the 
watershed in the history of Indo-Pak peace process as it prepared grounds for 
the fiiture to initiate dialogues. The two sides stepped towards the process of 
normalizations through dialogues. The revival of the peace dialogue between 
India and Pakistan in 2003 was an outcome of wise and objective political 
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calculations of Pakistan and India. The coming years, leaders of India and 
Pakistan have made many efforts to ease the situation between the two 
countries, and the India and Pakistan foreign secretary-level talks were one of 
the dialogue mechanisms. The composite dialogue process, which started since 
2004, touched upon eight contentions issues that had been the areas of concern 
for both countries. They include peace and security including CBMs, Jammu 
and Kashmir, Siachen, Wullar Barrage project, Sir Creek, Terrorism and Drug 
Trafficking, Economic and Commercial Cooperation and Promotion of friendly 
Exchanges in various fields. 
The main achievements of the composite dialogue process have been in 
the area of CBMs designed to enhance India-Pakistan contacts and 
connectivity. Many such CBMs were put in place even before the 
commencement by restoring snapped links and in upgrading them, enhancing 
people-to-people contacts and providing an institutional mechanism for the two 
sides to discuss their differences. It has improved the international rating of the 
two countries. A look at the history of relations over six decades shows that 
India and Pakistan have in fact moved forward on CBMs even as state-to-state 
relations remained poor. Today the two countries are guardedly optimistic on 
the prospect of resolving their differences. Since 2004 witnessed substantial 
improvement in the contact between the two societies, including unprecedented 
visits of media persons to Jammu and Kashmir on both sides of the Line of 
Control. The ceasefire on Kashmir continues to be respected and people to 
people communication links have been thrown open ; the bus service from 
Srinagar to Muzaffarabad directly linked the two Kashmir's for the first time 
since 2005, rail links and even trade issues are being grappled with while 
substantive development in key issues have not taken place, the composite 
dialogue is moving at an incremental pace and Confidence Building Measures 
(CBMs) in over eight divergent areas have resulted in building positive opinion 
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and trust. In 2007, during the first meeting of the Indian-Pakistani Joint Anti-
Terror Mechanism, the two countries agreed to exchange information for 
prevention of violence and terrorist acts. By the first half of 2008, the 
composite talks had been held five times, producing much consensus on 
problems left over from the past, development of bilateral trade, people-to-
people exchanges, and some other fields. 
The Composite Dialogue led to a ceasefire along the Line of Control, 
encouraged possibilities of bilateral trade, inspired greater people-to-people 
contact and helped create conditions conductive for mature negotiations. The 
Mumbai attack (26/11) pushed the peace process close to the brink of failure 
but was not completely scuttled, due to the tenacity and composure of the top 
leadership in the both countries. Recently, India offered to resume bilateral 
talks with Pakistan at the foreign secretary level to discuss terrorism and other 
prominent issues. Pakistan welcomed the offer. The India-Pakistan foreign 
secretary-level talks were held at New Delhi in February 2010, including many 
agendas about bilateral issues. It is the first official meeting after the 2008 
Mumbai attacks in India. 
At a time when a new spirit of reconciliation has gripped India and 
Pakistan recently, the importance of keeping alive and widening people-to-
people track of engagement against all odds is vital. The two government's 
facilitation of the process suggests that they too recognize its value. The India-
Pakistan forum of parliamentarians (IPFP) has been formed to achieve this 
objective. In this regard, the forum, would seek to realize a comprehensive 
mechanism of mutual exchange and engagement, and will work towards 
sensitizing and creating favourable public opinion to ensure peaceful relations 
between the two South Asian neighbours. India and Pakistan have agreed to 
strengthen their trade links as a means to normalizing relations between the two 
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countries. Bilateral trade between Pakistan and India almost doubled to cross 
the one billion dollar mark this year. This was attributed to the launch of a 
SAFTA and the opening of rail and road links between both the countries. The 
establishment of relations along with SAFTA has brought changes in customs 
tariffs and reduced trade-related barriers, leading to restoration of direct trade 
linkages and reducing the transaction costs. The IPFP is a step symbolic of the 
recent positive developments between the two nations. The forum is aimed at 
playing a crucial role in strengthening and supporting initiatives by giving the 
Parliamentarians an opportunity to focus on issues such as improving trade, 
reinforcing cultural ties, and boosting regional cooperation. The IPFP serves as 
a channel through which the Parliamentarians can further strengthen their 
resolve towards creating a conducive environment for a better tomorrow in the 
subcontinent, of which both the nations are an integral part. The IPFP's vision, 
is thus, envisaged at opening the doors of confidence in the Parliaments of the 
two countries, minimize differences at every level and enable India-Pakistan 
relations to reach greater heights. 
In the foregoing study it has been tried to analyse an overall view of 
India-Pakistan relations and peace process so far, especially since 1998. Now, 
one can attempt to draw a brief conclusion with suggestions about the future 
prospects of the India-Pakistan relations and peace process. This study also 
tries to emphasis that, the peace process cannot be held hostage to acts of 
terrorism and India and Pakistan, needs to keep the communication channels 
open even during the worst of crises, and not let non-State actors and their 
State sponsors derail or dictate foreign policy objectives of sovereign nations. 
The Composite Dialogue process between India and Pakistan can be viewed in 
the broader prospective, rather than skewed down to partial preferences of the 
two sides: A new perspective, a new environment and a new logic are needed 
to inform the interlocutors. The ideologies of adversity and diplomacy of 
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stalemate will have to be abandoned in favour of understanding, flexibility and 
accommodation. We live in a ruthless world of unilateralist, globalization, 
militarization and terrorism, economic instability, and cannot survive, nor fmd a 
respectable place in this world of great imbalances, without first putting the 
South Asian house. There cannot be any good beginning for this effort without 
a friendly relationship between the twin-brothers of subcontinent. 
The India-Pakistan rivalry will not be terminated until the leaders of the 
two sides are able to move their relationship beyond the bounds of realpolitik. 
A critical first step towards stability in Indo-Pak relations would be for the 
leaders of the two sides to move away from nuclear saber-rattling to a public 
recognition of the obvious, that a general war, with its high probability of 
nuclear war, would be a shared catastrophe. Each side needs to commimicate to 
the other that it recognizes that in a nuclear war on the subcontinent there 
would be no relative gains, only absolute losses. As nuclear-armed neighbours, 
India and Pakistan realize that their continuing feuding over Kashmir has 
turned South Asia into risk place, not only for its inhabitants but also for 
accessing foreign investment. Resumption of the India-Pakistan dialogue, with 
its focus on nuclear risk reduction measures, seems to be the only way credible 
way of easing world concern over the safety and security of the two countries 
nuclear arsenals. This is needed to display the accountability of world powers 
to push India and Pakistan towards peace process, where the worry of teirorism 
is widespread. The concepts of escalation control and stable nuclear deterrence 
presume rational decisions by rational actors, even in the deepest crisis. There 
are, however, extremist groups in Pakistan and India that would view the 
advent of crisis as an opportunity rather than as a problem to be contained. The 
best chance of defusing nuclear danger and controlling escalation lies in 
sustained and substantive political engagement. 
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Today both the countries face the nuclear threat for their national 
interests and security from each other. In bringing a consensus between India 
and Pakistan, there is need for some reorientation of policies to take into 
account in these changed circumstances of South Asia. At present it is difficuh 
to visualize any meaningfiil process which could lead to a reversal and 
denuclearization. So, early consultations to work for strategic stability in the 
post-nuclearisation state are necessary. In the ultimate analysis, pvoUforation 
dangers do not emanate from the mere existence or possession of nuclear 
weapons, but essentially from the belief in their use and usability which would 
influence intentions. It would be unrealistic to expect a dramatic change in 
political context of India-Pakistan relations, or to ignore the post-proliferation 
state of the nuclear environment around India. Thus, it is necessary to rapidly 
move towards stabilizing the situation in a maimer that lowers the risk factors 
and reduces the menace of nuclear weapons. Both coimtries share certain 
common concerns. On the foundations of these it can be built an edifice of 
security which will in the long run bring peace and prosperity not only to India 
and Pakistan but the entire South Asia. In the process, it will strengthen the 
global security system which is gradually acquiring discernible contours. So, 
both the countries may choose the following steps for the improvements of 
relations: (a) The avoidance of war circumstances (b) Prevention of nuclear and 
chemical weapons proliferation (c) Reduction in defence budget of the states 
(d) Combating drug trafficking, Terrorism and weapons culture (e) Curbing 
communalism and other immoral activities (f) Non-interference of other's 
domestic matters (g) Non-provocative defence between slates (h) 
Denuclearization measures for better future etc. 
Until India and Pakistan succeed in discovering solid mechanisms that 
could be instrumental in halting any probable nuclear conflict and if the 
paranoiac urge for nuclear might persists in the same frenetic pace, the region 
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will be bogged down under a constant threat of a lethal war that would result in 
the emergence of neither victor nor vanquished, but only promises mutually 
assured destruction of both the countries. This uncertainty has also kept the 
entire sub-continent marginalized from the mainstream of socio-econonaic 
development. A viable solution lies in building concrete trust between the two 
countries, but this is premised upon the amicable solution of the Kashmir 
dispute. As there exist an inevitable interface between the exasperated nature of 
the Kashmir conflict and the nuclear aspirations of India and Pakistan, however 
demure this inter-connection may be. Hence it can be underlined that the 
secvirity, stability and prosperity of entire region and its liberation from this 
nuclear consternation, largely depends upon the unraveling of the Kashmir 
entanglement. 
The South Asian subcontinent has not been a stable and peaceful region, 
despite the common cultural and geopolitical heritage of the India and Pakistan. 
It will be in the interest of both India and Pakistan and outside powers like the 
US to follow a policy oi least provocation and try and build mutual trust. This 
trend has to be consolidated in the interest of regional and global peace. Any 
solutions to the Kashmir dispute require to be based on the existing territorial 
and ground realities. An unstable India or unstable Pakistan could be mutually 
damaging to both. India and Pakistan both need to aware of the fact that war 
cannot decide the fate of Kashmir. By its covert operations Pakistan cannot 
force a settlement. Pakistan cannot wrench Kashmir from India by coercion. 
And India caimot win by repression. They ought to seek political solution. 
However, little progress can be made unless there is an effort to overcome the 
negative mindsets and mutual misperceptions of one another. The myths in 
India-Pakistan relations have to be debunked and a climate of mutual trust 
would be the ideal starting point to approach the issue. There is need for greater 
pragmatism on either side. Bilateralism offers the best way to resolve the Indo-
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Pak differences over Kashmir. It need be clearly understood by India and 
Pakistan policy makers that to establish reliable, credible and durable relations 
both countries have to leave all real or imaginary apprehensions, fears, 
suspicions and mistrust. Irritants have to be removed through diplomacy, 
cooperation, negotiation changed positive mindsets and attitude of give and 
take. India has some responsibility to carry burden of relations because of its 
power and influence. It is only then and then alone that a lasting, enduring, 
peaceful and strategic relations beneficial for both can be ensured. Hence, a 
long term objective of conciliation and mutual strategic friendship should not be 
lost sight of which is essential for peaceful co-existence. 
The growth of meaningful security cooperation in South Asia turns 
largely upon a substantial change for the better in India-Pakistan relations. 
Without a transformation in India-Pakistan relations, there is very limited scope 
for the emergence of the regional security cooperation, let alone the 
establishment of a regional security community. The prerequisite for this is a 
sharp turn in policy by both coimtries, i.e., for a shift from what has been 
hitherto a zero sum game, in which one's loss is seen as the other's gain, to a 
positive sum game, in which both gain. All in all, an analysis of the events and 
happenings of the period under review shows that the prospects of a modus 
Vivendi in the sub-continent are bleak indeed. The Indo-Pak cold war is 
continuing with increasing ferocity. There can be no hope of normalization of 
relations or resumption of normal cooperation without the resolution of the 
outstanding bilateral disputes and eventual political-strategic consensus. 
Keeping in view the failure of traditional avenues of dialogue, Track-II 
diplomacy may be suggested as a conflict resolution model to resolve Indo-Pak 
differences. Several rounds of official and formal negotiations have not brought 
about a qualitative improvement in India-Pakistan relations, probably because 
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in the area of conflict resolution our reliance has been largely on traditional 
instruments of statecraft and conventional diplomacy. The excessive reliance 
on official diplomacy has not been possible to break the logjam in several 
conflicts, and on the contrary it has proved to be a non-starter. It may be, 
however, understood that Track-II Diplomacy is in no way a substitute for 
official, formal "Track-I" government to government or leader to leader 
relationship. Rather Track-II activity is designed to assist official leaders by 
compensating for the constraints imposed upon them by the matrix of their 
domestic politics. 
Track-n Diplomacy becomes extremely important in the resolution of 
India-Pakistan conflict, which still brews in the cauldron of official diplomacy 
for the past several years. As a result, India-Pakistan relations have taken a 
roller-coaster ride and are characterised by mutual suspicion, closing of 
consulates, expelhng and even beating of diplomats, false propaganda etc from 
the other side. Besides this, a majority of people on both sides of the border 
remain captive to the historically circulated stereotypes of animosities, 
misinformation and distrust. Given the ethno-religious overlap in the two 
societies, the domestic disaffection easily feeds on the mutual hostility 
perceptions of the two states. The 'hidden hand theory' also plays an 
important role in worsening the situation. India-Pakistan conflict offers a 
typical instance of an artificially created people to people conflict in addition to 
state conflict. So there is a crying need for now-state actors to throw in their lot 
to transform their own relationship and go beyond state-centric paradigm. To 
further strengthen the peace process the principles of flexibility and reciprocity 
needs to be given utmost importance. 
India can pursue an active policy of creating and expanding a 
constituency for peace in Pakistan, which, in the longer run, could probably 
{ 150 } 
vindo the stranglehold of those states as well as non-state entities which are 
pushing the country towards a failed State syndrome. India can pursue the 
following policy options towards achieving such long-term objectives: 
• One of the effective means to neutralize the miUtary-militant nexus is to 
encourage democratic institutions and forces in Pakistan. This can be 
achieved by much more robust and extensive interactions at the 
government and public level with institutions like judiciary, election 
commission, legislature, imiversities, research organization, industry 
associations and media. Social interactions between the people should 
be encouraged by relaxed visa norms, university and educational 
institutional admissions, easier access to medical facilities, cultural 
exchange programmes and intense tourism promotion. 
• India need engage with the young leadership in politics, business, media, 
academia and social sector with greater focus. Exchange visits between 
the young communities on both sides of the borders should be frequent 
and widely publicized. This will help expand the commxmity of 
stakeholders in peace and stability in the region. 
• India also needs vigorously pursue the objective of dismantling terrorist 
infrastructure in Pakistan. All future official-level talks require rest on 
the precondition of Pakistan keeping its January 2004 commitment of 
not allowing its soil to be used by terrorist groups targeting India. 
• India requisite project peace as a viable option before the people of 
Pakistan, and the international community. The rhetoric of war must be 
kept low and preferably abjured. India must initiate measures to keep the 
status quo on its western borders and state unequivocally that it was not 
in favour of an armed conflict with Pakistan. 
• India may persuade the international community, especially the United 
States, to direct aid and other assistance to civilian institutions in 
Pakistan rather than the military. 
• It is clear that issues like Kashmir and Siachen defy an easy and early 
solution. Such complex issues have to be dealt with on a longer term and 
hence need distinct redressed systems than the present structure of the 
Composite Dialogue. These issues therefore should be divested from the 
prttam prooe«« and given » nepwftto delivery meolwnlim In the tOrm of 
a Joint Commission institutionalized by both the Parliaments with a 
longer but firm deadline of submitting its findings and 
recommendations. Such a step would free the recent process from the 
overhanging threat of discontinuity. 
• The Composite Dialogue must therolbre include a tbr more dlvono 
economic, political and social agenda, thus freeing the process from the 
political-bureaucratic hierarchies and giving it a popular momentxmi. 
This would mean, as argued by many scholars, a more generous 
commitment on trade and commerce, social and cultural interactions, 
cooperation in education and health matters, and an exchange of ideas in 
governance issues.' 
Such a modification of the Composite Dialogue fi-amework would be a 
natural progression, built on the lesions learnt from the past some years, and 
would infuse it with a greater popular involvement and therefore a better 
chance of survival in times of dramatic political changes in Asia. Only then can 
both the coimtries find a way out of the vortex of violence which has severely 
undermined peace and stability in the region. 
The little bridges between peoples of India and Pakistan are the 'actual 
key' to peace in subcontinent. And for this reason, peace-making cannot be left 
to rulers. It is the people on both sides that have to take charge of it. What the 
people have now is a unique and contradictory chemistry of love and hate, 
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ciiriosity and suspicion, friendliness and antagonism, admiration and envy, no 
to speak of nostalgia and convenient memory lapses. Forget about which of 
there is natural and which deliberately created. What is required for a stable 
relationship is a rational middle ground between tliese emotional extremes. The 
political class on both sides has specialized in hyping the emotional in India 
and Pakistan relations over the rational, fmding it a useful instrument for 
domestic political gain. Blame communally driven politics on the Indian side, 
and in Pakistan, the tight grip of a military that needs to perpetuate its 
predominance in national affairs.^  
Most of the celebrated India-Pakistan people-to-people contact since 
2004, including the interaction between the media, education, science, culture, 
sports, film and fashion worlds of the two countries, has tended to be driven by 
the governments on both sides, or blurred, encouraged or sponsored by the two 
states in some way. With rare exceptions, such contact has mirrored the official 
point of view, providing no room for building genuine bridges. No wonder they 
fell apart so easily in the aftermath of the 2008 Mumbai attacks to a point 
where goodwill seems almost irretrievable. But even now, the first thing that 
Pakistanis and Indians ask each other is: "We eat the same food, speak the 
same language, and even look the same, so why can't we be friends?" The 
short answer to that is that, we cannot be fiiends as long as we continue looking 
at each other through the narrow prism of our respective states. Pakistanis must 
locate the Indian within themselves, and Indians must discover their inner 
Pakistani. It would help understand each other better, and firee us from state-
manipulated attitudes. In our own interests, it is up to us, the people, to find 
ways to do this. 
In a nutshell, without a proper understanding between the twins brother 
of South Asia, the future cordial relation would be an elusive mirage. Hence, 
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now, India and Pakistan need to break whole the mental barrier and begin to 
greater trust one another. The following suggestions may take as a way to 
forward bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan. 
• Peace between and stabiUty in India-Pakistan relations is essential for 
the well being of South Asia, After nearly 63 years of hostility between 
India and Pakistan, it is critical that all stakeholders work for sustainable 
peace between the two countries. Civil societies in India and Pakistan, 
by and large, support the goal of peace and reconciliation; peace 
constituencies in both countries must, therefore, be further strengthened 
by providing them greater space and support. It is essential that the trust 
deficit and the burden of history not be allowed to impact on the task of 
moving relations forward. 
• Trust can be best built through multiple uninterruptible dialogues, 
positive incremental steps, confidence and trust-building measures, and 
most critically through acts of statesmanship by the leaders of the two 
countries. 
• A grand reconciliation can only be ensured, in the long-term, through 
engagement at every level: civil society meetings, official dialogues, 
engagement of political leaders, cooperation between business and 
corporate leaders, visits of artists, sportsmen, media, talks between the 
armed forces, Track-II engagements etc. 
• Temporary setback in inter-govemmental relations may not be allowed 
to impinge on people-to-people cooperation. Attempts should be made 
to create a visa-free regime for important stakeholders: including 
academics, journalists, businessmen, students, artists and former senior 
officials. 
• Progress made in previous rounds of talks should be carried forward in 
the official dialogue. Because dialogue is the only way forward to open 
channels of communications and restore trust and confidence. 
• Terrorism is of deep concern to India and Pakistan. The memory of the 
Mumbai attacks is still alive and continues to inform public opinion in 
India. Today, terrorism and extremism pose an existential threat to 
Pakistan. Indian concerns about terrorism and the terrorist threats to 
India are as much of a serious concern for Pakistan. Terrorism and 
extremism need to be comprehensively and permanently defeated. 
• India and Pakistan may seriously consider initiating an institutionalized, 
regular but discreet dialogue between the intelligence chiefs (the heads 
of R&AW, IB and ISI and IB Pakistan) of both countries. 
• The back channel on Jammu and Kashmir must be resumed at an early 
date keeping in view the fact that all stake-holders, particularly the 
people of J&K, will have to be consulted at some stage. If Jammu and 
Kashmir is considered as a piece of real estate there is little hope of a 
way ahead. Therefore, the welfare of the people of Jammu and Kashmir 
should be considered to be of paramount concern. In this context, all 
agreed CBMs has to be more robustly implemented. 
• The media are playing a critical role in shaping popular perceptions. 
They have thus a great responsibility to help strengthen the constituency 
for peace. A continuing dialogue between journalists, editors and 
proprietors of media houses is needed. 
• A sustained dialogue on ensuring strategic stability in South Asia must 
be an essential part of the bilateral dialogue. There is also need for 
discussion amongst experts on critical doctrinal issues and the need to 
work towards creating a nuclear safety. Assistance and Collaboration 
Regime in the region within the framework of minimum deterrence. In 
this context, a trilateral nuclear dialogue which includes China must also 
be pursued. 
• The problem of water is becoming a matter of great concern and there is 
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a need to address misperceptions in this regard. The Indus water Treaty 
has withstood the test of time and has a well established dispute-
settlement mechanism. Any concern about hydro-resources of the Indus 
river system should be taken up through the permanent Indus water 
commission. Within the framework of the treaty, the two countries must 
also share best practices on water management with each other. 
Environment and other experts with domain knowledge, from both 
countries, must be encouraged to provide concrete recommendations for 
better and optimal management of hydro resources given the huge 
challenge that the scarcity of water will pose for the region in the fiiture. 
• A stable, prosperous, sovereign and independent Afghanistan is in the 
interest of India and Pakistan and both countries must work for this goal 
and hold talks to allay each other's apprehensions. 
• Track-II dialogues are designed to move beyond officially stated 
positions, find a way forward, and can provide alternative approaches to 
the governments of Pakistan and India as well as other important stake 
holders. It is vital that Track-II dialogues be encouraged by both New 
Delhi and Islamabad. 
• Alongside the peace process, forward movement on trade, investment 
and energy sector cooperation would produce mutual gains that could 
enlarge the constituency for peace in both countries. •* None of this will 
work, however, if the leadership in India and Pakistan succumb to the 
temptation of playing to domestic galleries. Going by the record of the 
past few years, terrorist will attempt to destroy this latest attempt to 
restart the dialogue. Acting with maturity and restraint in the face of 
provocation will pay more dividends in the long run. 
Recent ongoing normalization of India-Pakistan relations is a harbinger 
of peace and stability in South Asia. In July 2009 after meeting at Sharm-el-
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Sheikh both Prime Ministers-Manmohan Singh and Yusuf Raza Gilani 
positively agreed to precede talks and negotiations. Both the countries have 
shown diplomatic maturity in case of sentencing death of Mohanunad Ajmal 
Amir Kasab in Mumbai Special Court and capturing the staff member of Indian 
High Commission Madhuri Gupta in Islamabad spying for Pakistan. ^ Such 
examples have been rare between India and Pakistan. Recently they have 
resolved water problem. Indus Water Treaty is reoriented to be faithfully 
followed by both. In recent SAARC Summit at Thimphu in April 2010 both 
Prime Ministers decided to keep on dialogues with trust and confidence. 
Regular dialogues and communications always pay and pave the way to 
proceed and coexist peacefully and friendly. 
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APPENDIX 
Relevant India-Pakistan Diplomacy and Dialogue. 1947-2010 
April 1950: Nehru-Liaquat Pact 1950 
September 1960: Indus-Water Treaty 
January 1966: Tashkent Pact 
July 1972: Shimla Agreement 
1982: the joint commission 
November 1986: Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Mohammad khan Junejo 
met in banglore at the SAARC Summit. 
February 1987: General Zia ul-Haque met Rajiv Gandhi in New Delhi. 
("Cricket Diplomacy-1") 
November 1987: Rajiv Gandhi and Junejo Met in Kathmandu at the SAARC 
summit. 
August 1988: President R. Venkataraman and Ghulam Ishaq Khan met at 
General Zia's flineral. 
December 1988: PMs Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi met at the SAARC 
Summit in Islamabad. 
July 1989: Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi met in Islamabad. 
Post-1990: Confidence Building is Highlighted 
November 1990: Prime Ministers Chandra Shekhar and Naw^ az Sharif Met at 
SARRC summit in Male. 
December 1990: India and Pakistan agreed to reestablish the Directors General 
of Military Operation. 
April 1990: Agreement on Advance Notice of Military Exercises, Maneuvers 
and Troop Movements; Agreement on the Prevention of the Violation of 
Airspace. 
May 1991: Chandra Shekhar and Nawaz Sheriff met at Rajiv Gandhi's funeral. 
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October 1991: Prime ministers Nawaz Sharif and P. V. Narasimha Rao met at 
the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Harare. 
December 1991: Nawaz Sharif and Narasimha Rao met at the SAARC Summit in 
Colombo. 
February 1992: Nawaz Sharif and Narasimha Rao met in Davos at the World 
Economic Forum meeting, 
April 1992: Nawaz sharif and Narasimha Rao met in Dhaka at the SAARC 
summit. 
August 1992: Joint Declaration on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. 
September 1992: Nawaz Sharif and Narasimha Rao met in Jakarta at the NAM 
summit. 
Composite Dialogue Emerges 
January 1994: Non-papers exchanged between the two countries. 
May 1995: Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and President Farooq Ahmed 
Leghari met briefly at the SAARC summit in Delhi. 
May 1997: high-level talks resumed; Prime Ministers I.K. Gujral and Nawaz 
Sharif met at the SAARC simmiit in male. 
June 1997: Foreign Secretaries identified eight "outstanding issues" on which 
the joint working groups would focus. 
September 1997: Talks braked down after Pakistan insists that Kashmir be the 
core issue; Prime Ministers I.K. Gujral and Nawaz Sharif met in New York at 
the UN General Assembly meeting. 
October 1997: I. K. Gujral and Nawaz Sheriff met in Edinburgh at the 
CHOGM. 
January 1998: I. K Gujral and Nawaz Sharif met in Dhaka for a trilateral 
Business Summit. 
July 1998: Prime Ministers Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif met in 
Colombo at the SAARC summit. 
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September 1998: Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif met in New York at 
the UNGA meeting. 
February 1999: Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Nawaz Sharif met in Lahore; 
Lahore Declaration and Memorandum of Understanding signed. 
Post-Kargil period 
November 2000: Vajpayee declared a Ramadan cease-fire. 
July 2001: Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf met in Agra 
for a Summit. 
After the 2001 Confrontation 
April 2003: Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee extends a "Hand of 
Friendship" to Pakistan in Srinagar. 
May 2003: India and Pakistan restored full diplomatic relations and announced 
the resumption of the Lahore Bus Services. 
October 2003: India proposed twelve CBMs. 
November 2003: Prime minister Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali announced a 
cease- fare. 
December 2003: The two countries agreed to resume direct air links. 
January 2004: Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Musharraf in Islamabad at the 
SAARC summit; the joint press statement indicated that the composite 
dialogue would resume; rail services resumed between the two countries. 
February 2004: foreign secretaries reach understanding on modalities of 
resuming the composite dialogue. 
March 2004: The Indian cricket team tours Pakistan for a full set of matches 
for the first time since 1989 ("Cricket Diplomacy-II") 
June 2004: Foreign Ministers Kurshid Kasuri and Natwar Singh met in China; 
experts met in Delhi to discuss nuclear CBMs; foreign secretaries met to 
discuss "peace and security" and "Jammu and Kashmir". 
July 2004: Kasuri and Singh met twice; scheduled of meetings drawn up to 
discuss the six other elements of the composite dialogue. 
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September 2004: Following the discussion on these other elements, the 
foreign secretaries met in Delhi to assess and review the composite dialogue; 
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President Musharraf met in New York at 
the UNGA summit and released a joint statement. 
October 2004: Musharraf announced his three-pomt based on which to solve 
the Kashmir dispute. 
November 2004: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Shaukat Aziz met in 
Delhi at the SAARC summit; India released its nine-point strategy for Kashmir. 
December 2004: Bilateral meetings held to discuss various elements of the 
composite dialogue; foreign secretaries reviewed progress at the 
commencement of the second round of dialogue. 
February 2005: foreign ministers Natwar Singh and Kurshid Kasuri met in 
Islamabad. 
March 2005: Pakistani cricket team traveled to India for a full tour after a gap 
of six years. 
April 2005: Srinagar - Muzaffarabad Bus services Began; Musharraf traveled 
to Delhi for a cricket match and met Manmohan Singh. 
October 2005: In the aftermath of the earthquake, India provides (and Pakistan 
reluctantiy and hesitantiy accepted) relief aid, and the Line of controls opened 
at five points. 
2005-2007: Prime ministerial, foreign minister, and foreign secretary talks 
continue on the composite dialogue; additional meetings by home and defense 
secretaries; other negotiations and meetings at several levels. 
Post-Mumbai Terrorist Attack Developments 
June 2009: P. M. Manmohan Singh and Pakistan president Asif Ali Zardari 
met on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in 
Russia. 
February 2010: India offers new talks with Pakistan. The talks held at top 
diplomatic level of the two countries. 
April 2010: P. M. Manmohan Singh and Pakistan P. M. Yusuf Raza Gilani met 
on the sidelines of SAARC Summit in Bhutan and India and Pakistan decided 
to put Composite Dialogue back on Track. 
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